The Moral Equivalent of War

By Jimmy Carter

"The energy crisis has not yet overwhelmed us, but it will if we do not act quickly.. . Our decision about energy will test the character of the American people and the ability of the President and the Congress to govern this nation. This difficult effort will be the 'moral equivalent of war, 'except that we will be uniting our efforts to build and not to destroy."

--Address to the nation, April 18,1977

Then I declared the energy effort to be the moral equivalent of war, a phrase coined by William James and suggested to me by Admiral Hyman Rickover, it was impossible for me to imagine the bloody legislative battles ahead. Throughout my entire term, Congress and I struggled with energy legislation. Despite my frustration, there was never a moment when I did not consider the creation of a national energy policy equal in importance to any other goal.

There was no doubt in my mind that our national security was at stake. In 1973, at the time of the oil embargo, we were importing about 35% of our oil. When I took office, our dependence on uncertain foreign oil supplies had grown to almost 50%--about 9 million bbl. a day. We were the only developed nation without an energy policy, and our total energy consumption was at a record high. The program put into effect during my term has now reversed the movement toward disaster. In some ways the bitter four-year struggle that proved necessary made the final victory even sweeter.

Our problems in 1977 were twofold. In the long run, available supplies of oil and natural gas would not be able to meet growing demand. We owed it to future generations to stop wasting so much energy and find other sources for fuel. The immediate problems were serious enough. Our excessive purchases on the world oil market were helping to force prices ever upward, and spasmodic shortages were damaging to the American economy. We were afflicted with both inflation and unemployment, and there was special suffering among the aged and poor.

The international dangers were also obvious. We and our major allies were susceptible to potential political blackmail from the oil-producing nations. Consumer nations that had little or no energy of their own were especially vulnerable and were inclined to modify their foreign policies accordingly.

Ignoring these unpleasant facts would have had grave consequences. Some of our more militant leaders were already talking about plans to seize foreign oilfields by force if our supplies were cut off again. Many others deeply resented that the greatest nation on earth was being jerked around by a few desert states.

We realized that in order to stimulate American production and encourage conservation, our domestic prices would have to rise, but in a predictable and orderly fashion, so that consumers of petroleum products would be protected from unreasonable fuel bills issued by an uncontrolled semimonopoly. Also, the unearned profits from higher prices needed to be shared with the consuming public.

The package finally approved was extremely complicated, but far-reaching in its beneficial effect on our nation. The production of gas-guzzling automobiles would be deterred by heavy penalties; electric utility companies could no longer encourage waste of energy with their distorted rate structures and would have to join in a common effort to insulate buildings; higher efficiency of home appliances would be required; gasahol production and car pooling were promoted with tax incentives; coal production and use were stimulated, along with the use of pollution-control devices; and the carefully phased decontrol of natural gas prices would bring predictability to the market, increase exploration for new supplies and reduce waste of this clean-burning fuel. The new bills also included strong encouragement for solar-power development. [In a second round of energy legislation, Carter achieved the deregulation of domestic oil prices, the levying of a tax on the windfall profits from the resulting price increases and the creation of an $88 billion program to develop synthetic fuels.]

In looking back on the "moral equivalent of war" against energy waste and excessive vulnerability from oil imports, I see nothing exhilarating or pleasant. It was a bruising fight, and no final, clear-cut victory could be photographed and hung on the wall for our grandchildren to admire. The results will have to speak for themselves; they are already doing so. Our Administration left the country with petroleum inventories at record levels, a natural gas surplus and a fair distribution system for it, more exploration under way for new petroleum than at any time in history and an orderly plan for eliminating unnecessary federal restraints. The rate of growth of domestic coal production doubled, and oil imports and even total consumption dropped rapidly. A substantial portion of the succeeding oil glut was caused by the worldwide shift to more efficient uses of energy and emphasis on fuels other than oil and gas.

There will undoubtedly be alternating periods of shortages and oversupply in the future, but now our country is better equipped to deal with either eventuality. Most important is that the attitude of the American people concerning energy has changed. Maybe our efforts have engendered a spirit of common purpose and sacrifice that will be adequate to meet new crises--if we remember that the war is not over.

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