The Man Without an Agenda

By KURT ANDERSEN

Adviser Clark grows in influence, but influence for what?

For as long as he has worked with Ronald Reagan, William Patrick Clark has had the job of troubleshooter. In 1967, when Reagan was Governor of California, he appointed Clark his chief of staff during an early crisis; thereafter Clark kept the Governor's office meticulously organized. In 1981, as Deputy Secretary of State, Clark worked to smooth Secretary of State Alexander Haig's high-strung relations with the White House. Finally, when Clark replaced Richard Allen as Reagan's National Security Adviser in January of last year, the common reaction in Washington was relief: a bland but efficient mediator had been brought in to straighten out a floundering operation. The staff was demoralized, and Allen was paralyzed by charges that he had improperly accepted gifts from Japanese acquaintances.

More than a year later Clark seems to have created more troubles. The Administration faces growing difficulties with Central America, the Middle East and Peking, and major political problems with U.S. allies in Europe and Congressmen on the Hill. Clark's job is to help devise solutions, but he has become, in many eyes, part of the problem. Instead of shaping or refining the President's raw, conservative instincts, Clark seems determined to let Reagan be Reagan, regardless of the fallout. Clark exercises as much influence as anyone in the Administration over military and foreign policy decisions.

The question is to what coherent purpose that new influence is being put. Clark says he is simply an expediter and administrator, in charge of coordinating national security advice coming in from Foggy Bottom, the Pentagon, the CIA and his own National Security Council (NSC) staff. Indeed, the former (Reagan-appointed) California Supreme Court justice most prides himself on his manifest neutrality and fairness. "I think I've been able to do what I tried to do, and that is act like a judge," Clark says. "I try to run meetings like my old courtroom, giving no opinions myself unless specifically requested."

In contrast with intellectually forceful predecessors like Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Clark does not operate a rump State Department in the White House basement. "I don't have my own agenda separate from the President's," says the soft-spoken aide. He has consolidated his authority by bringing a surface placidity and orderliness to the NSC office. Memos flow smoothly.

But Clark has no training in the substance of the memos. Indeed, he seems to be, in the uncomplimentary phrase of one White House aide, "content-free." He is conservative, but his ideological inclinations are visceral and seldom fine-tuned. Clark, a close friend of Reagan's, mainly seems to reinforce the President's rightward tendencies. On those rare occasions when he does come down hard on one side of an issue, Clark seems too emphatic, as if he seeks to be decisive for the sake of decisiveness. Says a senior State Department official: "He makes decisions that only he thinks have been fully thought out."

Critics point to Clark's ill-advised support for an embargo against West European suppliers of parts for the Soviets' natural gas pipeline. (NATO allies flouted the embargo, and, last fall, Reagan was obliged to drop it.) Clark took over the Administration's El Salvador policy, and the resulting harder line has produced a backlash in Congress. He has generally backed Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's resistance to budget cuts, even when it was clear that Congress would insist on trims. Clark is getting much of the blame for the politically costly skirmishing over Kenneth Adelman's nomination as arms-control chief; he was Adelman's main sponsor. And last month Clark encouraged Reagan to make his star wars missile-defense speech, despite the worries of other Reagan aides that it would reinforce the President's reputation for hawkish loose talk.

Clark has maintained generally cordial relations with the Secretaries of State and Defense. Indeed, he regards his good pal Weinberger practically as a client. Once each month or so, ostensibly to clear the air of tensions, he and Secretary of State George Shultz, accompanied by one aide each, hold a two-hour rap session. Yet that has not stopped the widening rift between the two.

Despite his much professed loyalty to the President and to "team play," Clark has lately run up against the major powers on Reagan's staff. In encouraging the President to speak his angry mind about El Salvador and the nuclear-freeze movement, Clark pointedly prevailed over White House Chief of Staff James Baker and others whom Clark in private dismisses as "civilians" and "political types." In January, Clark interceded against a White House reorganization that would have diminished the role of Presidential Counsellor Edwin Meese. This strained Clark's relations with Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver, who was the architect of the plan. Then in February, Clark tried to oust Press Spokesman David Gergen. "The tension around here is unbelievable," says one White House aide.

Tension between National Security Advisers and other ranking aides is not unique to Reagan's team. The larger problem is that the NSC is now headed by an amateur who, despite his managerial skill, reflects no real policy perspective beyond a rudimentary antiCommunism.

Policymaking has been further hindered by Secretary of State Shultz's reluctance to make waves or weigh in on difficult issues like arms control. Complains Maryland Republican Senator Charles Mathias: "There is too little depth and experience in foreign policy. Reagan hasn't any, Weinberger hasn't any, Clark hasn't any." In other Administrations, packed with scrappy egos, a strong, silent type at the head of the NSC might have fitted in well. But for this Administration, clearly, there is a need for someone at Clark's position who can bring prudence and substantive experience as well as order to the task. --By Kurt Andersen. Reported by Laurence I. Barrett and Gregory H. Wierzynski/ Washington

With reporting by Laurence I. Barrett and Gregory H. Wierzynski/ Washington This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.