Divisions in Diplomacy

By GEORGE J. CHURCH

The Haig-Weinberger disputes overshadow their views in common

Once again President Ronald Reagan was under pressure to convince skeptics that his Administration has only one, consistent foreign policy. And the reason he needed to dispel doubts was a disturbingly familiar one: seemingly contradictory statements put forward by Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and their spokesmen. First, the President last week dashed off a "Dear Menachem" letter to Prime Minister Begin, reassuring Israel's leader that there had been no cooling of U.S. friendship toward his country, no matter what impression Begin might have got from Weinberger's trip to Arab countries the week before. Two days later, at a White House press conference, Reagan complained about "overblown" reports from that tour, and insisted that "there is no difference in policy between" Weinberger and Haig.

Reagan was partly right--and partly wrong. While the two Cabinet Secretaries agree on certain broad policy goals, there has been a long series of disagreements between them. With its ad hoc case-by-case approach to problems overseas, and without a strong hand at the controls of the National Security Council, the White House has allowed the competition to ripen. Indeed, Weinberger has been "committing foreign policy," as he puts it, more vigorously than any Secretary of Defense since Robert McNamara two decades ago. The dissonance between Weinberger's generally hawkish views and the usually more moderate approach of Haig has sown doubt about the U.S. approach toward countries ranging from El Salvador to Poland, and nowhere more so than in the ever volatile Middle East.

The latest dustup began when reporters aboard the Boeing 707 that flew Weinberger to Saudi Arabia, Oman and Jordan filed stories quoting a Pentagon official as saying that Weinberger wanted to "redirect" American military assistance away from Israel toward the Arabs. As soon as this appeared in print, another spokesman insisted that the message had been garbled; Weinberger wanted only to "redirect" U.S.-assisted Arab military efforts toward countering internal subversion, as well as potential Soviet threats. But suspicion was inevitably aroused in Israel, where some newspapers bluntly described Weinberger as "an enemy" because of his alleged pro-Arab views. (Haig, in contrast, is regarded by Israeli officials as a good friend.)

Weinberger said little until his plane reached the Jordanian capital of Amman. But then he declared that he "favors" the sale of U.S. mobile Hawk antiaircraft missiles and F-16 fighters to Jordan. The Israelis were aghast at the prospect of these weapons in the hands of an unfriendly state that has rejected all overtures to join the Camp David peace process. Haig, returning to the U.S. from a trip to Portugal, Spain, Morocco, and Rumania, just as Weinberger was getting back from Amman, hastened to assert that "there was no specific request [from Jordan for U.S. arms], no offer made and no decision made of any kind." He added that "redirect" was "a very incorrect word" to describe U.S. policy toward the Middle East, however it had come to be used.

In private, Haig's reaction to the reports emanating from Weinberger's trip was more picturesque. Said one aide: "He took it with his usual equanimity. He climbed the walls and scratched the ceiling." There are increasing worries at the State Department that Israel, feeling ever more isolated, is about to launch an invasion of southern Lebanon to remove any threat from Palestine Liberation Organization forces there (see WORLD). Some U.S. diplomats feared that talk of an American arms sale to Jordan might give Israeli hawks just the excuse they need to persuade Begin to order such a strike, which could embroil the Middle East in yet another war and even lead to a superpower confrontation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

Those worries were premature, but Begin was incensed. He had no trouble persuading the Israeli Knesset to approve, by a vote of 88 to 3, a resolution expressing alarm at any sale of Hawks and F-16s to Jordan. Begin also sent Reagan a "Dear Mr. President" letter asking "why it was necessary for the Secretary of Defense to make his worrying statements." By then, however, Reagan had already dispatched his "Dear Menachem" missive. The President's letter repeated Haig's assurance that no request for American arms had been received from Jordan and added that if one is, it will be considered in keeping with the U.S. pledge "to see that Israel's qualitative technological edge [in weaponry over its Arab opponents] is maintained." The Israelis quieted down, but for how long is another question. The U.S. is indeed considering an arms sale to Jordan, which would involve Hawks and F-5Gs, a less sophisticated fighter than the F16. King Hussein has abided by an unwritten rule of diplomacy not to make a formal request until negotiations have shaped a deal that the Administration is prepared to urge Congress to approve.

Haig and Weinberger agree on many fundamentals of U.S. international strategy: both believe strongly in rebuilding American military might and both want to follow a resolute anti-Soviet line. But Haig, say colleagues, is "an old internationalist" and pragmatist who places great emphasis on acting in concert with U.S. allies; Weinberger tends to be more dogmatic in asserting the U.S. position, whether those allies agree or not. The two Secretaries disagree, at least in approach and nuance, in several specific areas of policy. Items:

The Soviet Union. Haig believes that the Soviets must be contained but not isolated; he would engage in negotiations where possible. Weinberger would prefer to defer arms-control talks until the U.S. has built up its strategic arsenal and advocates curtailing trade ties with the U.S.S.R.

Western Europe. Haig continues to expend much effort to persuade the European allies to accept intermediate-range American missiles on their soil, Weinberger is considering giving up on that attempt; his aides talk of stationing a fleet of missile-armed destroyers in the North Sea as an alternative. Weinberger would lean hard on the Europeans to scrap the proposed $15 billion gas pipeline from the Soviet Union. Haig also opposes the pipeline, but believes that further nagging of the allies is likely to be counterproductive.

Poland. Haig argues that forcing U.S. banks to call a default on their loans to Poland would distress the allies without helping to moderate the behavior of Warsaw's martial-law regime. Weinberger considers default a potentially usable option. Says one State Department official: "Cap wants to engage in economic warfare. He wants to hurt the other guy."

Central America. Haig, for once, is the more hawkish: he has not ruled out the use of American troops in El Salvador, and indeed has asked the Pentagon to draw up plans for U.S. military action as a last resort. Weinberger has refused on practical rather than idealistic grounds. He contends that the American public would not stand for any commitment of troops.

To date, Haig has won most of these clashes: the Reagan Administration is pursuing arms-control talks with the Soviets, and it has not called a default on the Polish loans. But he cannot be sure that his advantage will hold. While Reagan has been listening to Haig on policy, the Secretary of State never will have the kind of intimacy with the President enjoyed by Weinberger, an amiable, laid-back Californian who has been close to Reagan since he drew up budgets for the Governor of the Golden State in the 1960s.

In particular, Haig may clash again with Weinberger on policy toward the Middle East. He argued successfully last year that the U.S. should not impose the tough sanctions against Israel that Weinberger wanted after the Israeli raid against the nuclear reactor in Iraq. Haig feared that so blunt a tone would make Begin's government less receptive to American persuasion. But Haig's own policy of promoting a "strategic consensus" among the U.S., Israel and moderate Arab states against Soviet penetration of the area has gone nowhere, and the Secretary of State no longer uses the phrase. Haig's lieutenants are now devoting more attention to defusing the Israeli-Arab animosity over the Palestinian issue somehow, but they appear to have no new ideas about how to make progress.

Bereft of any long-range political strategy, U.S. foreign policy has increasingly focused on arms sales abroad, which is one idea that Haig and Weinberger agree on--sort of. Typically, Weinberger would go further and faster than Haig; he pushed hard for the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia, while the Secretary of State was lukewarm. Nonetheless, both Secretaries and the White House staff agree that the U.S. must arm friendly nations, both to win their cooperation and to keep them from turning to the Soviets for weapons. Indeed, Haig in Morocco and Weinberger in Saudi Arabia and Oman were simultaneously pursuing the same objective: laying the diplomatic groundwork to secure a chain of facilities that the American Rapid Deployment Force might some day use to hopscotch from the U.S. to the Middle East on its way to counter a Soviet thrust.

Admits one senior White House official: "Our foreign policy is in large part arms sales; that's true. Every other week we are selling something to someone." From October through January, the first four months of fiscal 1982, Government commitments to sell arms abroad came to $14 billion, not far short of the highest total ever recorded for any full fiscal year ($15 billion in 1980).

Administration officials, however, can point to few tangible gains from this policy of showering weapons abroad. Saudi Arabia, for example, has so far refused to give any "public" assurances about its possible use of AWACS planes that might mollify Israel. On Weinberger's recent trip, a Saudi official told U.S. visitors: "You are just arms salesmen, and we pay cash," making it clear that the Saudis would use the AWACS any way they please. The only reply from the White House was a remark from one spokesman: "We do not regard that as an official statement." Selling arms to Jordan is supposed to counter Soviet influence in that country, but King Hussein has given no indication yet that he will cancel an order for Soviet ground-to-air missiles, even if the U.S. does provide him with similar missiles and fighters.

The White House staff has been no help in setting a consistent foreign policy line, and that is where the leadership must come from in the end. William P. Clark, who replaced the inept Richard Allen as Reagan's National Security Adviser in January, is too new in his job to enforce coordination between Haig and Weinberger, let alone advance any strong ideas of his own. Moreover, Reagan's other top aides appear almost as uncomfortable with foreign policy issues as the President does. Too often they see these issues in domestic political terms--namely, how a decision will either enhance or detract from the President's image. At a recent Camp David session to plan for the fall elections, Reagan's political advisers did conclude that he should be perceived by the public as more in control of U.S. foreign policy. Before that can happen, the White House needs to have a better idea of just what it is he should be seen to be controlling. --By George J. Church.

Reported by Douglas Brew and Gregory H. Wierzynski/Washington

With reporting by Douglas Brew, Gregory H. Wierzynski

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