The U.S. and Europe: Talking Back

By Henry Grunwald

Whatever unity, cosmetic or genuine, was produced in that mirage of a city, Venice, could not hide the reality of the deep fissure between the U.S. and Europe. The decline of American strength that so impresses and distresses the Europeans is undeniable (see NATION). This weakening--in economic thrust, military force and will power--constitutes a crisis in American history. Unquestionably it has been aggravated by the Carter Administration's devastating policy zigzags and frequent ineptness. But it must be said, between friends, that the Western European estimate of the American decline is surely exaggerated, and the reaction to it is misguided. The decline is being used to support a self-serving and self-defeating course. Indeed, the recent European attitude toward the Soviet Union has been so cautious as to verge on neutralism. The backdrop to the conflict between the U.S. and Europe is an old skein of misapprehensions and reproaches, failed hopes and even disappointed loves that can only be compared to an ancient family quarrel: tediously familiar, yet ever fresh in its capacity to wound. On both sides of the Atlantic, one regularly hears the ritual incantations about a joint cultural heritage. Yet America is, at most, only partly European. Besides, kith and kin are apt to have harsher conflicts than total strangers. At the outset, America defined itself against Europe (a fact neatly re- versed in Henry Kissinger's latter-day complaint that Europe seems to be able to unite only against Amer-ica). The U.S. saw itself--and to a great extent still sees itself--as a new beginning in history. Liberal, enlightened Europe used to share that view. Goethe wrote:

America, you're better off Than this old continent of ours. You have no petrified ruins And no broken towers...

That idealized view gave way to one of America as too rich, too powerful, too heedless of fate. Today Europe's complaint is that America is not rich enough, not powerful enough--and still too heedless of fate. These perceptions of America's early virtue and later vices, of its pre-Viet Nam power and its present weakness, share one quality: they are feverishly overblown.

America, in turn, could never quite get over the view of Europe as a seat of moral decay and corrupt sophistication. Looking at Europe in long historical perspective, Americans today certainly still see it as the creator of a glorious civilization. They also believe that, well into the 20th century, Europe was the creator of fanatical nationalisms and the builder of a colonial system from whose legacy we all still suffer. Many Americans point out bitterly that Europe plunged the world Into two global wars, only to be rescued from their disastrous consequences by America. Looking at Europe's post-Afghanistan policies, some American critics would argue--unfairly, perhaps, but not absurdly --that Europe has moved from fanaticism to faintheartedness.

These polemics are revived today because many European commentators tirelessly stress Western Europe's superiority: its' steadier and wiser leadership, its more successful economic and energy policies. Indeed, the combined G.N.P. of the European

Economic Community is now slightly higher than America's, and in some places its living standard is comparable to that of the U.S. Despite emerging trade rivalries, such successes should be cheered in the U.S. But they must be examined sharply when they are used to justify decisions that weaken the Western alliance.

One underlying irritant is the presumption that the diversity of Europe is supposed to be understood in the U.S., and with it the ever shifting concept of Europe, which is sometimes all the nine countries of the Community, sometimes France, Germany and Britain, sometimes just France and Germany--and sometimes, hi the Paris version, just France. The U.S., on the other hand, is a United States, its diversity and internal conflicts too easily ignored. The U.S. has coasts and horizons, dreams and duties only dimly perceived abroad. It must balance populations, cultures and values as varied as those of Europe, which, after all these centuries, still cannot quite cope with the conflict of Walloon vs. Fleming, Spaniard vs. Basque.

So it is a question of which "Europe" is compared with which America. When European critics ask why the U.S. is not ready for a draft, Americans must concede that European countries do have conscription.

But one might well inquire about the quality and fighting spirit of their armies. Little Holland is obviously not a key part of NATO, and yet it is hardly irrelevant that its draft army seems more like a hippie encampment or a pacifist trade union than a military force. When it conies to will power, in a recent French public opinion poll, 58% said they would not support the use of France's nuclear deterrent if the country were about to be invaded, and 49% guessed that President discard would not push the nuclear button if the need arose.

When critics point to American indecision and the dizzying multiplicity of U.S. pressure groups, what about the European left, which in every single country holds a significant veto power over policy? When they complain about profligacy in energy, fair enough--at least until the recent decline in U.S. energy consumption. Besides, Europe uses relatively less oil not merely because of self-discipline but because consumption patterns have long been different and because its industry is more starkly dependent than that of the U.S. on imports.

Superior political leadership? All honor to Thatcher, Schmidt and Giscard for their domestic achievements. Yet only a short time ago, even this impressive trio was justly regarded with alarm as heading unstable or minority governments. And what about some of their likely successors? Not to mention the less than formidable figures of only yesterday or the day before.

It would be easy to dismiss such recriminations on both sides of the Atlantic as pointless, except that in Europe at least they have clearly begun to shape public opinion--and policy. They are widely used to obscure one central fact: for all its economic achievements, Europe simply has not pulled its weight in the defense area. Of course that is the very reason why a relative decline in U.S. military power provokes such panic. But, given this fact, in is sheer delusion of grandeur for Europe to speak of having a really independent global foreign policy.

When the U.S. was clearly the world's predominant power,

Europe was quite pleased to find shelter behind that power, concentrate on building its prosperity, and complain that the U.S. was overbearing and probably plotting condominium with the Soviets. Now that the power balance is no longer clear cut and the American nuclear shield no longer as protective, no one can blame Europe for trying to be realistic. But would in not be the better part of realism to seek, instead of accommodation and special deals with the Soviets, joint measures against them? That may be easily said on the American side of the Atlantic but not so easily on a continent shared with Soviet tanks. Europe, however, cannot have it both ways. If the U.S. is to be impressed by that smashing G.N.P., by that standard of living and by that brilliant leadership, then it has a right to expect more support and cooperation.

European commentators argue that the U.S. simply can no longer act alone. Thierry de Montbrial, head of France's most distinguished foreign policy think tank, said recently: "It's time for the U.S. to listen to us." But what are the Europeans saying, beyond no? They may be right in arguing, for example, that it is no use blustering about the crucial importance of the Persian Gulf if the U.S. lacks the ready practical means to defend it--although one can just hear the screams about U.S. passivity if Washington had not "blustered."

And if Europe accuses Washington of having no strategy toward the Soviets in the present crisis, what is Europe's strategy? Where are the practical suggestions or initiatives for joint action, other than the vague notion of a neutralized Afghanistan? Yes, the Germans are being helpful in snoring up Turkey; the French are always willing to send some paratroopers to trouble spots--and such actions should not be underestimated. On the other hand, the .European Community's recent Middle East initiative only strengthened the Begin government's intransigence. It runs the risk, even in its toned-down version, of arousing unrealistic expectations in the P.L.O. of what Israel can be expected to concede and encourages the Arabs to play off the Americans against the Europeans. It is difficult to explain this initiative in any terms other than Europe's trying to assert an illusory independence and seeking good karma with the oil suppliers.

European reluctance about sanctions against Iran is defensible; they are clearly not only useless but downright dangerous. Not so economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, which could have had considerable impact. The same goes for the Olympic boycott; symbols do matter, especially to the Soviets. Americans understand why Europe seeks to avoid the economic costs and political risks of stronger measures, but such calculations are dangerously shortrange. The widely heard European argument that one must not isolate the Russians is a half policy at best; where is the other half?

Margaret Thatcher took a refreshingly hard line against the

Soviets, but was unable to do much in practice. Giscard d'Estaing journeyed with unseemly haste to a pointless meeting with Leonid Brezhnev. Helmut Schmidt is about to have his own meeting with Brezhnev, and an inevitable topic will be last year's NATO decision to deploy new theater nuclear weapons (American Pershings and cruise missiles) to counter the Soviets' SS-20 intermediate missiles now aimed at Western Europe. That decision was one of the few really strong Western European actions in recent years. Schmidt has suggested that both sides freeze deployment of these missiles to see whether a mutual reduction can be worked out. It is symptomatic of the current U.S.-European atmosphere that Washington saw a possible retreat in Schmidt's proposal, hence Jimmy Carter's letter to the Chancellor warning against such a move. This infuriated Schmidt and prompted his private meeting with Carter in Venice at which this particular conflict seems to have been patched up.

Washington may have been unduly suspicious about the mis sile issue. But on balance Western Europe's policy since Afghanistan has been based on conciliating the Soviets and, in many American eyes, has suggested appeasement. The ultimate question about this has nothing to do with what Europe owes America -- that is not even worth talking about -- but what it owes Eu The question is whether this policy is truly in Eu rope's own long-term interest. It is not.

There seems to be an unspoken assumption that the U.S. needs Europe more than Europe needs the U.S. After all, the argument goes, the U.S. cannot possibly allow the Soviets to absorb Western Europe's industrial base. Therefore the U.S. will do its utmost to prevent this, no matter what Europe does.

In the meantime, just in case the U.S. should prove too weak in muscle or spirit, it is just as well to buy reinsurance by seeking accommodation with the Soviets. Hence the widespread talk in Eu rope about becoming a third force between the superpowers.

Basically the U.S. is not too weak to stand against the Soviets in Europe or elsewhere. On the other hand, the time, place and nature of such a stand are not preordained or automatic. Euro pean policy can influence what happens. If that policy continues in its present vein, U.S. opinion may well say: "To hell with them." Amer ican isolationism, long quiescent, might reemerge; indeed, there are signs that it has begun to do so al ready. The assumption that the U.S.

cannot let the Soviets absorb Western Europe's industrial base would be ignored or overridden, and America would turn to the north and south, and to Asia. European commentators have expressed fears that the U.S. might retreat into "Fortress America." This too is avoidable, but a more or less neutralist European policy could help bring it about. Moreover, Fortress America might just prove to be an excellent position from which to establish that condominium with the Soviets that the Europeans have so often feared. It is a mystery how Western Europe could expect to maintain its standard of living, let alone its liberties, in such a world.

Europe's true long-term self-interest lies in working with the U.S. to stand against the Soviet Union politically and militarily so that, eventually, detente can be put back on track. Europe can and should belabor Washington all it wants in private to bring about a better strategy and a smoother partnership, but the destruction of a joint public front is extremely dangerous. Europe and the U.S. of course blame each other for damaging that united front, and Washington must carry its share of responsibility.

But the Europeans are strangely blind to their own blunders.

Europe must also accept the consequences of its prosperity and potential power by shouldering a greater share of the com mon defense, doing more to support NATO's crumbling southern flank, and playing a role in strategic areas beyond the NATO theater. That all this would require revived American strength, a military buildup, and better leadership is obvious. The U.S.

has shown again and again that it has the resilience to recover from failures, though it often takes a while and the process is democratically muddled. "Americans," said Dean Acheson, "do at the end of the day what they don't like to do at noon." Present European attitudes and policies are not designed to help bring about an American resurgence. On the contrary: they can only help thrust America back upon itself and thus ultimately hurt Europe. If, through arrogance or fear or misjudgment, Europe's leaders were to count America out too soon, they would not be readily forgiven in the U.S. -- nor, perhaps ultimately, in their own countries. &$151;By Henry Grunwald

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