A True Diplomatic Test

By GEORGE J. CHURCH

The Administration faces dangers and opportunities in the Middle East

It was the most poignant moment in the Administration's brief history. On Tuesday afternoon, Ronald Reagan, with an ashen-faced Nancy at his side, stepped out from the foyer of the White House State Floor to the North Portico, there to issue a brief statement on the death of a "close and dear friend," whom they had welcomed to the White House just two months before. There was grief and anger in Reagan's voice as he denounced the assassination of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat as "an act of infamy, cowardly infamy." The shock and concern of official Washington were also written large on the faces of scores of dignitaries at a memorial service held in the stately National Cathedral.

Policymakers in the nation's capital had been stunned by the news, and the reasons why went well beyond the widespread admiration of the visionary Egyptian leader. Foreign policy has not been the Administration's strong point because the White House has been concentrating on pressing domestic concerns. All too often, the President and his aides have seemingly reacted to events as they occurred. The absence of a real strategic design has been notably true in the Middle East, where Reagan's policy, at least until recently, consisted of little more than an obsession with Soviet expansionism, uncritical support for Israel and ever deepening reliance on Sadat. His assassination now presents U.S. diplomacy with new dangers and opportunities. It has yet to prove that it can handle them successfully.

Sadat's importance to the U.S. can hardly be overstated. First and foremost, of course, he was the one Arab leader who had the imagination and courage to make peace with Israel. Beyond that, he had transformed Egypt, the most populous Arab nation, from a Soviet client to a steadfast U.S. friend. Under Sadat, Egypt played many pro-American roles besides rapprochement with Israel: it was a buffer and counterweight to the pro-Soviet and pro-terrorist Libyan regime of Muammar Gaddafi to the west; guardian of the Sudan to the south; defender of the Suez Canal; indispensable base and staging area for any U.S. forces that might have to be rushed to the Middle East to protect the Persian Gulf oilfields.

Moreover, all these roles rested not on written agreements but on personal understandings between Sadat and the American Presidents and diplomats with whom he dealt. Says one senior American military officer: "Geography guaranteed Egypt a central role in any Mideast military equation, but it was Sadat who made Egypt the linchpin of our strategy." Adds former Under Secretary of State Joseph Sisco: "Personality is more important to diplomacy in the Middle East than in any other part of the world. The question of personal trust often looms larger than economic, political and strategic conditions."

Washington's first task will now be to forge with Sadat's successor-designate Hosni Mubarak an alliance as close as possible to the one it had with the slain President. Mubarak has already accepted an invitation from Reagan to visit Washington next year. The U.S. will probably speed up deliveries of military equipment to Egypt to replace the Soviet tanks, guns and planes delivered before 1972, which still constitute the country's main armaments. That might help Mubarak, a former air force commander, overcome disaffection within the Egyptian officer corps. The U.S. is also likely to supply more military aid to the Sudan, which is threatened by Libyan aggression and subversion. Acting as Sadat's envoy, Mubarak had been pleading for that aid in Washington only two weeks ago.

Washington will probably also press for conclusion of some agreements it had been secretly negotiating with Sadat. The U.S. Rapid Deployment Force had been scheduled next month to conduct a training exercise in Egypt similar to Operation Bright Star in November 1980; in addition, Sadat had been discussing a program under which small groups of American forces could use Egypt's Western Desert to train for warfare in the Middle Eastern sands. Secretary of State Alexander Haig will undoubtedly seek Mubarak's approval for these projects in talks following Sadat's weekend funeral. Haig may also press Mubarak for a formal commitment to let the U.S. stockpile, at the Egyptian airbase of R'as Banas, supplies that the R.D.F. could pick up on its way into a Middle East battle. Sadat had agreed to make the base available, but only in a letter to Jimmy Carter; Congress will doubtless insist on something more substantial than the word of a dead leader to a President no longer in office before it votes to commit $500 million to improve facilities at the base.

Completing these projects, however, will require exquisitely tactful diplomacy. Too much pressure put on Mubarak too quickly could jeopardize his chances of cementing his hold on his own country. Mubarak cannot afford to be seen as an American lackey.

The U.S. will also try to promote a reconciliation between Egypt and Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Chances of such an alignment may have slightly improved with Sadat's death. When the rulers of Saudi Arabia and Jordan denounced his peace initiative toward Israel, Sadat showered them with personal insults, thus adding to their enmity. A new alliance of moderate Arab states, however, might result in drawing Egypt further away from the U.S., rather than bringing Saudi Arabia and Jordan closer. The killing of Sadat has sent a wave of fear through the Middle East. Says one Saudi diplomat: "First the Shah [of Iran], now Sadat--it is fatal to be America's friend."

Worse, an Egyptian-Saudi-Jordanian coalition could well terrify Israel, leading it either to balk at returning the rest of the Sinai to Egyptian rule on schedule next April, or to continue stalling on negotiations with Cairo to provide autonomy for the 1.3 million Palestinian Arabs of the occupied West Bank and Gaza, or both. The Reagan Administration has proved notably unwilling to lean on Israel in any way that would assuage Arab fears. Washington's ineffectual protests against Israeli air raids on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, and on Palestinian areas of Beirut, were widely and bitterly noted in the Arab world. The Arabs, moreover, have been unmoved by U.S. pressures to form a "strategic consensus" against the Soviet threat. They regard Israel's intransigence on the Palestinian question as a more immediate provocation than the menace from Moscow.

Picking its way through this snarl of conflicting interests would be a formidable task even for an American Administration that had evolved a forceful, consistent foreign policy. The Reagan Administration is far from that position of strength. In the Middle East, one key aim is to reassure the Saudis of American friendship; the primary method of doing that is pressing the sale of AWACS radar planes, and that deal is still in deep trouble in Congress. In the broader area of foreign policy, the Administration has blown hot and cold on dealing with the Soviet Union and is relying heavily on a huge American military buildup. But Reagan's nuclear-arms plans also have stirred doubts among the legislators.

Some greater cohesion in foreign policymaking may now be possible. Secretary of State Haig appears to have survived the bureaucratic wars and re-emerged as the leading voice of U.S. policy. After Sadat's death, he successfully insisted that there be no formal Administration comment until he could deliver it himself. He did so at a press conference where he spoke with a self-confidence and authority only sporadically present before.

Still, there are some damaging gaps. The State Department on some occasions has failed to mesh with National Security Adviser Richard Allen, who is supposed to coordinate the foreign policy advice reaching the President. Allen, however, lacks the easy access of his predecessors; he reports to Reagan through Presidential Counsellor Edwin Meese. Some Administration insiders worry that Reagan is not getting the detailed analyses of foreign policy problems and options that would normally come from a strong National Security Adviser. That is an especially serious burden for a President who lacks expertise in foreign affairs.

The abrupt loss of an influential friend like Sadat in an all-important region of the world would be a severe blow for any Administration. In Reagan's Washington, it opens a time of testing for a foreign policy apparatus that is still in the formative stage. --By George J. Church. Reported by Laurence I. Barrett and Gregory H. Wierzynski/'Washington

With reporting by Laurence I. Barrett, Gregory H. Wierzynski/Washington

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