Homecoming to Misery

By Kenneth W. Banta

Africa's onetime model state betrays its promise

The refugees waved and cheered from overcrowded trucks; thousands of them stampeded joyfully down the gangways of rusty ships docked at Ghana's port of Tema. They were home after an often brutal fortnight spent in flight from Nigeria, more than 200 miles to the east. Along with workers from other nearby countries, the Ghanaians had been made scapegoats for Nigeria's formidable economic problems, and last month the Nigerian authorities gave them just two weeks to leave the country. Terrorized by fear of reprisals if they stayed, more than 500,000 Ghanaians braved beatings, bureaucratic delays and dwindling food supplies to reach their homeland. At least 30 died en route.

Those who made it back quickly found an impoverished nation hopelessly in debt, staggering under an increasingly unpopular, largely ineffectual military regime. It was not always so. Back in the late '50s, Ghana (pop. 11.5 million) was something of a showcase for African nationalism. It was the world's leading exporter of cocoa, and it produced nearly 10% of the world's gold. Its Western-style constitution promised civil liberties and political stability. Over the years, however, Ghana's promise was betrayed by a succession of inept governments and ill-considered economic policies. The returnees last week were quickly hustled off to their native villages, where few of them will find work and many may go hungry.

What has become a blueprint for failure began as Africa's first black nation to emerge from colonial rule. Under the charismatic leadership of its first President, Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana gained independence from Britain in 1957. But poor planning and extravagant government spending soon undermined the economy, while incompetent officials and pervasive corruption eroded Nkrumah's popular support. In 1966 he was overthrown in a widely popular military coup. That revolt set the pattern for the future; in the succeeding 17 years Ghana has endured five such coups.

The current military ruler, Flight Lieut. Jerry Rawlings, 35, first came to power in 1979, when he overthrew a military regime, vowing to end corruption and bring a return to parliamentary government. He made good on his second promise, calling free elections three weeks after the coup, but after just two years of civilian rule Rawlngs again moved in with his army strongmen. A leftist revolutionary descended from a Scottish engineer father and a Ghanaian mother, Rawlings promised on regaining power that Cuba would be the model for Ghana's development.

After just 13 months, however, Rawlings' administration is in danger of collapse. He has alienated intellectuals by abolishing the constitution and outlawing all political parties. Of the seven original members of Rawlings' governing Provisional National Defense Council, only two remain in office. The growing belief is that Ghana's economic problems are beyond Rawlings' limited talents to master. Says a onetime schoolmate: "Rawlings is strong on rhetoric but weak on reality."

The depth of Ghana's economic malaise is painfully visible on the streets of Accra, the capital. Potholes are everywhere; government buildings have not seen a new coat of paint in a decade. In the city's once thriving central market, goods are now in short supply. An egg costs $2.20; a pack of cigarettes, $30. Many factories have closed completely for lack of materials, while those that remain open commonly operate at only 10% of capacity. Harvests of cassava, the staple vegetable of the Ghanaian diet, have fallen to 1.8 million tons, down from 3.6 million tons ten years ago.

Ghana's greatest single economic failure, however, has been a precipitous drop in cocoa production, which accounts for 70% of the country's exports. Only 200,000 tons will be produced this year, in contrast to 500,000 tons twelve years ago. The reason: successive regimes forced artificially low prices on farmers, who then abandoned cocoa for more lucrative crops. Meantime, the country's already dwindling export earnings were poured into industrial projects that have largely failed. As a result, Ghana's foreign debt exceeds $2 billion, the equivalent of two years' exports.

In a bid to reinvigorate the economy and revive foreign confidence, Rawlings recently unveiled a new four-year recovery plan based on still more state control of the economy. "Successive Ghanaian governments have done more or less the same thing, with disastrous results," says a Western diplomat. "It seems like a new recipe for an old economic disaster."

The government is currently negotiating with the International Monetary Fund for much needed aid. Bankers say at least $400 million would be required to ease Ghana's problems in 1983. In return, the IMF is likely to demand a devaluation of the cedi, Ghana's grossly overvalued currency, along with other stringent austerity measures. Any such agreement, however, could easily spark another coup by revolutionary elements within the military. The powerful radicals, says a former Ghanaian army officer, would "like to turn Ghana into a Cuba overnight and get rid of the last vestiges of private enterprise." As Rawlings vacillates between unpalatable alternatives, the influx of refugees brings not only the promise of serious food shortages but a dangerous infusion of unfulfilled expectations. Says returning Construction Worker Joseph Azah: "We left Ghana to escape rural poverty. We are not coming back to grow cassava." The flight lieutenant may soon regret that he cannot offer anything better.

--By Kenneth W. Banta. Reported by John Borrell/Accra

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