Monday, Feb. 15, 1982

The Attack That Almost Was

By William E. Smith

Israel comes close to launching an assault on southern Lebanon

For months diplomats and military experts around the world have been expecting land and air strikes by Israeli forces against Palestine Liberation Organization strongholds in southern Lebanon. That assault was narrowly averted last week, though perhaps not for long. TIME has learned that Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, in a last-minute decision, rejected a plan by Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and Chief of Staff Lieut. General Rafael Eitan that could have led to war in Lebanon.

Sharon and Eitan had recommended a modest attack on Palestinian strongholds in retaliation for the entry into the occupied West Bank a few days earlier of a six-man P.L.O. squad from Jordan. The problem, Begin concluded, was that given the state of tension, a small-scale Israeli action would lead to a sharp counterthrust by the P.L.O. and then to a full-scale assault on Lebanon by Israeli forces. For that reason, Begin decided to set aside the proposal -- at least for now.

Sharon has been pressing for just such an attack for several weeks. In mid-January, he met with Bashir Gemayel, commander of Christian Phalange forces in Lebanon, aboard an Israeli gunboat off Jounieh, a port city north of Beirut. The main subject: coordination of efforts between Israelis and Phalangists, in the event of an invasion that would bring Israeli forces as far north as the edge of Beirut International Airport. Such a penetration could also bring the Israelis into direct contact with the forces of Syria, whom many Israelis regard as the ultimate enemy of the Jewish state. What the two men decided at this meeting is not known.

Next, Sharon flew to Egypt to confer with President Hosni Mubarak. The two discussed details of Israel's withdrawal from the last third of the occupied Sinai by April 25. More important, Sharon felt he secured from Mubarak an understanding that, in the event of Israeli action in Lebanon, Egypt would remain on the sidelines. Mubarak had said previously that in case of war, Egypt would not rush to the aid of Syria.

Then, when Sharon learned a week ago of the six-man P.L.O. infiltration of the West Bank, he swung into action. At a press conference that the daily Ha'aretz described as "overdramatized," defense ministry officials declared since participants in the raid had been trained in Lebanon, the P.L.O. in effect had violated the July 1981 truce in southern Lebanon. As government radio and television commentators cried out Sharon against the summoned P.L.O. "provocation," Sharon summoned Eitan and a small group of generals and intelligence officers. Israeli tanks and troops were al ready moving north. Sharon decided that he and Eitan should take their plan for a limited attack on P.L.O. positions in southern Lebanon to the Cabinet committee responsible for defense and foreign affairs. Begin, in the meantime, was studying the military situation and the foreign-policy consequences of an Israeli strike.

Throughout most of the meeting, which was held at the Prime Minister's residence last Monday night, Begin sat in silence. He listened as Sharon recommended action, and other ministers questioned about the costs to Israel of an expanded operation. At one point, Begin excused himself for 15 minutes.

When he returned, he took command of the meeting; it was immediately clear that he was not ready to plunge Israel into war. He spoke of the price of such a move in terms of men and materiel. He described the political cost of sending Israeli forces to the outskirts of Beirut: alienating the U.S., Western Europe and further isolating Israel. He let Sharon and Eitan off the hook gently, declaring quietly that his personal view was that the government should wait. He did not rule out the possibility of an attack some time in the future.

In Beirut, the P.L.O. leadership has been convinced for weeks that the Israelis were preparing for an attack. The organization's chief of staff, Abu Walid, said last week that he anticipates a two-phase Israeli assault: a period of intensive artillery shelling, air raids and helicopter operations in coastal areas, to be followed by a land invasion through "the gap," a five-mile-wide corridor that separates the two main U.N. areas. "We would expect them to occupy Lebanon south of the Litani river," said Abu Walid, "and to engage in some operations to the north of it." The P.L.O. also suspects that, aside from military considerations, the Israelis are particularly anxious to take over the southwestern slope of Mount Hermon, now a P.L.O. -dominated area, because of its plentiful water resources.

Both the Israelis and the P.L.O. recognize the desperate need of the Palestinian guerrilla forces to hang on in southern Lebanon. Indeed, their retreat is virtually blocked in every direction. Central and northern Lebanon are dominated by the Syrians, with pockets under the control of Christian militias.

Syria itself might well refuse to admit the Palestinians as a military force, and in any case the P.L.O. might be reluctant to accept the authority of the beleaguered President Hafez Assad. Whether the P.L.O. could return to Jordan, after its defeat by King Hussein's army in the "Black September" fighting of 1970-71, is doubtful. And, for reasons that are both obvious and tragic, they cannot go home.

If the Israelis do invade Lebanon in force, the P.L.O.'s aim will be to inflict enough casualties to make the continuing cost unacceptable. Most experts believe that the overall position of the P.L.O. in southern Lebanon has improved during the past year. But it is still no match for the Israeli armed forces. Says Abu Walid:

"We do not have a large army, and we have never claimed to have the ability to defeat the Israeli armed forces. The only course of action open to us is to fight in southern Lebanon and fight hard." Adds Abu Ahmed Fouad, chief military commander of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a radical component of the P.L.O.: "We will fight not just in Lebanon. We will attack in the occupied territories and all through Palestine [Israel]." If necessary, threatens another guerrilla leader, the Palestinians will launch a new wave of hijacking and sabotage against "the Israelis and the friends of Israel at sensitive targets throughout world."

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