Teetering on the Brink

By George Russell

As the diplomats talk, Britain and Argentina brace for combat

Like wary boxers who had learned they could be hurt, Britain and Argentina traded cautious punches last week around the Falkland Islands. The military action was restrained: both sides drew blood, but neither tried to aim a knockout blow in their South Atlantic confrontation. The reason: there were continuing prospects for a diplomatic resolution of the six-week crisis.

Although each side remained deeply suspicious of the other, the main action shifted for most of the week from the frigid waters around the disputed islands to secluded conference rooms in the United Nations Secretariat building in Manhattan. Even as they continued to spar with warships and planes, the combatants exchanged peace proposals through U.N. Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar. To be sure, the hopes for a diplomatic settlement were fragile. The greatest gulf between the disputants was still caused by the central issue: the ultimate disposition of the Falklands. But Argentina's Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Mendez optimistically declared: "We are closer to peace than we are to war." Said Sir Anthony Parsons, Britain's Ambassador to the U.N.: "I think we are making progress again." Declared Perez de Cuellar on Friday: "There is always a risk of a breakdown." But the two parties "are much closer than when I started my exercise. These next days will be decisive."

In an effort to persuade the Argentines to budge on the thorny issue of Falklands sovereignty, U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig sent Retired General Vernon Walters, a trusted troubleshooter, to Buenos Aires. Haig has also been urging other Latin American governments to intercede with Argentina, to little avail.

At week's end the negotiating process was interrupted as Ambassador Parsons flew back to London to consult with his government. There was no indication of whether his departure was an omen for good or ill, although Parsons on arriving in Britain declared that this week "things will move very rapidly one way or another." Underscoring that point, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sounded far from hopeful as she told a Conservative Party audience in Perth, Scotland, that a negotiated settlement of the Falklands dispute "may prove unattainable." Said she with passion: "I hope with all my heart that the negotiations will succeed. I do not want to see one more life lost in the South Atlantic--whether Argentine or British--if it can be avoided." But she warned that if the diplomatic process broke down, "we should have to turn to the only course left open to us"--invasion of the islands.

There was further cause for concern when the Soviet Union for the first time intruded into the Falklands dispute. British Ambassador Sir Curtis Keeble was summoned to the Foreign Ministry in Moscow to hear a surprisingly harsh statement read by Vladimir Pavlovich Suslov, the desk officer dealing with Britain. Suslov condemned as "unlawful" the 200-mile air-and-sea blockade that the British have been maintaining since April 30 around the Falklands. He also accused London of having issued several "warnings" to the Soviets that were regarded as "provocative." Suslov presumably was referring to notifications that London had sent to all governments concerning its blockade. Moscow's motives were obscure, although the Kremlin surely would like to increase its standing with Argentina--the Soviets are that nation's most important trading partner--as well as to curry favor with Latin America as a whole.

Meanwhile, preparations for an all-out war over the Falklands continued. To the skirl of bagpipes, some 3,500 Scottish, Welsh and Gurkha troops last week boarded the hastily requisitioned Queen Elizabeth 2 to begin a ten-day journey to the South Atlantic. They were intended to join some 4,000 other British soldiers in the potential invasion force aboard the 20-ship battle squadron surrounding the islands. British warships kept up a harassing bombardment of the Falklands coastline, while Sea Harrier jets sank an Argentine trawler, possibly a spy ship, that was discovered deep within the blockade zone. Argentine warplanes flew a retaliatory sortie against the blockading fleet; London said that three of the aircraft were downed, and the Argentines damaged one British frigate in the action. hen the British added a daring new twist to their tactics. Late Friday night, a commando force slipped ashore on Pebble Island, a slice of land practically touching West Falkland Island. Supported by naval gunfire, the raiders, who were probably ferried ashore in helicopters, attacked an airstrip and Argentine military outpost, blowing up a large ammunition dump and destroying eleven aircraft. The action was a sustained one; it was only after dawn that the commando force left the island, suffering only two minor casualties. London stressed that the operation was a "raid, not an invasion," but the assault marked the first time that British troops had set foot on the Falklands since their departure after the Argentine invasion on April 2.

While claims and counterclaims about the progress of peace negotiations emanated from London and Buenos Aires, the leaders of both countries remained ready to use even more force to settle the dispute. Prime Minister Thatcher, who insisted that "there are certain fundamental principles which we cannot fudge in any way," was prepared to add the "land dimension"--a step-by-step invasion--to the Falklands pressure. British Defense Secretary John Nott also talked of mounting an extended air-and-sea blockade "for far longer than the amount of supplies the Argentines have available for their forces on the islands." For his part, President Leopoldo Galtieri, head of Argentina's ruling three-man junta, warned sternly that "if Britain continues to use her military strength to the maximum, Argentina is spiritually and militarily ready to respond."

As the rhetoric of the belligerents grew harsher, U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, facing his first frontline test as the U.N.'s top diplomat, was attempting to ease the tension. Perez de Cuellar had assumed responsibility for mediating the dispute on April 30, after a month-long peace-keeping effort by U.S. Secretary of State Haig ended in failure. Perez's peace proposals do not differ markedly from those originally put forward by Haig. They include: 1) a ceasefire; 2) phased and corresponding withdrawal of Argentine troops and the British fleet; 3) establishment of a temporary administration over the islands, under U.N. auspices; 4) the opening of direct negotiations on the final disposition of the disputed territory.

Unlike Haig, however, Perez de Cuellar has concentrated on the procedural details, such as the sequence of troop withdrawals and the membership of the interim administration, rather than the substantive differences between the disputants, The key to Perez de Cuellar's mediation has been to avoid all discussion of the most difficult issue: ultimate sovereignty over the islands.

His negotiating technique was to meet with each envoy separately. Sometimes the emissaries would come twice a day to his spacious 38th-floor office overlooking the East River. The Secretary-General would make an oral presentation to each on a point or two and then ask for comments. Each representative would then communicate with his home government. When the replies were disappointing, the Secretary-General would look for "some conciliatory U.N. formula." His worst fear, he said, was "the danger of a great military incident in the area. I am always wondering whether one of the parties would withdraw from the negotiating table because of such an incident."

Perez de Cuellar's efforts were helped by the fact that both London and Buenos Aires were sobered by the sinking two weeks ago of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, with 321 fatalities, and the British destroyer Sheffield, which lost 20 men. Britain had backed away from a demand for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Argentine troops from the Falklands. In their talks with Perez de Cuellar, the British also indicated that they would accept a temporary U.N. administration of the Falklands.

For their part, the Argentines made the somewhat murky concession that any peace agreement had to contain a "sure and guaranteed route" to Argentine sovereignty over the Falklands "within a reasonable time." That stood in distinction to an earlier position that the sovereignty issue was beyond discussion.

The Argentine concession, if such it was, did not impress Thatcher. In the House of Commons, she spelled out Britain's minimal negotiating demands with her customary acerbic style. Any Falklands ceasefire, she said, "must be accompanied by a withdrawal of the Argentines to a specific timetable and in a comparatively short time. We must make it absolutely clear that the Argentines must not enter into these negotiations in the belief or on the condition that by the end of them sovereignty is ceded."

On the key question of who would ultimately hold sovereignty over the islands, Thatcher and the government had earlier maintained that the 1,800 residents themselves must have the final say about who would rule them--a point flatly rejected by the Argentines because it was a guarantee that the islands would stay British. The British have softened this stand by stating that while the wishes and interests of the islanders must be considered in any settlement, those need not necessarily be the deciding factors. However, said Thatcher, "we are working for a peaceful solution, not a peaceful sellout. Our objective would be to allow the people of the Falkland Islands their own wishes, to live their own way of life under the government of their choice."

One reason for Thatcher's firmness was that she was coming under fire from an unusual source: right-wing members of the Conservative Party are growing increasingly restless with their government's willingness to try for a negotiated settlement. To those M.P.s, Britain has already made too many concessions. Such accusations drew an angry riposte from Foreign Secretary Francis Pym, who stoutly insisted that "our resolve has not wavered. Our military presence in the South Atlantic is continuing to become stronger. If, in the end, Argentine intransigence prevented success in negotiations, Argentina will know there is another kind of ending to this crisis."

The other ending that Britain now has in mind is a gradual invasion. As one senior British diplomat told TIME Correspondent Frank Melville, "The strategy is not a simple choice between war and peace. What the government intends is a stage-by-stage repossession, with partial landings on the West and then the East island, but with the door being left open for continuing diplomatic efforts. This means pushing the Argentines to the conference table on a realistic basis by exerting greater and greater military pressure until their nerve fails them."

In practical terms, the scheme for a backdoor invasion calls first for British landings at remote beaches on West Falkland, where few Argentine troops are believed to be. That would give the British naval task force a land base for its vertical takeoff Harrier fighters. The plan also calls for the placing of radar on high ground on West Falkland to prevent a recurrence of the surprise Argentine air attack that destroyed the Sheffield.

The British would establish a number of bridgeheads on West Falkland before attacking the eastern island. The final aim is to limit casualties while creating an air, sea and land encirclement of the territory's capital of Port Stanley and the lesser port of Darwin.

The invasion plan is the result of a compromise within Prime Minister Thatcher's five-member war cabinet. According to top-level British sources, Thatcher herself favors a frontal assault on Port Stanley, currently the Argentine strongpoint. She has also considered a British air strike against Argentina's mainland airbases. But the more cautious members of her inner circle, notably Foreign Secretary Pym and Deputy Prime Minister William Whitelaw, are anxious to keep the avenues for a diplomatic solution open to the very end. They also fear heavy British casualties. Accordingly, they made a bargain with Thatcher, trading their support of her tough stand on the question of Falklands sovereignty for her acquiescence to the step-by-step invasion. Says a senior British Cabinet minister: "On this basis we will enter this fray as a united Cabinet."

At least some of last week's sporadic military action may have been related to the invasion plan. Early in the week a British frigate nosed into Falkland Sound (now known to the Argentines as the Straits of San Carlos) between East and West Falkland. The aim was to provoke Argentine fire in order to gain knowledge of hostile troop positions. A Lynx helicopter was launched from the frigate, and machine guns and a flare were fired, but there was no Argentine response.

Later in the week, however, the British Defense Ministry announced that a frigate had attacked an Argentine supply vessel in the sound. When the frigate fired its 4.5-in. guns, British officials said, there was a huge explosion, leading to speculation that the vessel might have been an oil tanker. In Buenos Aires, military spokesmen flatly denied the account, but late in the week the Argentines said that they had lost radio contact with a supply vessel on transportation duty in the Falklands.

Easier to verify was the news of a British Harrier assault on an Argentine fishing boat, the Narwal. Argentina first disclosed the attack, charging the British not only with bombing and strafing the boat southeast of the Falklands but also with attacking the vessel's lifeboat after the 26-member crew had abandoned ship. British officials first denied the incident, then agreed that an attack had taken place. They said that 25 crewmen, 14 of whom were wounded, were taken prisoner and that one Argentine, killed in the incident, was buried at sea. The British, who denied machine-gunning the lifeboat, said that the Narwal, which eventually sank, carried sophisticated electronic spying gear and that one of the prisoners was an Argentine naval officer. The Argentines, in turn, argued that the boat carried no eavesdropping equipment.

There was also a dispute over the outcome of a midweek raid by mainland-based Argentine A-4 attack bombers against the British fleet. According to the British, twelve of the U.S.-built Skyhawks, carrying bombs and rockets, bore down on the ships. British Defense Ministry sources said that two of the aircraft were downed by British frigates using sophisticated Sea wolf missiles, while a third disappeared from task force radar screens and was presumed destroyed. (The Argentines said two aircraft were lost.) The Argentines claimed that their bombers had inflicted considerable damage on the frigates during the attack, while the British said that one of the ships had suffered minor damage from a bomb and was back in service the same day. Whatever the results, it was an uncomfortable reminder of the vulnerability of the British fleet to attack by air. (The British also lost a helicopter that the Argentines said they shot down; the British account was that the aircraft was ditched at sea.)

Meanwhile, top priority for British antisubmarine aircraft and frigates last week was to locate Argentina's diesel-powered Santiago del Estero. The World War II sub, built by the U.S., has a 12,000-mile range and poses an unnerving threat to the liners Canberra and QE2.

British ships edging within 14 miles of the Falklands coast continued last week to shell the Port Stanley area and the airfield, which London said was "severely cratered." But the Argentines displayed a film showing C-130 Hercules aircraft taking off from the airstrip. The landing strip may have been useless for fighter aircraft, but it was apparently still accessible to the versatile transports.

Britain's gravest weakness was in the air. The 17 Sea Harriers aboard the British fleet cannot achieve superiority over Argentina's 42 Mirage and Dagger fighters and 64 Skyhawk bombers based on the mainland. An additional 18 Harriers, most of which had arrived in the Falklands battle area last week, would not be enough to make up the difference. The British reportedly asked Washington for a KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft for in-flight refueling.

Without air superiority, says one foreign military attache in Buenos Aires, "the British might be able to land troops, but they would take very heavy losses because they could not keep an umbrella over them for a long enough period. When the Harriers are supporting their troops, they are a match for the Argentine planes, but they can't be there all the time. They simply don't have enough." Adds a Western European military observer: "Once the troops were ashore, the entire Argentine air force would go into battle. The British could not cover the troops from sea fire. They can try landing by helicopter, but they would lose a fair number of the choppers."

Another problem for Britain remains the size of the potential invasion force. Even with the troops aboard the QE2, the British would still be outnumbered by the Argentines. By many military estimates, an attacking force should outnumber defenders by at least 3 to 1 to ensure success; at the moment, the Argentines outnumber the British by 2 to 1. In addition, the British are undoubtedly suffering from the effects of weeks on the turbulent South Atlantic seas. On the other hand, Argentine forces are also suffering from the harsh conditions of their garrison duty on the windswept Falklands.

If the hostilities continue for any lengthy period, the Argentines are expected to run into problems of their own, including shortage of spare parts for warplanes, ammunition and high-technology missiles like the French-built Exocet that smashed the H.M.S. Sheffield two weeks ago. Argentine military suppliers, such as France and West Germany, have embargoed further shipments to the country. Some of the slack will be taken up by neighboring Brazil, which has its own burgeoning arms industry but cannot supply the most sophisticated weapons. Some military observers in Argentina believe that the Soviet Union has offered weaponry and other forms of support. So far, the Argentines have shown no inclination to accept Soviet help. Peru and Venezuela have both offered military aid to Argentina, and there were reports last week that Argentina was scrambling in the netherworld of the private international arms market to satisfy some of its needs.

The monetary cost of the war effort was not yet seriously bothering the Argentines, although it would surely have long-range adverse effects. Over the weekend foreign ministers of the European Community were expected to renew their month-long economic sanctions against Argentina.

Meanwhile, Argentina seemed perfectly willing to face the prospect of all-out war. In coastal cities in the southern portion of the country, blackouts had become common as a precaution against air raids, and schoolchildren drilled for attacks by crouching beneath their desks. The government appealed for "patriotic" financial contributions to the war effort from the public and received more than $20 million in cash and valuables, including Aberdeen Angus steers and Mercedes-Benz automobiles.

In a society traditionally riven by social strife, the anticipated danger had created a kind of unanimity. Even the rivalry among the three branches of the Argentine armed forces had, for the moment at least, disappeared. In one emotional scene last week, thousands of Argentines turned out to welcome 189 soldiers and civilians who finally returned home after their capture by the British on April 25 on remote South Georgia Island. There seemed no reason to doubt the resolve of President Galtieri, who warned once again last week that if the drawn-out Falklands battle turned into a broader war, "we will be forced to reply with every means at our disposal." --By George Russell. Reported by Bonnie Angela/London and Barry Hillenbrand/Buenos Aires

With reporting by Bonnie Angelo, Barry Hillenbrand

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