Flying into Trouble

By GEORGE J. CHURCH

Selling AWACS: dubious militarily and dangerous politically

A first it looked like a shrewd way to expand U.S. influence in oil-rich, pro-Western Saudi Arabia, without unduly roiling its troubled near neighbor Israel. But by last week the prospective deal had turned into something of an Arabian nightmare. By spelling out just what would be included in $5 billion worth of modern weaponry, which he intends to sell to the Saudis, Ronald Reagan set a time bomb ticking toward an explosive congressional battle over his foreign policy.

At issue are five E-3A AWACS, converted Boeing 707s with an awesome array of supersophisticated radar and electronics equipment (see box). The White House confirmed last week that the AWACS (price with supporting equipment: $2.5 billion) would be included in the arms sale, with delivery beginning in 1985. Moreover, the White House said, the sale would be presented to Congress as a single package. Thus legislators who approve the sale of less controversial items, such as Sidewinder missiles and fuel tanks to double the range of F-15 fighters already ordered by the Saudis but have their doubts about AWACS will be unable to duck the issue; they will have to cast specific yes or no votes on the AWACS sale.

The announcement fanned into flame opposition that began smoldering in early March, when it became clear that the Administration was indeed likely to include the AWACS in the arms sale. Israeli officials initially expressed little more than token opposition to the sale, but they have been convinced by the country's military leaders that AWACS in Saudi hands could lay bare all of Israel's military secrets to Arab enemies. Prime Minister Menachem Begin reacted to the sale announcement last week by giving U.S. Ambassador Samuel Lewis a memorable private tongue-lashing. Labor Party Leader Shimon Peres, Begin's major opponent in the June 30 Israeli elections, denounced the U.S. decision as "dangerous to the peace process and security of the region." Deputy Defense Minister Mordechai Zipori pledged that Israel would take its case "to the American people"--a clear signal to the lobby of U.S. Jewish organizations to mount a full-court press on Congress to block the sale.

Many Congressmen need no great urging. Democratic Whip Alan Cranston of California counted a majority of 51 Senators opposed to any AWACS sale; 46 already have gone on record against it. So have 78 Representatives, and House leaders say a majority probably is opposed. Moreover, the opposition includes not only traditional Democratic friends of Israel but staunchly conservative Republicans who are stalwart Reaganites on most other issues. Concedes a senior Reagan political adviser: "As of today, the Saudi deal would not get through Congress."

Reagan, however, is not expected to submit the proposed sale for congressional approval until September. By law, the President must first officially notify Congress of his intention to make the sale, then follow within 20 days with a formal proposal. After that, Congress has 30 days during which it can reject the sale, by majority vote of both Houses. Thus seven weeks of battle could elapse between first submission and final vote.

During the interval the Administration hopes to negotiate restrictions on how the Saudis can use the planes. These guarantees might allay the fears of some congressional supporters of Israel, and put pressure on Republicans who have misgivings about the sale but are equally dismayed by the thought of handing their President a major foreign policy defeat.

Even if those tactics work, however, the outlook is for a protracted struggle from which it is difficult to see the Administration emerging with any great gains. However the vote goes, relations will be strained between Israel and an American Administration it had hoped to get along with. On the other hand, the Saudis have made the AWACS sale a test case of the Administration's evenhandedness toward the Arab world. Even if the purchase squeaks through, the Saudis might be as dismayed by the fury of the fight necessary to get it approved as they were by the ugly conflict in 1978 over their right to buy F-15s. While they understand the political necessity of delaying the vote in Congress, the Saudis are already grumbling. Asks one high Saudi official: "How can we work with a country that has no consensus?"

A larger question is how did the Administration get itself into this unfortunate position? It clearly underestimated the depth of both Israeli and congressional opposition to an AWACS sale. But the fault does not lie with Reagan and his aides alone: the story began during the Carter Administration.

In 1978 Jimmy Carter rammed through Congress the sale of 62 F-15s to Saudi Arabia, partly by promising that they would not be outfitted with offensive equipment--such as range-extending fuel tanks. The Saudis, however, soon after felt themselves encircled by unfriendly states. They began asking for more powerful weapons.

In February 1980, only a few weeks after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Saudis made a request for AWACS to National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Warren Christopher, then No. 2 man at the State Department, who dropped by after a visit to Pakistan. The Saudis renewed that request in September, when the Iran-Iraq war broke out, this time turning to Air Force General David Jones, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was visiting Riyadh. Jones arranged for four U.S. AWACS planes to be dispatched to Saudi Arabia to monitor military movements in the region; the planes are still flying out of Saudi bases with U.S. crews, and will continue doing so through 1984. State Department officials now say that Jones also gave a premature but strong impression that the American planes would soon be replaced by the Saudis' own AWACS aircraft.

Whatever Jones may have said, there is no doubt that the Pentagon saw advantages in acceding to the Saudi request. Saudi Arabia is a thinly populated, poorly defended country whose vital oilfields are vulnerable to attack. Ground radar, for example, would give the Saudis only two to four minutes' warning of an assault by Iranian planes flying in low over the gulf. Points out a Pentagon official: "You have to consider the possibility of irrational acts by Iran, and that means anything is possible." The availability of AWACS would extend the warning time to 15 minutes, enough to enable Saudi interceptors to swing into action. U.S. planners, including Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, hope, too, that Saudi use of American weaponry will establish a continuing U.S. military presence in the Middle East.

But these arguments are fiercely disputed. Stansfield Turner, who was Carter's CIA director, contends that AWACS would hinder rather than increase Saudi security. As he wrote last week in the Washington Post: "There is no way they can absorb AWACS into their military structure without detracting from their primary concerns," which he defined as preparing to combat "insurrection and guerrilla warfare." Indeed, Turner claimed the Saudis' real reason for wanting AWACS is not military but political: "asking us to take an action that would be opposed by Israel" in order "to test whether we would eventually pressure Israel into making concessions on the Palestinian question."

The Saudis also want to demonstrate to radical Arab critics that their friendship with the U.S. is not leading them into a kind of colonial dependency, but can bring them tangible security benefits while preserving their freedom of action. Said Saudi Oil Minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani on a visit to the U.S. last week: "We do need these planes. The threat we have is definitely from the outside and it is because of the oilfields we have, which happen to be of real interest to you."

Carter waffled on the question of more arms for the Saudis until after he had been defeated. In Carter's last days in office his Administration came down on the Saudi side and proposed to Reagan's transition teams that the outgoing and incoming Presidents jointly announce a major arms sale. The Reaganauts demurred until they could study the question for themselves. By mid-February the basic decision had been taken to make an arms sale to Saudi Arabia, including some type of surveillance aircraft.

That month Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir arrived in Washington to touch base with the new Administration. His instructions were to express displeasure about the pending arms sale but not to make a major issue of it. "I guess it's just something we'll have to live with," said one high official in Israel at the time. Israelis assert that Shamir was given no hint that the deal might include AWACS and they now feel misled, even betrayed. U.S. officials insist that Shamir was told specifically that AWACS might be included.

But Israel certainly knew the details shortly after. On March 6, the Reagan Administration formally announced that it intended to sell arms to Saudi Arabia, including "surveillance aircraft." Within a few days the Israeli as well as the U.S. press reported that these planes likely would be AWACS. Even so, when Secretary of State Alexander Haig visited Israel in early April, his hosts expressed objections but down-played them. Reagan aides now profess surprise at the fury of the Israeli response to the formal announcement. Says one: "Whatever is driving the spirited Israeli opposition is not clear to us."

According to the Saudis, the essential Israeli concern is that, with AWACS surveying their aircraft and naval movements, they could not again pull off a surprise attack on Arab states, such as the aerial assault that won the Six-Day War of 1967. Israeli officials insist that their objections go much deeper. One or two Saudi AWACS planes hovering over Saudi territory, they assert, could keep all of Israel under surveillance: though AWACS cannot pick out ground targets, the planes could monitor all Israeli aircraft movements and even aerial training exercises. Pentagon planners say AWACS planes could not coordinate an Arab attack on Israel unless all Arab air forces were equipped with sophisticated devices that can come only from the U.S., and that the U.S. will not provide. But Israelis doubt that the U.S. could prevent the Saudis from sharing their AWACS-gathered intelligence with radical Arab states.

Just before the March 6 announcement, Reagan Administration officials fanned out on Capitol Hill to brief Congressmen and Senators on the pending arms sale, including the AWACS. Says one: "We found opposition, but not overwhelming opposition." Congressional leaders tell a different story: they assert that the Administration ignored warnings of very serious trouble for the AWACS deal.

Congressional enemies of the sale voice varied arguments. They fear that supplying AWACS to Saudi Arabia would accelerate a potentially lethal arms race in the Middle East. They also worry that the planes, with their highly sophisticated, secret equipment, might fall into the wrong hands. Says New York Democrat Joseph Addabbo: "There is no one who can guarantee what type [Saudi] government, pro-U.S., anti-U.S. or violently opposed to Israel, will be in control of these weapons one year or five years from now."

Many Congressmen also fret that Saudi Arabia has given no discernible quid pro quo for the AWACS sale: it has not pledged support for the Camp David-Middle East peace process, nor ceased its support for the Palestine Liberation Organization. Finally, critics pose this question: If aerial surveillance of the Persian Gulf region is militarily necessary, why could it not be accomplished by continuing to have U.S.-owned AWACS planes fly out of Saudi bases, rather than replacing them with Saudi-owned AWACS that terrify Israel? The Administration has no convincing answer.

On April 2, the day after the National Security Council approved the package sale to the Saudis, Reagan confirmed the decision from his hospital bed. The President is inexperienced in the nuances of Middle East politics; in hindsight, it is easy to argue that he should have waited longer to make his decision. The problem is that a bruising battle in Congress, which could have been avoided, has now been joined. It will take all of Reagan's political skills to avoid either a political defeat, or an outcome in Congress that will alienate one or the other of two nations that the U.S. wants as allies.

-- By George J. Church. Reported by Laurence I. Barrett and Roberto Suro/Washington

With reporting by Laurence I. Barrett, Roberto Suro

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