Carrington on Rhodesia

Bristling at his highhanded tactics, Guerrilla Co-Leaders Mugabe and Nkomo sometimes accused him of "thinking he is Moses." As chairman of the 15-week London conference that produced the historic settlement, in fact, British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington did not hesitate to impose himself. Operating with a formidable combination of hard-nosed brinkmanship and shrewd insight, he repeatedly extracted concessions with what appeared to be daredevil ultimatums.

His now-or-never threats were based on an accurate initial perception: the time had come when all the parties involved--the Salisbury regime, the guerrillas and the so-called frontline African states--desperately wanted a settlement. As the patrician, 60-year-old Foreign Secretary explained to TIME'S Frank Melville in an exclusive interview in his ornate Victorian office, that same premise lies behind his current hopes for a durable peace. Excerpts from the interview:

Q. Will the cease-fire hold?

A. It depends entirely upon whether both sides want it to hold. We would be grossly overoptimistic if we thought there were not going to be cease-fire incidents and incidents of electoral intimidation. But I still think it is possible to get a successful cease-fire and an election that is fair and free. I also think that neither side is absolutely certain it can win the war. Consequently, both sides have come to the conclusion that a negotiated settlement is the way out.

Q. What happens if Lord Soames is confronted with serious violations?

A. The monitoring force is not there to fight, only to observe the ceasefire. If the cease-fire breaks down in a bad way, which I don't visualize happening, then the Governor would have to use the forces that he has at his disposal and are loyal to him--forces he can rely on from all the parties concerned [that is, whatever units of the Rhodesian security forces or the Patriotic Front he can count on in any given situation].

Q. Are you ready to use British troops to restore the ceasefire?

A. No British soldier is going to fire a weapon--except in self-defense. We are not prepared to risk Rhodesia becoming Britain's Viet Nam.

Q. Isn't the loser in the elections likely to reject the outcome and resume the war?

A. I don't think so. There might be a short period in which something might happen. But I have reasons for saying that the frontline states would not support the continuation of a war--based in their countries and supplied from their countries--after an election that is generally felt to have been free and fair. Nor, I am confident, would the South Africans. I feel much more optimistic about [the postelection period] than about the immediate ceasefire.

Q. What about the eventual integration of the two forces after independence?

A. What one hopes will happen is this: on the cease-fire commission there will be representatives of the Patriotic Front and the Salisbury [security force] people talking to each other all the time. There should grow up from there an understanding of each other. After all, they are of the same nationality, and there is no reason why they shouldn't make a start. It may just be possible in some degree to start planning for an integration --during the election period--at the commanders' level.

Q. Are the South Africans pulling out from Rhodesia now that there's a settlement?

A. Yes, they are. The South African government knows perfectly well that we are insistent on a withdrawal of all outside forces. There are, in fact, six or seven other countries with forces operating covertly in Rhodesia. [Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, SWAPO guerrillas from Namibia and a few Cubans.] They've all got to leave--every last one of them.

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