The Great Debates Debate

By Ed Magnuson

Jockeying for advantage is the name of the game for all the contenders

Only twice in the television age, 1960 and 1976, have presidential candidates formally debated, and it is an article of political faith that in both those hairline contests the encounters may well have decided the election. With all three candidates this year having long since agreed to joust, presumably a few aides should by now, with Nov. 4 only nine weeks away, have settled the details for the great TV debates of 1980. Quite the contrary. They are having surprising difficulties in getting the show on the road.

With Democrat Jimmy Carter and Republican Ronald Reagan locked in a virtual tie in the latest opinion polls, and with Independent John Anderson desperately clamoring for equal public attention, the squabbling has permutations that were not possible in the one-on-one situations of the past. Publicly, this bitter campaign within the campaign was pitched in terms of high principles. Privately, each camp was coldly determined to exploit what it saw as the potentially decisive weaknesses of its foes, as well as to capitalize on the strengths of its own man.

Carter's strategists were pushing hard for as many sessions as possible with Reagan and were insisting, quite stubbornly, that the first one, which all agree could be crucial in making vital impressions on viewers, should not include Anderson. Carter's aides believe that Reagan is more likely to flub if he is matched head to head with Carter and has to face tough questioning on issues involving detailed knowledge of the Government.

Presidential Press Secretary Jody Powell argued for excluding Anderson from the first debate on the ground that "it's one thing to say Anderson should be heard, but quite another to say he should be afforded the same status as the nominees of the two main parties. That's just not defensible." The Carter strategists do not want to cooperate in giving Anderson any wide exposure, on the well-founded theory that it would help his cause and thereby hurt the President's more than it does Reagan's, since lately Anderson seems to be pulling far more votes from Carter than from Reagan (see chart). But just as important, they want to establish a clear-cut first debate contrast between the President and Reagan; Anderson's presence, they fear, would cloud and diffuse viewer judgments on the outcome of the Carter-Reagan performances and reduce the President's chances of scoring a clear win in the public perception.

The Reagan plotters, on the other hand, were fighting to give Anderson a chance to compete in the first one, al though they were willing to meet Carter alone later on. They also wanted to limit the number of debates. "Frankly, I think there ought to be two debates," Reagan said last week, "one domestic and one on foreign policy." Why only two? Reagan's chief debate negotiator, James Baker, contended that preparing for a greater number of debates in various cities would take too much time away from campaigning. Argued Baker: "We want to debate, but we don't want to run around the country to win the debates but lose the election."

Despite the current closeness of the polls, Reagan's aides figure he will regain a clear edge after the so-called "halo effect" of the Democratic Convention's wide coverage fades and Carter's support drops. The Reagan strategists thus feel he has far more to lose in the debates than does Carter, and they would really prefer to have no debates at all. But they know that Reagan as the challenger who must demonstrate his presidential timber, dares not duck the exchanges completely. While Reagan is confident that his relaxed camera presence and soothing generalist's approach will prove effective, his aides candidly concede that Carter will have an incumbent's edge with his knowledge of Government. Admits one: "Facts, numbers and the precision of his engineering mind will make Carter a formidable opponent. Carter is a master at detail. He is going to be very, very tough."

As for Anderson, the Reagan aides contend publicly that their sense of fairness precludes making any deal with Carter to eliminate the Congressman from the debates. Insists Baker: "We will not be a party to a device to carve up the turf and exclude a viable candidate." The Reagan advisers want Anderson included for the same two reasons that Carter's advisers want him out. They too believe that, at least up to a point, if Anderson gets stronger, Carter will suffer the most in voter preference. They also agree that a three-man exchange makes it less likely that Reagan will be seen as the clear loser if he has a bad night.

In this jockeying for position and an edge, none of the political pros involved was fooling any of the others. Said Baker about Carter's people: "They're anxious to avoid Anderson at all costs." Said Powell about Reagan's men: "They're afraid of a one-on-one debate." Anderson's motives scarcely required any analysis. Nothing could raise his stature more quickly than to be seen by millions as just as competent in debate, or possibly even more so, than the major-party candidates. Anderson angrily accused Carter of taking a "narrowly partisan approach to the public's right to know" and of "frantic behind-the-scenes efforts" to rule him out of at least the first debate. He cited polls by ABC News-Harris Survey and the Roper Organization showing that more than 60% of Americans want to see a three-man debate and vowed to take his case to "the court of public opinion."

With these conflicting interests in mind, the Carter and Reagan teams feinted and parried last week about the ground rules of the debates. The main battle was over the proposal by the League of Women Voters, which had sponsored the 1976 Carter-Ford sessions. This time the League had drawn up a tentative schedule calling for three presidential debates (in Baltimore, Cleveland and Portland, Ore.) and one vice-presidential exchange (in Louisville). The League decided that the first debate, originally set for the week of Sept. 7, should include Anderson if the major opinion polls showed that he was supported by at least 15% of those surveyed. The League angered the White House not only by failing to consult it about the plans but by delaying the first debate until Sept. 18, thus giving Anderson more time to establish his eligibility.

Jack Watson, Carter's chief of staff, openly solicited other groups to sponsor the debates by declaring publicly on TV that "the League does not have any franchise on presidential debates." Watson said that Carter would like to take on Reagan sooner than the League had planned. Carter quickly accepted invitations from the National Press Club in Washington, CBS's Face the Nation and the Ladies' Home Journal, all proposing an early Carter-Reagan face-off. But Reagan did not, claiming he was committed to the League's sponsorship.

That left the League as still the most likely debate sponsor. Trying, but not too hard, to reach agreement, aides to both Carter and Reagan sat down for 2 1/4 hours of bargaining with League officials in their Washington headquarters. "It was clear in ten minutes that nothing was going to come out of it," said one Carter participant. The Reagan team accepted the League's invitation for the first debate, but both sides complained of scheduling conflicts. The League officials settled on Sunday, Sept. 21, following the telecast of a professional football game that would help beef up the TV audience. The Carter team pressed for the first debate to exclude Anderson. The League refused to budge from its position that Anderson should be included if he had a 15% ratio.

For Reagan, Baker sought a free-flowing debate format roughly akin to the historic Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858. Each contender would make an opening statement, then go at each other with rebuttals timed by a moderator. Scoffed a Carter aide: "Reagan wants to make speeches." The President, on the other hand, wants a format in which experienced reporters ask questions in their field of expertise and then pursue sharp follow-up quizzing.

The impasse caused the League to canvass its board of directors to reconsider its position. But the board stuck with its conditions for Anderson's entry in the first debate and set it for Sept. 21 in Baltimore. Stay tuned.

With reporting by Laurence I. Barrett, Reagan and Chrisopher Ogden

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