A Deadly Dilemma

By WALTER ISAACSON

Congress and the White House agonize over arms control

With the inevitability of fallout from an atom bomb, the ever growing national concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war landed on Washington last week. There was a special debate in the House on arms control. The Senate held heated hearings on the Administration's strategic policy that raised sharp questions about the need for new weapons systems. Urged by anxious aides to get out front on a populist issue that threatens to overwhelm his plans for a massive military buildup, President Reagan held his first evening press conference--broadcast on television's prime time--to assure his fellow citizens that he shared their worries. Said the President in his opening statement: "My goal is to reduce nuclear weapons dramatically, assuring lasting peace and security."

Reagan's words were designed to calm a nation that has become increasingly unsettled by his Administration's apparent lack of commitment to arms control and its loose talk about the feasibility of "limited" nuclear wars. "I invite the Soviet Union to join with us now to substantially reduce nuclear weapons and make an important breakthrough for lasting peace on earth," the President told reporters gathered in the White House East Room. "Everybody would be a loser if there is a nuclear war."

Reagan's call for arms control had another purpose as well: to defuse public sentiment for an immediate freeze by both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons. The President feels this would serve to seal what he claims is the Soviets' present strategic advantage.

"On balance the Soviet Union does have a definite margin of superiority," he said. "I think that a freeze would not only be disadvantageous--in fact even dangerous--to us with them in that position, but I believe it would also militate against any negotiations . . . The Soviets' great edge is one in which they could absorb our retaliatory blow and hit us again."

That candid suggestion of U.S. inferiority went well beyond anything said by Reagan's recent predecessors in the White House. The President and his advisers had discussed the issue beforehand. They clearly underestimated the political and diplomatic impact of the statement, which once more conveyed to some observers of the press conference a sense that Reagan lacked command of foreign affairs. Some nuclear experts charged that Reagan was simply wrong--a question on which there is room for argument (see box). Others contended that whether or not the President was right as to the facts, his admission of weakness could only inflame Europe's politically potent peace movement, with its anti-American overtones, and encourage the Soviets to act tougher. Thus, as soon as the implications of Reagan's statement became clear, the so-called fudge factory of State Department spokesmen began backtracking. Richard Burt, director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, rushed onto the CBS Morning News the following day and explained, "What the President actually said was that the Soviets have the momentum and we are worried about the trends."

To chill sentiment for a freeze of weapons at the present levels, Reagan announced his support of a Senate resolution, which the White House helped draft, sponsored by Democrat Henry Jackson of Washington and Republican John Warner of Virginia. Although it uses the word freeze, the Jackson-Warner proposal would place no restraints on new weapons until the Soviets and Americans agree on a mutual reduction of armaments to equal levels. This would allow, among other things, the U.S. to proceed with the deployment of new Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe in order to counter the Soviets' present advantage in intermediate-range nuclear weapons on the Continent. "If you freeze first, Western Europe is left naked," Jackson has argued. The plan has 61 sponsors in the Senate and 103 in the House.

The Jackson-Warner resolution was designed as an alternative to a Senate proposal for an immediate freeze, sponsored by Democrat Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and Republican Mark Hatfield of Oregon. Their resolution calls on the U.S. to seek agreement now with the Soviets to halt the production and deployment of all nuclear weapons, in a fashion that each side could verify, as a prelude to arms-reduction talks. Attacking Reagan's assertion that the U.S. needs to continue its buildup in order to force eventual arms reductions, Kennedy argued, "This is voodoo arms control, which says you must have more in order to have less."

Although the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution has attracted only 20 supporters in the Senate, it has a better chance of passage in the House, which last week held an extraordinary eight-hour arms-control debate. The most recent comparable session was a discussion of the Viet Nam War in 1969. In somber tones Speaker Tip O'Neill spoke of the overabundance of warheads possessed by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Said he: "What is happening to us? What is the cause of this madness? I hope and pray the [freeze resolution] will provide the vehicle to stop this arms race." Republican Leader Robert Michel disagreed: "The major issue confronting the world today is not the possession of nuclear arms by the U.S., but the defense and preservation of freedom. If freedom cannot be defended through any other means but the possession of a nuclear deterrent by the U.S., the possession of such a deterrent is a political and moral imperative."

On the other side of the Capitol, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee met with top Administration policymakers who had come to sound out sentiment on the disarmament issue. They got an earful. Maryland Republican Charles Mathias, normally quiet and reflective, slammed both hands against the table as he told the officials they have had 467 days since Reagan's Inauguration to do something about arms control but have produced nothing. "He's pounding the table for all of us," chimed in Massachusetts Democrat Paul Tsongas. "This issue will make Viet Nam seem like a Cakewalk."

Members of the committee finally got their chance last week to interrogate Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Thomas K. Jones, who had suggested, in an interview with the Los Angeles Times last January, that the U.S. could survive a nuclear war if enough people dug homemade shelters. The Senators wanted to use Jones' testimony to publicize the Administration's casual attitude toward limited nuclear war and its unwarranted faith in civil defense, but they had to threaten a subpoena before a reluctant Pentagon would allow him to appear. Jones was subdued and careful. In a barely audible voice, he said he had not meant to "imply that nuclear war was anything less than a terrible disaster." He left it to Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle to defend the Administration's seven-year, $4.2 billion civil defense plan, which calls for evacuating people from 380 high-risk centers to presumably safer nonurban "host areas." But the Armed Services Committee agreed, on a voice vote last week, to cut the proposed 80% increase in civil defense funds to a 5% increase.

The rising antinuclear sentiment has contributed to an erosion of support for the Administration's proposed military buildup, which is already in trouble because of worries over huge budget deficits. Last week the Armed Services Committee voted to eliminate $2.1 billion in funds for deploying the first 40 MX intercontinental missiles. The Administration, which has still not decided how to base these new weapons, wanted to house them temporarily in existing Minuteman silos. Critics charged that this ad hoc system would make them vulnerable to a Soviet strike. The committee made $1.1 billion more in cuts before sending the fiscal 1983 weapons budget of $180.2 billion to the Senate floor. There it may face even rougher treatment as critics attempt to cut $11.3 billion in funds slated for the B-l strategic bomber and two nuclear aircraft carriers. The budget trimmers got some moral support from Gerald Ford, who said last week that it was "hogwash" to think that U.S. security would be endangered by a slowdown in weapons procurement. Said he: "The Soviet Union isn't going to attack the U.S. because you deliver in one fiscal year three less B-l bombers. That's baloney."

What began as a popular, and populist, grass-roots sentiment has now become a potent factor in determining U.S. policy. This is the basic strength of a democratic system, but also a possible cause for concern. In an open society, legitimate movements based on valid ideals, like the arms-control crusade, have the potential to be manipulated in such a way that passions and emotions override rational judgments.

The Administration also reacted to the antinuclear sentiment by pushing ahead with plans for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) earlier than some diplomatic experts would have wished. At his press conference, Reagan said he hoped to be ready for talks by summer, but added that "setting a date will depend somewhat on the whole international situation." Reagan's vague words appeared to be a slight backing away from the strong concept of linkage--tying arms negotiations to good behavior by the Soviets in Poland and elsewhere--that is favored by Secretary of State Alexander Haig, among others. As for the Soviets, the official news agency TASS questioned Reagan's genuine commitment to arms control but responded favorably to his call for talks: "The Soviet Union is not the side that has to be convinced of the benefits of negotiations."

Nonetheless, the Administration faces several major hurdles on the way to START talks. Although the experts hope to have some options ready by next month, none of the U.S. bargaining positions has been determined, nor has the President made any basic strategy decisions. In addition, even some of its supporters wonder whether this Administration is truly capable of reaching a settlement with the Soviets.

Some officials, particularly at the Pentagon, simply do not believe in arms control on any realistic terms. "It seems far fetched to imagine Edward Rowny signing an agreement with the Russians," said one Administration official, referring to the retired Army general and vocal opponent of SALT II who heads Reagan's START team. Nor is it clear that the Soviets would seriously consider the concessions that Reagan and his team will undoubtedly demand. The Kremlin leaders may well conclude that their best course is simply to stoke the antinuclear movement with claims that the Soviet Union is interested only in peace. Thus they could gain the best of both worlds, undercutting support for Reagan's military buildup while avoiding arms reductions of their own. --By Walter Isaacson. Reported by Douglas Brew and Evan Thomas/Washington

With reporting by Douglas Brew and Evan Thomas/Washington

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