A Desperate Sanctuary

Bold hospitality from Sadat; a controversial "message"from Carter

Once again Anwar Sadat had the eyes of the world on him. Two and a half years ago, the Egyptian President made history by courageously flying to Jerusalem, the capital of his Israeli enemy, in pursuit of peace. That galvanizing journey led to the treaty between Egypt and Israel, the one significant step yet taken toward a Middle East settlement. Last week Sadat made another bold gesture: he welcomed to Egypt the deposed Shah of Iran, the contemporary world's man without a country, and offered him elaborate medical care and unlimited refuge. A few days later, an international medical team removed the ailing Shah's spleen. By any measure, Sadat's gesture was a brave act of international hospitality.

The Carter Administration reacted with concern, not over what Sadat had done--the invitation he had given the Shah was of long standing--but over the Shah's decision to leave Panama at all. The U.S. fear: the Shah's move would further jeopardize the status of the 50 American hostages in the U.S. embassy in Iran. The entire five-month drive to free them, it was feared, might now be substantially set back. In addition, there was another worry: the political risk to Sadat. By standing up against the anti-Shah emotions prevailing in the Middle

East, he was isolating himself even further from his Arab neighbors, and at home risked provoking anti-Shah protests that could threaten his regime. What might happen to the Middle East equation without Sadat? The answer was a political nightmare. But as usual, Sadat was heeding his own inner motives, a daring player on a dangerous stage.

Almost as soon as the Shah disembarked in the shimmering heat of Cairo airport from a chartered DC-8 jetliner, mass demonstrations erupted in Iran against "this new American plot." Tens of thousands of demonstrators marched past the U.S. embassy in Tehran. The mood of the crowds alternated between fury and levity. A man wearing a plastic Jimmy Carter mask and leashed on a rope held by a jester made pathetic charges at the embassy door, sticking his tongue out. President Abolhassan Banisadr maintained an official calm. Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, in an interview with TIME (see box), suggested that the hostage impasse might be resolved "much sooner" than expected.

Other outward signs were not so promising. The second round of elections for the new Iranian parliament was postponed to allow a special commission to investigate charges of fraud in the first round. This delay will put off, probably for at least two months, the convening of parliament, which has been given the task of settling the hostage problem by Iran's spiritual leader, the Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini. As political pressure mounted at home, Washington made plans to impose economic sanctions against Iran.

The crisis took another confusing twist at week's end when the Iranian state radio network broadcast what it described as a letter from President Carter to Khomeini acknowledging past "mistakes" in U.S. policy. The President was quoted as having said: "My Government has inherited a very sensitive international situation which is the result of policy and other conditions, which made us all make mistakes in the past." White House Press Secretary Jody Powell at first categorically denied that any such message had been sent. On Sunday, however, Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh reaffirmed in a televised interview that a "constructive" message from Carter had indeed been received, though he explained that it was not a written document but apparently an oral message transmitted to him and President Banisadr by a Swiss diplomat. At that point, White House officials confirmed that a message had been passed through the Swiss some five days before, pressing for speedy action on the hostage crisis. But they continued to deny that there had been any communication addressed to Khomeini personally. It seemed likely that the confusion over the message emanating from the White House would add further fuel to the primary-campaign controversy about Carter's handling of foreign affairs.

The Carter Administration was correct in assuming that many Iranians would see the Shah's flight to Egypt as an American machination. The truth, however, was quite the opposite: the U.S. tried hard to talk the Shah into staying in Panama. It was no coincidence that the Shah left only a few hours before extradition papers were scheduled to be filed in Panama by lawyers for the Iranian government. U.S. officials had repeatedly assured him that Panama would never grant extradition. But, suspicious of American promises, the Shah had contacted Sadat a few days earlier to find out whether the Egyptian President's offer of refuge still stood. Sadat immediately repeated the invitation he had extended last year. Even at that time, the U.S. had felt that his presence in Egypt could be politically upsetting to Sadat, and the Shah had agreed. But this time, fed up with Panama, the Shah was eager to go.

In an effort to forestall the move, President Carter sent White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan to Panama. At that point it was still assumed that the main problem was to make sure the Shah received proper medical care. Panamanian authorities assured Jordan that they would do whatever they could and would allow the Shah to remain as long as he liked. The Shah refused to see Jordan and asked to see Presidential Counsel Lloyd Cutler, whom he had liked and trusted when Cutler helped arrange his move from Texas to Panama last December.

During his meeting with the Shah last week, Cutler explained why the U.S. felt a move to Egypt was unwise, detailing the adverse effects it might have not only on the hostages and on Sadat but on the whole Middle East peace process. The Shah dismissed the arguments and, at a second meeting the next morning, confirmed that he was going to Cairo. As one U.S. official described it later, "He put his own interests first." The President's National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, said the Shah had been given the choice of coming to the U.S. for treatment, but it is doubtful that a serious invitation was officially offered.

The Shah had apparently been more concerned by the talk of extradition than the Carter Administration realized. Panamanian officials told him privately that they would never send him back to Tehran, but also said publicly they would carefully consider the request for extradition. Referring to the dealings between Panama and Iran, one Administration official remarked: "Some theater was being played." Such backstage maneuvering could have troubled the Shah.

In Egypt, Sadat did not stint on the royal welcome. He escorted the Shah to the hospital, where a suite of ten rooms overlooking the Nile had been reserved. Later he proclaimed magnanimously that the Shah would take up permanent residence in Egypt. No foreign or internal pressures would dissuade him, said Sadat, from showing "Islamic compassion." Continued Sadat: "What Khomeini preaches is not true Islam, for our religion does not speak of vengeance or hatred." A day later, Sadat announced that the Shah had agreed to the offer of permanent asylum. "And believe me," Sadat added with a smile, "if he had not accepted it, I would have forced it on him."

Sadat reminded his people of Egypt's duty to aid a man who had once come to Egypt's aid. Speaking to a group of polytechnic graduates, Sadat recalled how at the close of the October War of 1973 it had been the Shah who had answered Egypt's emergency appeal for oil and followed this up with $1 billion in aid.

Sadat seemed unconcerned that his offer of a haven to the Shah might produce painful repercussions. At least for the moment, the reaction was relatively subdued, with only scattered incidents of protest. As for the rest of the Muslim world, Sadat assumed he had little left to lose. Diplomatic relations with Iran were broken off last May, and after the Camp David accords, every Arab country except Oman withdrew its ambassador from Cairo. In addition, Egypt now not only is self-sufficient in oil production but earns $1 billion from its oil exports.

Most Western authorities were ready to accept the view that Sadat's principal motive was his desire to show his loyalty to an old ally and his adherence to the Islamic codes of honor and dignity. As a British diplomat puts it, "by welcoming the ailing Shah, Sadat is showing the civilized world that there is another face of Islam, honorable and compassionate."

In the Middle East there was more skepticism. Said Syrian Diplomat Adib Daoudy: "Sadat wants to portray himself as a man to be trusted, a man who can stand alone against all the odds." Israelis suspected that Sadat was putting the U.S. in his debt at a convenient moment.

Sadat unquestionably has been frustrated and exasperated by Israeli intransigence in the autonomy talks and its determination to press ahead with new settlements in the occupied West Bank.

He was also keenly disappointed by the Carter Administration's flip-flop in the United Nations, where the U.S. first supported a resolution calling on Israel to dismantle its settlements in the occupied territories, then disavowed its vote. Later a discouraged Sadat sent Carter a message saying that Carter should act urgently to save the peace process from total stagnation. Following this, Carter invited Sadat and Begin to Washington for separate meetings beginning next week.

While Sadat's act of charity toward the Shah has created difficulties for the Carter Administration with respect to Iran, it has boosted Sadat's personal prestige in the U.S. With Begin facing a possible showdown with Carter over the settlements, Sadat may have concluded that in an American election year it would be difficult to get Carter to pressure the Israelis for concessions on Palestinian autonomy. But by accepting the Shah, Sadat applied a little pressure of his own.

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