Reflections of a China Hand

When the man who initiated the present U.S. policy to ward China returned to Peking last month to commemorate his triumphal 1972 presidential visit, China's current leaders hailed him as "an old friend" and treated him as a visiting head of state. Shortly after Richard Nixon's return home, TIME Diplomatic Correspondent Strobe Talbott interviewed him at his office in New York City and found him relishing the role of elder internationalist. Now 69, Nixon is convinced that his accomplishments in foreign policy will vindicate his presidency. He is proudest of his role in renewing U.S. relations with China. His optimism on the future of Sino-American relations is based not only on nostalgia but on cogent analysis and firsthand experience. In Nixon's view, the resumption of negotiations between the People's Republic and the Soviet Union is not necessarily a cause for alarm. "What brought us and the Chinese together ten years ago--the Soviet threat--is greater now than before, and the Chinese know it at least as well as we do," he says. "Still, I am not among those who believe it would be good for us if the Soviet

Union and China went at each other. Let's suppose tensions were to escalate and the Soviet Union were to jump the Chinese. In the nuclear age, such a conflict would inevitably lead to global war." Added Nixon: "Therefore, a reduction in Sino-Soviet tensions should be welcomed. Besides, a lasting relationship between the U.S. and China cannot be based solely, or even primarily, on fear of the

Soviet Union; for as the fear diminishes, the relationship comes to an end."

Nor is Nixon upset that the Chinese are stepping up criticism of the U.S. in their propaganda aimed at the Third World. "It's not in our interests for us to be in lockstep with them," he says. "It is, however, in our interests for them to pose an ideologically attractive alternative to Soviet influence in poor, developing countries and to prevent the Soviets from being the only major spokesman for those countries. The Chinese feel they have to kick us around a bit to keep their own credentials as a Third World nation."

What do the Chinese leaders think of Ronald Reagan's brand of anti-Sovietism? "They're too intelligent and sophisticated to tell me. What I sense is that deep down they welcome and respect an Administration that's anti-Soviet and that's committed to a military buildup. But what concerns them is how effective and realistic its policies are. And on that the jury is still out."

Nixon would like to see a shift in Sino-American relations from an emphasis on strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union to economic cooperation, "not on a modest, but on a massive scale." He believes the Chinese want the same thing. "When I first went to the People's Republic in 1972," he recalls, "the conversation was all geopolitics. Economic assistance hardly came up at all. Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai made clear that they weren't about to sell their ideology for a bowl of economic pottage. What we talked about was survival in the face of the common Soviet threat. On this last trip, by contrast, the present leaders wanted to talk about their econo my and what the U.S., the richest nation in the world, can do to help China, the most populous and one of the poorest."

Nixon believes that the priority the People's Republic is giving to economic development may provide a way out of the conundrum of Taiwan. Says he: "There's no question that the Taiwan issue has poisoned relations for the past two years. Some people here in the U.S. took the attitude that they could do anything they wanted with regard to Taiwan, and that forced the Chinese leaders to demonstrate that Peking can't be taken for granted, that China has other places to turn to. Let's keep the problem on the back burner and not go off on new arms sales [to Taiwan] at least so long as Peking continues down the path of 'peacefully resolving' the issue. I think it will be resolved subtly. The Chinese know they need a vital, economically strong Taiwan and Hong Kong too. Both, I think, may eventually end up in some sort of a loose federation or commonwealth with the People's Republic. They don't know exactly how it will work, but it will be very clever."

What about the evolution of Chinese Communism itself?

Nixon sees Deng Xiaoping, his comrades and his successors

facing a deep dilemma.

"On the one hand, as pragmatists, they know that doctrinaire Communism simply doesn't work.

They're impressed and even awed by what they see in Japan, South Korea, Singapore and the other non-Communist countries of Asia as compared to their own situation. They know that what China needs is a true Great Leap Forward and that Communism won't get them there.

On the other hand, they also know that the Communist system provides the best way in the world for a set of leaders to stay in power. Also, they haven't washed out of themselves their upbringing as Marxists."

Nixon believes that the U.S. can coax the Chinese in the right direction by providing them with Western technology. He hastens to add: "That does not necessarily mean military technology. We should reduce the profile of our military partnership with them. There is no point in having American Secretaries of Defense running over there all the time, putting on their hard hats and huffing and puffing. [Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown visited China in 1980, and Caspar Weinberger wants to go.] For one thing, that kind of display doesn't scare the Russians; it just makes them more conspiratorial. The Russians know the Chinese are light-years behind them militarily, and the U.S. couldn't do much to change that even if it wanted to.

"The best way to help China is to strengthen its economy. A weak China invites aggression. Therefore, what they need most is the technology to build up their industry. [The Reagan Administration] has got to break the roadblocks with regard to technology transfer."

In Nixon's view, it would be a grave mistake for the U.S. to miss the opportunity now available. Says he: "China, with its population and resources, is eventually going to be a superpower in any event. It is vital that we help them become a superpower associated with the West rather than one that is against us. Developing that relationship, which will take skillful leadership, could be the overriding factor of the next ten years, perhaps of the next century. It may change the world."

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