Selling the Carter Doctrine

A show of support for Pakistan and Saudi Arabia

Possibly inspired by the mountains that towered behind him, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski was in an elevated mood when he inspected Pakistan's border with Afghanistan last week. "You should know that the entire world is outraged," he told a group of refugees at Sadda, urging them in effect to reclaim their land "because God is on your side." After lunching in the mess of the famed Khyber Rifles, Brzezinski was garlanded by area tribal chiefs and had his picture taken at the Khyber Pass, quipping that it would be "a historic picture--three weeks before the march on Kabul." He spotted a Pakistani soldier carrying a Chinese-made rifle and asked to see it fired. The heavy recoil knocked the embarrassed rifleman to the ground as the weapon sprayed bullets in all directions. "Any casualties?" asked Brzezinski only half in jest. Luckily, there were none.

Brzezinski and his traveling mate, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, were in the midst of a week-long trip to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Their mission: explaining the new Carter Doctrine of throwing an American security blanket over Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf to the two states in the region most vital to the West. Their first stop was Islamabad, where a week earlier Foreign Ministers of 35 Islamic states had issued a ringing condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

In the Pakistani capital, the U.S. team talked with Military Strongman Mohammed Zia ul-Haq about how to protect Pakistan from the Soviet threat along its 1,400-mile border with Afghanistan. Brzezinski and Christopher reassured Zia that the U.S. intended to come to Pakistan's aid in the event of a Soviet invasion. Though they failed to agree on an aid package, the Pakistani general seemed very interested in a pledge of defense. At the outset, Zia asked for a treaty with the U.S. that would protect Pakistan from all of its neighbors. Such a pact could conceivably oblige the U.S. to defend Pakistan in some future conflict with India. Brzezinski demurred and persuaded Zia that a 1959 Executive agreement that grew out of the Eisenhower Doctrine to defend the Middle East against Communist aggression was strong enough.

Brzezinski, who played chess and kibitzed with reporters during the 19-hour flight to Islamabad, argued that Pakistan will be expected to defend itself against border skirmishes and limited incursions; the U.S. would intervene only if the country's security was threatened. Calling the talks "encouraging, fruitful and educational," Zia said that the American show of support "has brought new life to the 1959 agreement." Brzezinski and Christopher left behind a 15-man military group, headed by Assistant Secretary of Defense David McGiffert, to study Pakistan's defenses in the north and northwest and assess its arms needs.

The Americans then, flew to Saudi Arabia for talks in Riyadh with Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal and Crown Prince Fahd. The Saudis (see following story) remained adamant against having U.S. forces on their soil. Nonetheless, the visit went off far better than a similar call by Brzezinski and Christopher last year, when they unsuccessfully sought Saudi support for the Camp David accords. TIME State Department Correspondent Gregory Wierzynski, who traveled with the two emissaries, reported that they made five general points: 1) the U.S. is committed to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict peacefully, with special efforts toward settling the question of Palestinian rights; 2) the U.S. is upgrading its military presence in the area, including its facilities in the Indian Ocean, and is prepared to engage in joint military exercises with friendly forces in the region; 3) the U.S. would Like, specifically, to cooperate with Saudi Arabia in the interests of mutual security; 4) the U.S. is pledged to defending Pakistan against Soviet invasion; and 5) the U.S. has an interest in an "independent and integral" Iran, once the hostage issue is settled. In response, said a delegation official, the Saudis showed a "heightened confidence in the U.S."

While Brzezinski and Christopher were trying to clarify U.S. policy abroad, there was increasing concern in Washington because the Carter Administration was once again sending out conflicting signals. There were still reverberations from Special Envoy Clark Clifford's visit to New Delhi, where he told a press conference that the U.S. would go to war if the Soviets "move toward the Persian Gulf." Secretary of State Cyrus Vance gently rebuked Clifford, apparently feeling that stating the policy too bluntly could only make Washington's dealings with Moscow more tense than they already are. Such slips may be minor considering the size of the turn that the Administration is making. More open to question, say critics, are some of the new policy's premises. Even with allowances for election-year hyperbole, the invasion of Afghanistan is not the most serious crisis since World War II, as Carter has claimed.

Some observers also believe that the Carter policy slides too lightly over the prospect of internal subversion, which is the most likely way the Soviets would try to extend their influence. The risks in the new policy are many, to be sure. Symbolic gestures--such as declaring the Persian Gulf an area of vital American interest--are fine, but only if backed by the real thing. So far the Administration has not defined precisely what it will do, except to state that it would go to war to defend the Gulf. The U.S. may be assuming responsibilities it cannot meet.

American efforts to coordinate an allied response to the Soviet intervention also received a setback late last week when France abruptly announced that it would not send a representative to a Foreign Ministers' meeting in Bonn next week. The talks had been initiated by the U.S. The French refusal to participate considerably undercut the impact of an unusually strong joint statement issued earlier in the week by French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt; it called the Soviet intervention "unacceptable" and demanded a withdrawal.

Meanwhile, the Soviets continue to step up their eight-week-old occupation of Afghanistan. Some Washington analysts estimate that the Soviet force, about 80,000 troops, has suffered 2,500 killed and wounded since the takeover. In the population centers, Afghan insurgents snipe and toss rocks at the Soviets.

Military attaches in Kabul believe that the Chinese may be sending automatic weapons, bazookas and a few small mortars to aid the rebels--but not directly across their border, which is virtually impassable. "A sturdy Swiss with a yak caravan financed by National Geographic might be able to cross in high summer," said a Western diplomat. "But wheeled vehicles are out of the question and even camels are doubtful." More likely, say observers, China may be sending in weapons by way of Pakistan.

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