Loser on the Sidelines

No matter how the Iran-Iraq war is resolved, the U.S. is a likely loser. From Washington, TIME Diplomatic Correspondent Strobe Talbott analyzes the American quandary:

Even before the outbreak of the Persian Gulf crisis, the U.S. was widely perceived, both at home and abroad, to be losing its ability to anticipate and influence events that jeopardize Western interests and world peace. For the U.S. to find itself on the sidelines of the current trouble is particularly frustrating and ominous. This marks the first time in the long and variegated history of modern Middle Eastern warfare that the U.S. has neither diplomatic relations with, nor political leverage on, either of the combatants. Commented Saudi Arabia's Foreign Affairs Minister, Prince Saud al Faisal: "The almost total absence of any U.S. sway with the parties directly involved in such a dangerous situation is sobering to say the least."

Fortunately the U.S. did have some sway with the Saudis themselves and with their neighbors the Omanis. To its credit, the Administration worked quickly and quietly behind the scenes to dissuade Saudi Arabia and Oman from making their airfields available to Iraqi planes and thus exposing themselves to Iranian retaliation. But that accomplishment was offset by the Administration's inability to prevent King Hussein of Jordan, a longtime friend of the U.S., from throwing in his lot with Iraq.

The U.S. had no choice but to remain neutral. But the Administration made a vice out of a necessity by conveying the impression early in the war that its policy of non-involvement was closely linked to, if not dictated by, concern for the American hostages. President Carter worried out loud about the effect of the fighting on the captives. He thus deepened concerns around the world that his public toying with the idea of resupplying the Iranians if they released the hostages was not only inconsistent with neutrality but cynical and desperate as well.

The war has further complicated U.S. diplomatic efforts to bring about a wider Middle East peace. From the Israeli perspective, radical Iraq has gone on a military rampage with the outright support of the supposedly moderate King Hussein, while the U.S. has stood helplessly by. That spectacle will hardly make the Israelis more amenable to bringing Hussein into the ongoing talks with Egypt about Palestinian autonomy, or to mediation by the U.S.

The Carter foreign policy advisers and their would-be successors in the Reagan camp are going to have to rethink their plans for protecting the security of the Persian Gulf. Both Carter and Reagan have elaborate strategies for deterring direct Soviet military intervention. But as recent weeks have shown, the more immediate threat is indigenous turmoil. Neither presidential candidate--nor anyone else, for that matter--has an answer to that problem or to the encroachment of Soviet diplomacy, such as the friendship treaty with Syria that Presidents Leonid Brezhnev and Hafez Assad signed last week.

Once the present fighting subsides and the two sides feverishly prepare for the next round in what could be a protracted bout--and once the hostage issue is settled--the U.S. will have to decide whether to resume arms supplies to Iran. It is a no-win dilemma. If the U.S. decision is to rearm Iran, an angry Iraq will use its growing influence with Saudi Arabia, the smaller gulf states and Jordan to punish Washington by trying to diminish further its influence in the Arab world. But if the U.S. refuses to help Iran rearm, the Iranians are very likely to turn to Moscow. The Soviets might well oblige--and thus greatly increase their own influence in Iran. They appear to have been fairly successful in covering their bets on both sides during the Iran-Iraq war so far. They may be even more successful during any uneasy truce that follows.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.