Props for a Tottering Domino

But Zia 's government is less than enthusiastic about U.S. aid

Relations between the two nations could hardly have been worse. A mob of fanatical Muslims had attacked the U.S. embassy in Islamabad last November; by the time the siege was lifted, seven hours later, two Americans were dead. The U.S., meanwhile, had consistently obstructed Pakistani efforts to build a uranium-enrichment plant--which would give the country a nuclear weapons capability --had cut off economic and military aid, and had criticized the execution last April of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Such actions, complained the government-owned Pakistan Times, "amounted almost to interference in our internal affairs." Said a State Department official of the embassy attack: "That left a scar that hasn't really healed."

Yet last week, as the Soviet invasion of neighboring Afghanistan swelled the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan to 400,000 or more, the Carter Administration was suddenly searching for ways to prop up this tottering domino of Southwest Asia. Nobody in Washington predicted that Pakistan faced the immediate threat of an all-out invasion, although the possibility that Soviet troops might cross the border in hot pursuit of the Afghan rebels could not be ruled out. Some Washington contingency planners feared that the Soviets might use their new base in Afghanistan to encourage unrest among the Pushtun and Baluch peoples who populate the border areas and are openly hostile to the Pakistan government. A major fear was that the Soviets might sponsor a revolt by the Baluch, whose traditional homeland stretches along the Arabian Sea into eastern Iran. Such a breakaway by Baluchistan would give Moscow access to ports leading into the Indian Ocean, threaten the Persian Gulf oil supply routes, and probably lead to the end of Pakistan as a viable state.

Washington's worries are shared by the Pakistan government, which nonetheless prepared to accept the offers of American help with something less than full enthusiasm. A grim editorial in the Pakistan Times charged the U.S. with having adopted a "hostile tone" toward Islamabad and being blind to "the danger posed to Pakistan" by the original Marxist coup in Afghanistan in 1978. It was, said the editorial, "amazing that the event was lost on Washington and London." But in a certain teeth-gritting spirit, the editorial concluded: "Pakistan must accept the offer of military aid from the United States."

Relations between the two countries, which were good during the Nixon Administration, have deteriorated in recent years, and turned notably sour after General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq took power in a 1977 military coup. Washington was annoyed by the general's refusal to abide by his promise to hold elections and restore civilian rule, and was alarmed as well by Pakistan's plan to build a uranium-enrichment plant, reportedly financed in part by Libya.

In trying to dissuade Pakistan from creating an "Islamic bomb," Washington has used both carrot and stick, with equal lack of success. Last spring the Carter Administration offered 50 F-5E fighters and help in developing a nonmilitary nuclear program. Less than a month later, after Pakistan refused to renounce its nuclear-development program, the U.S. withdrew its military and economic aid (about $85 million).

A massive infusion of aid to the Zia regime would be a worry for India, Pakistan's traditional foe. But Indian diplomats have privately told the Carter Administration that New Delhi understands the immediate need to bolster Zia militarily and indicated that the new Indira Gandhi government would not object, provided the equipment Zia receives is not overly sophisticated. India's reasoning: if Pakistan was truly threatened with attack, it could not defend itself without American military intervention. Therefore, the Indians say, the only use Pakistan would have for highly sophisticated weapons would be against India.

One fear in Washington is that Zia might use his new weaponry to keep himself in power. His coup against Bhutto initially had widespread popular support. The first truly devout Muslim leader in Pakistan's history, Zia inspired an Islamic revival among the country's 73 million Muslims (96% of the population). He restored stability after a period of political chaos. But despite his original promises, he will not release the reins of power; he continues -- like Bhutto -- to put his political opponents in jail, and the economy has continued its downward slide. Bhutto's followers have not forgiven Zia for having their leader martyred.

Some diplomatic experts believe that the Zia government has no public support. In the words of one Washington analyst: "The U.S. is about to rush great aid to a government that represents nothing." Another observer in Washington offers the chilling suggestion that the situation the U.S. now faces in Iran could arise in Pakistan. Says he: "We end up again giving guns to a tyrannical regime that will use them against its own citizens. And if Zia falls, then we'll be in a worse position than we started with."

Zia, meanwhile, has strongly endorsed the revolutionary regime in Iran, and cooperation with Ayatullah Khomeini's archenemy -- Washington -- will not be a popular move among many Pakistani Muslims. Thus the Zia government, says a high-ranking U.S. official, has been debating "how closely it can embrace us." To make things easier, the White House has been able to put together a "consortium" of aid-giving nations, so Zia will not be put in the position of accepting handouts direct from the U.S.

Will some of the aid find its way to the Afghan rebels? The Soviets certainly think so. Last week an article in Pravda charged that the rebels were being trained by American, Chinese and Pakistani officers and that money and weapons were flowing in "an endless stream from the United States, China and a number of other Western countries." Warned Pravda: "Participation in such adventures is by no means in accord with the interest of the Pakistani people or the principles of good-neighborly relations."

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