Hostages Near Freedom

And a U.N. commission would probe past abuses in Iran

Nobody could be sure, and nobody would talk. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance slipped up to Manhattan for a secret meeting with U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, then slipped away again. At the U.N. and in West European capitals, normally accessible diplomats became uncharacteristically secretive. Washington buzzed with rumors, but the White House banned all official speculation, and Jimmy Carter urged the nation "to guard against excessive optimism." Though such caution was certainly warranted, there was mounting evidence from all quarters that the long, cruel ordeal might finally be coming to an end for the 50 Americans being held hostage by militant Iranian youths at the U.S. embassy in Tehran and the three Americans being detained at the Foreign Ministry.

"It's apparent that there's a certain amount of ferment," said presidential Press Secretary Jody Powell of the hostage issue, but "whether that ferment produces wine or vinegar remains to be seen." Last week's clues pointed toward wine. Not only did Carter say, in his first press conference in eleven weeks, that there were "positive signs" in the attempts to free the hostages, but near week's end Iran's newly elected President, Abolhassan Banisadr, also issued the most encouraging statement to come from a responsible Iranian official since the militants seized the Americans last Nov. 4. Said he, in an Italian television network interview: "There is a proposal on President Carter's desk now which, if he accepts, can lead to the release of the hostages in 48 hours."

It seemed clear that some Washington-Tehran deal was nearing completion. Among its critical ingredients apparently would be:

1) The establishment of a U.N.-sponsored international commission before which Iran's new rulers could state their grievances against the U.S. and deposed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. At his news conference, Carter said that "an appropriate commission with a carefully defined purpose would be a step toward resolution of this crisis." Exactly who devised this concept has become a matter of hot controversy between Carter and Ted Kennedy in their battle for the Democratic Party's presidential nomination (see box).

This commission will apparently not be the Robespierrean tribunal that the Iranians originally had sought. Instead of making judgments, it will simply gather facts, hear charges and then submit a report to the U.N. Said a U.N. diplomat from a country that is being considered for a commission seat: "The U.S. will not be humiliated by the report." Mentioned as possible panel members have been, among others, Algeria, Bangladesh, France, Syria and Venezuela.

2) A U.S. statement about its role in Iran. The new leaders in Tehran have been demanding that Washington confess and apologize for alleged crimes against the Iranian nation supposedly committed while the U.S. backed the Shah. Though the Administration remains adamantly opposed to anything smacking of an apology, it seems ready to issue a statement that would affirm Iran's inviolable sovereignty and pledge not to interfere in its internal affairs. Washington especially has been balking at any reference in such a statement to the CIA-backed coup that returned the Shah to his throne in 1953 or to any wording that depicts the Shah as an American puppet. But it is expected that the U.S. will recognize Iran's right to pursue the Shah and his vast fortune through established legal channels. This is all that remains of the Iranians' original demand that the Shah and his money be sent to Tehran before the Americans would be freed.

3) Release of the hostages. At some specific time after the U.N. commission's creation is announced, the hostages will be set free, although exactly who would transport them out of Iran was uncertain.

Washington's apparent readiness to buy this formula reflects a key shift in the Administration's position. Right after the attack on the U.S. embassy, the White House declared that the hostages must be released before it would discuss any other matters with Tehran. As late as last week, some Iranian militants still insisted that the U.N. must finish its investigation before the hostages could be released.

Once freed, the hostages will be flown to a U.S. Air Force hospital in Wiesbaden, West Germany. A team of doctors and psychiatrists, some of whom had treated G.I.s captured by the North Vietnamese, was being assembled last week. They will thoroughly examine the 53 released Americans for symptoms of what is feared might be substantial physical and mental injuries resulting from their long ordeal.

After the hostages come home, the Administration is expected to take a number of steps to improve relations with Tehran. Said Carter at a White House meeting with magazine editors: "We look forward to a time in the future to have normal relationships with Iran." One possible move: the Treasury Department could rescind its freeze on the estimated $6 billion of Iranian assets in the U.S. or on deposit with American banks. Banisadr would like the U.S. to resume shipments of spare parts for Iran's sizable arsenal of U.S.-built sophisticated weaponry.

A main problem in resolving the U.S.-Iran crisis has been the absence in Tehran of any official able to negotiate with authority. For a while this seemed to be still the case last week. Banisadr told Le Monde, the Paris daily, that the release of the American hostages was no longer linked to the return of the deposed Shah, and that "it would suffice that the U.S. admits its responsibilities and resolves never again to interfere in our affairs." This was soon contradicted by Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, who was in Athens on an official visit. There he declared that "our demands are legitimate and right, and the Shah must be extradited." And the Ayatullah Seyyed Mohammed Beheshti, First Secretary of Iran's ruling Revolutionary Council, indicated that Banisadr lacked authority to order the militants occupying the U.S. embassy to release the Americans. Such a move, maintained Beheshti, "would have to be approved by a majority of Iranians and by the students." As for the militants, they continued to oppose any compromise with Washington, but reaffirmed their readiness to do as ordered by the Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran's religious leader, and they called on him several times last week for "specific instructions." From Khomeini himself, ailing in a Tehran hospital, there came an enigmatic message to a huge crowd celebrating the first anniversary of the country's Islamic Revolution. Iran must continue "its decisive struggle against the ruthless, expansionist U.S.," said Khomeini, but he also said that "normal, very ordinary relations could be established."

What were the conflicting Iranian statements supposed to mean? To some observers, they were an example of skillful psychological warfare aimed at wearing down Washington's resolve. Other experts contended that the Iranians were merely behaving like rug merchants in a classic Persian bazaar, demanding the maximum but willing to settle for quite a bit less.

At first the Carter Administration indicated that it was in no mood for haggling. After Banisadr's interview with the Paris daily, State Department Spokesman Hodding Carter III said flatly that the U.S. has no intention of "declaring its guilt, either specified or unspecified."

But the Administration quickly decided that any hard-line response to Banisadr's statement could weaken the position of the relatively moderate Iranian President. His election on Jan. 25, with 76% of the vote, was viewed by Washington as a very positive development. Not only was the selection of a President expected to bring an end to more than a year of Iranian political chaos, but Banisadr was known to favor a compromise on the hostages. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the threat it poses to the Persian Gulf may have convinced many responsible Iranian leaders that their ties with the U.S. should be improved. Thus it would seem to be in the U.S. interest to bolster Banisadr. Said a White House official last week: "He's still building his power base, and anything we say at this point would probably hurt him." A senior Western diplomat in Tehran agreed, noting that "it is precisely such outbursts [as Hodding Carter's statement] that can make Banisadr's task impossible by giving too much ammunition to his critics."

Indeed, one of Banisadr's most difficult tasks since his election has been to trim the militants' power. In a couple of key showdowns with them, he has won the backing of the Revolutionary Council and has even been named this ruling body's chairman. But it remained uncertain whether he could persuade--or force--the militants to hand over their hostages.

A U.S.-Iranian deal winning freedom for the hostages would have enormous impact. For the 53 captive Americans and their intensely worried families, the joy and relief would be immeasurable. Jimmy Carter's reputation as a national leader and international negotiator would be greatly enhanced. Most important, an end to the hostage crisis would make possible a great improvement in U.S. relations with Iran and thus would help in the defense of the vital Persian Gulf region against continued Soviet aggression.

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