France Draws the Line

By William E. Smith

But Mitterrand creates controversy in Paris and Washington

The fighting in the embattled Central African nation of Chad was in stalemate, checked by the arrival of some 1,000 French paratroopers. Though the French soldiers were ostensibly in Chad as "instructors," the fact was that there were already half as many French troops in the country as there were soldiers in the Chadian army. The French buildup was a warning to Libyan Leader Muammar Gaddafi, whose intervention in behalf of Rebel Leader Goukouni Oueddei had threatened to topple the government of President Hissene Habre. The message: Libya should not move its forces any farther south in the direction of the Chadian capital of N'Djamena. What had started two months ago as the latest round in a long struggle between two northern Muslim warlords seeking control of N'Djamena had thus become a test of France's determination to maintain its traditional links with its African allies, and of Libya's attempt to destroy those bonds.

French President Franc,ois Mitterrand's decision also provoked a test of wills on two fronts far from Central Africa. In Paris, Mitterrand's Communist partners and even some members of his Socialist Party criticized the extensive deployment of French troops into Africa as a throwback to the "neocolonialist" policies of Mitterrand's predecessors. Members of the center-right opposition complained that the President was doing too little, too late. U.S. officials, meanwhile, took umbrage when Mitterrand charged in a newspaper interview that the U.S. had sent its AW ACS surveillance aircraft to the region without properly consulting the French government. White House Spokesman Larry Speakes insisted that consultation had taken place "at the highest levels." When a reporter asked if that included the French President, Speakes replied, "You got it."

In Africa, there were some preliminary efforts to find diplomatic solutions to the Chadian impasse. Meeting in Brazzaville, capital of the Congo People's Republic, ten African heads of state called for a cease-fire in Chad. In N'Djamena, PresidentHabre did not rule out the possibility of holding talks with Gaddafi but said he would never negotiate with his archrival Goukouni, whom he described as a "Libyan mercenary." Gaddafi, in turn, held a press conference in Tunisia at which he brazenly denied that there were any Libyan troops in Chad.

At the northern Chadian oasis town of Faya-Largeau, which fell to Goukouni's Libyan-supported rebels two weeks ago after a ten-day bombardment by Libyan aircraft, Libya was resupplying its 3,000-man garrison. For their part, the French were busy flying troops, arms and ammunition to their outposts in Abeche, Biltine, Arada and Sallal. The four towns are positioned along the main routes that an invading force from the north would have to use to attack the capital. The advantage of this new "line in the sand" is that it is situated at the limit of the Libyans' air range. As a further indication of its determination, France appointed Brigadier General Jean Poli, 54, a career paratrooper with combat experience in Africa, to assume command of its forces in Chad.

All week long, residents of N'Djamena (pop. 200,000) could hear the rumble of French Transall aircraft taking off with supplies for the forward garrisons. Combat helicopters swung low over the Chari River, beside the capital, and heavily laden trucks moved out of the French military camp near the airport. The French troops were being equipped with both antiaircraft and antitank missiles so that they could be ready for either an aerial attack or a ground assault. At the same time, U.S. C-141s flew into N'Djamena carrying Jeeps, artillery and other supplies promised by President Reagan two weeks ago.

In the neighboring Sudan, two U.S. AWACS were ready to assist the French if the fighting resumed. There was also evidence that France was prepared to bring in its own planes if the Libyans should attack. Four French Jaguar fighter-bombers were standing by in the Central African Republic's capital of Bangui, 600 miles south of N'Djamena, along with two aerial tankers that would enable the Jaguars to be refueled in midair.

With its military deterrent in place, France embarked on the delicate task of seeking a diplomatic solution. In Brazzaville, French Minister of Cooperation and Development Christian Nucci spoke for an hour with the Libyan Ambassador to the United Nations, Abdessalam Ali Triki. Earlier, Mitterrand had sent his special adviser on African affairs, Guy Penne, to meet withHabre in N'Djamena. Although the Chadian President had previously branded Penne a "poor imbecile" who was the head of a "pro-Libyan lobby,"Habre said after the meeting that his relations with France were "clear and unambiguous."Habre, 41, a wiry man with fierce brown eyes, reserved his harshest words for Gaddafi, who in 1973 seized and annexed a 44,000-sq.-mi. stretch of northern Chad known as the Aozou Strip. SaidHabre: "Libya now occupies half of Chad. Gaddafi wants to annex Chad, and that is that."

A more mysterious diplomatic mission involved Mitterrand's lawyer and close personal friend, Roland Dumas, who flew to Tripoli for a three-hour meeting with Gaddafi. When word of Dumas's trip appeared in the press, French officials claimed that it was a "private" journey. There were unconfirmed reports that Dumas had warned Gaddafi that France would use force if the Libyans decided to advance on N'Djamena, and advised Gaddafi that he would do better to accommodate himself to the French presence than to risk bringing the U.S. and the Soviet Union into the conflict.

Gaddafi, in turn, reportedly hinted to the French that he was willing to talk peace. But on what terms? Previously he has urged France to help overthrowHabre and pave the way for a new "government of national reconciliation," presumably meaning one that would be more mindful of Libyan wishes. One possible solution might be international recognition of Libyan control over the Aozou Strip, in return for Libya's withdrawal from the rest of Chad. Another would be the effective partition of Chad into a Libyan-dominated north and aHabre-controlled south. But neither of those formulas would be acceptable toHabre or indeed to many other African leaders. Just as the U.S. and France were finally managing to show unity in their response to Libya's actions in Chad, an article in the French newspaper Le Monde sowed new discord. The article, based on an interview with Mitterrand, described the French President as irritated over the Reagan Administration's interference in Chadian affairs. It said that Mitterrand was angry about Washington's constant harping on Franco-American "cooperation," which left France open to Soviet charges of being a "tool of American imperialism." In fact, Mitterrand asserted, France is committed to the defense of Chad's territorial integrity, not to toppling Gaddafi, for whom he has no particular hostility. If Reagan sees Gaddafi as some sort of monster, the article said, let him confront the Libyan leader directly instead of trying to use France as a surrogate.

The French President's criticism drew a quick retort. White House Spokesman Speakes noted "that Reagan and Mitterrand had exchanged letters twice before the U.S. dispatched its AWACS and F-15 aircraft, though consultation about specific details took place between French and American military officials. Speakes denied that the U.S. had applied "pressure" to France, and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger insisted that the U.S. had sent the AWACS planes only because "the French indicated that they wanted them."

Mitterrand's statements reflect the sensitivity of the Chad issue in France. The Socialists have usually opposed military interventions in Africa, and they now find it awkward to have changed their position. French rightists also find themselves in a paradoxical position, reluctant to condemn an intervention that is in line with their own past policies. The three main opposition leaders, former President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, former Premier Raymond Barre and Paris Mayor Jacques Chirac, have all kept silent on the subject. Yvon Blot, spokesman for the neo-Gaullist party, speculated that Mitterrand's "bizarre" outburst was meant mainly for home consumption, as a ploy to retain the support of Communists and left-wing Socialists. After all, said Blot, "Reagan has merely recognized the fact that France, because of its colonial past, should play a leading role in Africa."

Some U.S. diplomats are convinced that Mitterrand's strategy is to give himself some negotiating flexibility by decrying the American "pressure" even as he sends in troops to check the Libyan advance. It is altogether possible that the tactic is working. Gaddafi last week gave Mitterrand the benefit of the doubt, saying that France "was drawn into that conflict in spite of itself." This, as well as his repeated assertions that Libya is not directly involved in the conflict, may be Gaddafi's way of preserving a little room to maneuver in future negotiations.

Whatever happens next is not likely to happen quickly. French officials say that the "training" of the Chadian army will take four months. But no matter how long it takes, the French will not be inclined to pull out if Libya continues to reinforce its garrison at Faya-Largeau. At the moment,Habre is powerless to conduct the war as he sees fit. As soon as he is able, however,Habre is determined to see to it that the northern oasis, near which he was born, does not remain in Libyan hands indefinitely. "They can take Faya-Largeau 20 times," he vowed last week, "and we will recapture it 20 times." These are the words of a man whose country has already endured 18 years of civil war, with no end in sight.

-- By William E. Smith

Reported by John Borrell/N'Djamena and Thomas A. Sancton/Paris

With reporting by John Borrell, Thomas A. Sancton This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.