Summit East

By John Kohan.

Moscow sends mixed signals

The quietly organized meeting seemed to have been planned as the Soviet bloc's answer to the Williamsburg summit. After all, if the heads of the six most powerful Western nations and Japan could use their conference in May to endorse NATO plans to deploy new nuclear missiles in Western Europe, the Soviets and their allies would want a chance to criticize the scheme in their own forum. But NATO members were in for a surprise. Instead of escalating the war of words, the seven Warsaw Pact leaders who gathered in Moscow last week issued a joint statement that was quite restrained. Said a puzzled Western diplomat in Moscow: "Why circle the wagons if you are not going to do anything?"

The document criticized the "unprecedented" U.S. defense buildup. The Soviet Union and its allies, it said, would not "allow military superiority to be achieved over them." But this oft-repeated warning stopped short of the heavyhanded Soviet hints dropped on the eve of the Williamsburg summit that the Warsaw Pact would consider deploying nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe if NATO went ahead with its plan to install 572 U.S.-made Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in five West European countries beginning in December. Some parts of the Warsaw Pact's final statement were even conciliatory in tone. It noted that "no world problems, including the historical dispute between capitalism and socialism, can be solved by military means." It dusted off old peace proposals calling for a freeze on military spending and urging both sides to pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The modest change of signals came shortly after the Soviet Union rejected a plan first outlined by President Reagan last March in an effort to end the deadlock in the Geneva talks on intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. The U.S. negotiators asked the Soviets to propose a limit of anywhere from zero to 450 on the number of warheads each side could deploy; in effect, Washington was asking Moscow to trade some of its 360 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles, most of which are targeted on Western Europe, for a reduction in the number of missiles that NATO plans to deploy. Previously, the U.S. had favored the "zero option," according to which neither side would have any intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

During a visit to Southeast Asia last week, Secretary of State George Shultz said that the U.S. felt it deserved "a responsible answer" rather than a brusque nyet. In a response to critics who have charged that the Reagan Administration was not negotiating sincerely in Geneva, Shultz added, "There are those who argue that in negotiations you make an offer, and if nothing is forthcoming, you offer something else. That is stupid, because you are negotiating with yourself. The name of the game is to negotiate with the other side."

However moderate the tone of last week's statement may have seemed, the Kremlin has not changed its basic strategy. It continues to build up its arsenal of SS-20s, while hoping that pressure from peace groups in Western Europe will force the alliance to scuttle its deployment plans. Some Western diplomats surmised that the bland language of the final document was a result of pressure from Rumanian President Nicolae Ceausescu, who, to Moscow's embarrassment, has frequently criticized both the East and the West for the arms buildup. Another explanation was that the Warsaw Pact leaders wanted to sound a peaceful note on the eve of West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's meeting with Soviet President Yuri Andropov in Moscow this week. Andropov will undoubtedly urge Kohl not to accept deployment of Pershing II missiles on West German soil.

If the Soviets have shown no sign of wanting to compromise on the issue of nuclear missiles in Europe, they have made slight changes in their bargaining position at the Geneva talks on strategic arms reduction. Though a final agreement is still a long way off, Soviet negotiators have dropped their demand that the U.S. limit the deployment of Trident submarines and Trident II missiles. The Soviets have also stopped insisting that the U.S. restrict the range of cruise missiles launched from bombers.

In addition, Moscow made a gesture last week that was an apparent response to the Reagan Administration's call for concrete action to show good faith in the area of human rights. Fifteen Pentecostals from Siberia were allowed to emigrate to Israel. Some of them had taken refuge in the U.S. embassy five years ago, hoping that U.S. diplomats would help get them out of the Soviet Union.

The Siberian Seven, as they came to be known, were a continuing source of U.S.-Soviet friction. When one of them had to be hospitalized during a hunger strike and subsequently received permission to emigrate, the remaining six voluntarily left the embassy basement. Upon their arrival in Vienna last week, the Pentecostals expressed joy at being in the West but regret that tens of thousands of fellow believers were still waiting back home for exit visas. --By John Kohan. Reported by Erik Amfitheatrof/Moscow

With reporting by Erik Amfitheatrof/Moscow This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.