The French and British Connection

By John Kohan

A seemingly logical Soviet proposal endangers the alliance

When U.S. and Soviet negotiators return to Geneva this month, they may, paradoxically, find themselves haggling more about British and French weapons than about Soviet SS-20s or U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles. Reason: the centerpiece of the Soviet position is the demand that the 162 nuclear missiles under independent French and British control be counted alongside those of the U.S. If the proposal were accepted, the U.S. would in effect forgo its deployment plans while allowing the Soviets to keep many of their SS-20s in place. As former State Department Counsellor Helmut Sonnenfeldt told participants at TIME'S Atlantic Alliance Conference last week: "The problem of the British and French forces is probably the single most difficult political and psychological issue we face in the West."

What has made the question especially vexing for Western defense strategists is that on its surface the Soviet proposal seems eminently logical. According to Moscow, the U.S. idea of trading Soviet SS-20s against a NATO promise to deploy fewer Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe would still leave the Soviet Union vulnerable to a surprise strike from British and French nuclear forces. Said Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko last month: "Imagine that a terrible tragedy has occurred and that, say, a nuclear-tipped British missile is in flight. Should it carry the tag I AM BRITISH? And if it delivers its charge, people will die just as they would die from any other missile."

Some West Europeans, anxious over the Reagan Administration's hard line toward Moscow, also feel uncomfortable about leaving out the British and French forces. Among them are a number of Socialist politicians, including West German Social Democratic Arms Spokesman Egon Bahr and Denis Healey, deputy leader of the British Labor Party. Says Enrico Jacchia, director of the Italian Center for Strategic Studies in Rome: "A large part of public opinion in Europe feels that the French nuclear force exists, and the effect of saying it should not be counted causes confusion. People think the Americans are playing a trick."

In fact, when they are lined up nuke for nuke beside the vast arsenals held by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the British and French missiles do not seem worth counting. France's force de frappe consists of five nuclear-powered submarines, each equipped with 16 single-warhead missiles, and 18 land-based missiles. Their range: no more than 1,800 miles, barely enough to reach Moscow. Britain relies on four nuclear submarines, each armed with 16 Polaris missiles. Says former French Ambassador to NATO Franc,ois de Rose: "The number we have now is immaterial compared with the 10,000 warheads the Soviet Union and the U.S. have." Moreover, plans to modernize the British and French systems will only marginally overcome their technological inferiority to the Soviet Union's mobile, longer-range SS-20s.

Despite Moscow's stated fears, French and British nuclear forces are simply not large, accurate or powerful enough to be used in a surprise first strike against the Soviet Union. According to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, only eight of the 18 warheads on the French land-based missiles would be likely to reach Soviet targets in time of war. Britain and France's 144 submarine-launched missiles are not accurate enough to hit hardened missile silos and are too few to aim at such standard military targets as airbases. The European warheads exist for their deterrent value; they could destroy Soviet cities in retaliation for an attack on Britain or France. Says Colonel Jonathan Alford, deputy director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies: "French and British nuclear weapons are essentially weapons of last resort, designed to make it clear to the Soviets that they cannot risk an attack on London or Paris without suffering the destruction of, say, Moscow and Kiev." But if France or Britain ever fired their nukes first, they would leave themselves open to annihilation.

In addition, the British and French nuclear contribution to overall Western security is less significant than Moscow seems to think. Both countries have said that the purpose of their nuclear weaponry is to defend their own territory and ensure their own survival. They could not serve as the sole protection for West Germany or any other European NATO member. At best, they help to defend the Continent by creating an additional headache for Moscow's military planners. Says a British NATO official: "The Soviet Union must take into account a second center of decision making, and this acts as a sobering influence on Soviet decisions."

The Soviet motive for trying to include the French and British missiles in the Geneva talks is more political than military. It is an attempt to sow discord within the alliance. Says Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle: "It is a kind of public relations argument to justify the retention of a rather large number of SS-20s in the Soviet Union." In the view of many NATO governments, Moscow would have an overwhelming advantage in Europe if the U.S. accepted Soviet Leader Yuri Andropov's proposal that the number of Soviet SS-20s be reduced to 162 to offset the British and French missiles, leaving the U.S. with no sophisticated intermediate-range missile on the Continent. For nations such as West Germany and Italy, which have no independent nuclear forces, this would raise the troublesome question of whether the U.S. would fire its nuclear weapons, thereby risking retaliation against its own cities, in order to defend Western Europe. Says Friedrich Ruth, the West German Foreign Ministry's senior arms negotiations expert: "If the Soviet demand were met, the Soviet monopoly over European intermediate nuclear forces would be complete. And that would make a dramatic change."

So far, both the British and French governments have adamantly refused to let their missiles be part of U.S.-Soviet arms-control negotiations. "It would be a disaster," says Jacques Huntzinger, international-affairs adviser to French President Franc,ois Mitterrand. "It would result in the dominance of SS-20s over Europe." For the foreseeable future, it will be up to the U.S. to keep the nuclear weapons of its European allies off the bargaining table in Geneva.

--By John Kohan.

Reported by Jordan Bonfante/Paris and Frank Melville/London

With reporting by Jordan Bonfante/Paris, Frank Melville/London This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.