A Precarious Peace

By William E. Smith

Israel and the P.L.O. agree to a ceasefire, but their dispute remains

All week long, the tension built like a drum roll as the attacks smashed back and forth across the border between Lebanon and Israel.

Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, called the raids the opening round of an all-out "IsraeliPalestinian war." His soldiers seemed positively elated, as if the exchange of Israeli bombing raids over Lebanon and Palestinian rocket attacks on northern Israel signaled a new phase of the hostilities that the guerrillas had long been waiting for.

On Friday, at the end of a week of thrust and counterthrust across the embattled border, Israeli forces staged a naval raid on Jiyah, 13 miles south of Beirut, and Palestinians responded by sending yet another volley of rocket fire into the settlements of northern Israel. By that time, the 14 days of continuous fighting had become the heaviest between the Israelis and the Palestinians since the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in March 1978. The Palestinians and Lebanese had suffered by far the greater number of casualties: some 450 dead and 1,500 wounded, most of them in a bombing raid on Beirut, compared with six dead and 66 wounded on the Israeli side.

And then, at week's end, President Reagan's special envoy Philip Habib suddenly announced in Jerusalem that a cease-fire had been established. Emerging from a talk with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Habib read a message from a scrap of paper: "I have reported to President Reagan that as of 13:30 hours local time, July 24, 1981, all hostile military action between Lebanese and Israeli territory, in either direction, will cease." Begin then followed with a comment of his own: "The government of Israel endorses the statement just made by Mr. Habib, the emissary of the President of the United States."

The vicious little war had ended, at least for the moment, although one radical Palestinian faction refused to observe the ceasefire. But even if the shelling and bombing had been halted, for the most part, the issues remained that could cause fighting again and again until Israel and the Palestinians come to terms. The most alarming aspect of the hostilities was the way the Israelis had plunged ahead with the fighting, heedlessly bombing targets in densely populated areas in Beirut. Throughout the Western world, some of Israel's staunchest friends and supporters --in European governments, in the U.S. Congress, and even within the American Jewish community--criticized Israel's role in the latest round of fighting. The essential questions were posed by Charles Percy, Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "At what point does [Israel's] pre-emptive strategy undo all our efforts toward peace? At what point does the preemptive strategy weaken Israel's political and diplomatic position in the world?"

The Israeli attacks, which employed American-built equipment bought on favorable terms set down by the U.S. Congress, raised suspicion in the Arab states that Washington condoned the raids. That view already has damaged U.S. relations with the Islamic world. Top U.S. officials criticized Begin, and President Reagan was forced to take some action to show his displeasure. At the summit conference in Montebello, Canada, he reluctantly ordered a further postponement in the delivery often advanced F-16 jet fighters to Israel.

In military terms, the gesture was little more than a slap on the wrist. But it also served as a warning by the Reagan Administration that Israel's Begin could not afford to ignore completely Washington's sentiments on such matters of war and peace, which are vital not just to the Middle East but, in that volatile and oil-rich area, to the world at large. The latest round of fighting also raised two important issues: What kind of controls can the U.S. reasonably ask of its tough and independent ally? And how can the U.S. press the Israelis on toward the next step in the Camp David peace process, solving the basic problem in the area, that of establishing some form of autonomy for the Palestinians?

Initially, Western diplomats in the Middle East had been unsure of the reasons behind Begin's repeated thrusts into Lebanon. As days passed, however, it became clear that the Israelis were worried about the heavy weaponry that has lately been reaching the P.L.O., mostly from Libya via Syria --artillery, tanks and sophisticated antiaircraft guns. Said a Begin aide: "Artillery and armor are not the attributes of guerrilla groups, but of a real army."

Furthermore, there was speculation in Lebanon that Libya or Syria might soon supply the Palestinians with Soviet-made Scud or Frog surface-to-surface missiles, which have a maximum range of between 37 and 167 miles. Launched from southern Lebanon, these missiles could easily reach the northern Israeli port city of Haifa. Indeed, there were reports in Beirut last week that the P.L.O. was considering the bombardment of a major Israeli city as a strategic objective.

All this, coupled with their irritation over the continuing rocket attacks on their northern settlements, led the Israelis to strike at Palestinian positions in southern Lebanon, particularly in the region between the Zahrani and Litani rivers. Some Israeli Cabinet ministers are said to have favored an all-out ground operation in Lebanon. For once, Begin was less militant than some of his Cabinet. Perhaps because of Israel's rising difficulties with Washington and with world opinion in general. Begin opposed a major invasion of southern Lebanon.

But the attacks that Begin and the Cabinet authorized were fierce enough. If any one factor turned world opinion against Israel--and thus perhaps hastened the cease-fire--it was the air raid on Beirut. On July 17, aiming at Palestinian guerrilla offices in a crowded neighborhood, Israeli warplanes killed some 300 Lebanese and Palestinians and wounded another 800. Even many of Begin's own countrymen, especially those from the Western-oriented Ashkenazi community, were shocked. Former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin declared that the Palestinian command posts and offices had been in Beirut for years but that, because of the political price involved, previous governments had felt that Israel could derive little benefit from attempting to destroy them. Said Rabin: "Israel used to have the moral right on its side, and in the methods it used to defend itself."

Throughout Western Europe, Begin's reputation fell to an all-time low. Lord Carrington, the British Foreign Secretary, called in the Israeli Ambassador to warn him that pre-emptive strikes, "with their horrible trail of human destruction, cannot conceivably advance the cause of peace." In Paris and Bonn, top officials were equally scathing in private.

In the U.S. Congress, a number of Israel's traditional friends and supporters were disturbed over recent developments. Four Republican Senators called on the Administration to withhold indefinitely deliveries of the F-16s as a sign of Washington's displeasure over the bombings. Declared Democratic Senator Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts: "We have got to start distinguishing between Begin and Israel. The real trouble is the way Begin is eroding our general support for Israel. There is now in Congress a clear, widespread and deep-rooted unhappiness with Begin."

Israel's Ambassador to Washington, Ephraim Evron, managed to quiet the fears of most of the 34 Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations to whom he talked in New York City at midweek, but many prominent American Jews remained troubled. California Industrialist Max Palevsky called the Beirut raid "appalling,", and added, "Begin's terrorism is as bad as that of the P.L.O. We just can't tolerate that kind of behavior from anybody." Said Meyer Berger, a Pittsburgh businessman and a member of the national board of the American Jewish Committee: "Never has the anti-Begin sentiment been as strong as it is right now among the American-Jewish community. And Begin is making it tough on Reagan, who wants to help."

Indeed, Reagan had put the matter exactly that way. Speaking privately to advisers a few days earlier, the President had remarked, "He sure makes it hard for us to help him, doesn't he?"

The immediate dilemma was what to do about the ten F-16 jet fighters due to be shipped to Israel. At the beginning of the week, Reagan and his top aides flew to the summit in Canada with the matter still undecided. There they learned of an Israeli commando raid in Lebanon. That seemed to settle it. The following evening, Secretary of State Alexander Haig told reporters, "The President has decided to defer the shipment of F-16s to Israel. This matter remains under review."

Early in the week, Reagan and Haig learned for the first time that Habib had a genuine chance of achieving a ceasefire. One day Habib spent a total of six hours with Begin, interrupted by a Cabinet meeting at which the ministers discussed what they should do. At times, the talks between Begin and Habib seemed to ramble, but not without purpose. One Israeli official recalls how Begin would talk about his childhood in Poland, and Habib would tell what it was like to grow up Lebanese in a Jewish neighborhood in Brooklyn. Says the Israeli: "If you didn't know what they were really talking about, they'd sound like two grandfathers sitting on a park bench together. But every anecdote had a special meaning in the context of the negotiations."

Habib delivered a request from Reagan that the Israelis consent to a cease-fire with the Palestinians. For the Israelis, that implied a willingness to recognize the P.L.O. as a negotiating entity, and this they would not do. So Habib announced that he was proceeding with his mission "to secure a cease-fire along the Israeli-Lebanese border." In the meantime, the United Nations had been making progress in discussions with the P.L.O., and the Reagan Administration had been quietly working through U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim to persuade the P.L.O. to cooperate after the Security Council called for a ceasefire.

To find ways of putting pressure on the P.L.O., Habib went to Saudi Arabia, where the Saudis turned out to be anxious to play a part in reaching a settlement. Says one senior White House aide: "Saudi Arabia's role has been significant and constructive since the beginning of the Habib mission. The Saudis have understood what has been needed." Translation: the Saudis leaned on their client, the P.L.O., which they have been bankrolling. In comparison, the U.S. seemingly did not try to force the Israelis to go along. Haig has often said that strong-arm tactics only alienate allies. Moreover, Haig and Reagan were the two members of the Administration most sympathetic to Begin. Says one top White House aide: "The President still appreciates Begin's pluck, despite all the difficulties he has caused."

Habib, who was reporting daily to Haig, told Washington in midweek that a ceasefire, by whatever name, was a likelihood. That was the day, as it happened, that Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger attacked Begin for failing to show any "moderation," and Deputy Secretary of State William Clark told reporters that Begin had caused "disappointment and some embarrassment" to the Administration by ordering the raid on Beirut.

It turned out that neither Weinberger nor Clark had seen the restricted cables from Habib describing the ceasefire as imminent. Haig and Reagan feared that the criticism might offend Begin, but they did not themselves want to contradict Weinberger or Clark openly.

So White House Chief of Staff James Baker was sent out to have breakfast with reporters and say that the attacks on Begin did not represent the Administration's views.

By that time, the agreement, severely limited in scope, had nearly been hammered out. The deal said nothing about reducing tensions in Lebanon, let alone solving the more fundamental problem of Palestinian autonomy. The P.L.O. did not pull back any of its weapons that had been hitting Israel, and the Israelis insisted on continuing their reconnaissance flights over Lebanon.

The P.L.O. went along with the Habib plan, in part because it could use a rest after two weeks of fighting. Perhaps more important, the P.L.O., by acceding to a U.N.

resolution, gained the prestige of playing a role on the world stage. The U.N. had dealt directly with the P.L.O., not through an intermediary. As for the Israelis, the cease-fire eased the pressure they were feeling because of the Beirut air raid, paved the way for an early resumption of delivery of the F-16s, and stopped the rocket attacks on their villages.

Those veterans of the Camp David accords, Egypt's President Anwar Sadat and Israel's Begin, are both due to visit Washington shortly, Sadat in August and Begin in September. Sadat is said to feel "disappointed and betrayed" by the Israeli raids in Lebanon, but is unlikely to speak out openly against Begin. For one thing, he is determined to retrieve the last portion of the Sinai, which the Israelis are set to hand back to the Egyptians next April, and will do nothing to give the Israelis an excuse for delaying their departure. But, more than that, Sadat has pinned his reputation on the hope of the Camp David accords, and has not yet given up on either Israel or the U.S. The unfinished business still facing the three partners in those accords remains the most difficult step of all: an autonomy agreement concerning the rights and status of the 1.2 million Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza.

--By William E. Smith.

Reported by David Aikman/Jerusalem and William Stewart/Beirut

With reporting by David Aikman/Jerusalem, William Stewart/Beirut

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