Reagan II: A Foreign Policy Consensus?

By Henry Grunwald

The second Reagan Administration has a rare opportunity to reshape American foreign policy. President Reagan's overwhelming election victory has strengthened his already impressive capacity for political leadership, reinforcing his authority to deal with the factions of his own party, with the feuding wings of the bureaucracy and with foreign countries. The question is whether he will seize that authority and will know how to use it. Which Reagan, and which Reagan advisers, will dominate? The stubbornly hard-line or the flexible President, the "ideologues" or the "pragmatists" among his counselors? The labels are somewhat oversimplified, but they do describe a genuine conflict, and in the first term, the evolution of that conflict was quite evident: from ideology to pragmatism.

The Administration started out with a hardline, aggressive and Manichean set of policies, or pronouncements, that in nearly every instance gave way to compromise and at least outward accommodation. This was true of attitudes toward the Soviet Union, arms control, Central America and the European allies, among others. The need to compromise was symbolized by the resort to bipartisan commissions (the Scowcroft panel on the MX missile, the Kissinger group on Central America) that did extremely useful work and produced sound, generally centrist recommendations, which by no reasonable standard could be described as weak. Despite recent, markedly pacific gestures from the Administration, it remains to be seen whether, in the second term, such centrist policies will prevail or whether the right-wing "true believers" will succeed in reasserting the ideological superhard line. On the answer depends the possibility of reaching a new national consensus on foreign and defense policy.

Up to a point, the hard line was a useful corrective for weak and confused policies of the past and was welcomed in many quarters as a sign of a new American assertiveness. Administration critics almost automatically preface "ideology" with "right-wing." But there is liberal or left-wing ideology too, and its reading of Soviet intentions and of the causes of Third World instability often has been just as simplistic as right-wing interpretations, if not more so.

Besides, the Administration did have its successes. The arms buildup may have been excessive, and ill-advised in some particulars. But it was plainly necessary. It constitutes the most important single "foreign policy" action by Reagan so far. Another clear achievement was the missile deployment for NATO, in the teeth of all-out Soviet opposition. Dealings with China, despite decades of a deep Republican commitment to Taiwan, were prudent and professional. The same may be said, at the risk of considerable disagreement, about the Reagan policy toward South Africa. In other instances, policy was muddled through lack of skill and understanding, as in the Middle East.

On balance, the Reagan Administration often proved itself quite capable of realistic and largely nonideological policies, but they did not fit into any unified concept. Thus "more pragmatism" is not a sufficient foreign policy prescription for Reagan II. What is required is pragmatism within a framework of principle; firm assertion of American goals combined with a recognition that there are different ways of attaining them, and that some may be unattainable in the near future. Passion without skill can be worse than skill without passion. Reagan II must recognize more clearly that toughness can take many forms and that guile and the ability to maneuver are every bit as important as muscle.

In perspective, the Reagan Administration's difficulties in dealing with the Soviet Union are familiar, almost traditional.

From the outset, the Administration had trouble coping with the yes-but formula advanced for the last three decades by just about every specialist in the field: Yes, we must be strong, but at the same time flexible. Yes, we must understand that the Russians are relentless foes, but at the same time we must seek ways of coexisting. And so forth. Almost every new Administration comes into office paying lip service to the principle, while actually believing that a fresh start, a new approach--softer or harder--will permit escape from the painful, laborious double track.

The Administration was particularly determined to reject the formula, which requires the ability to hold two opposite ideas at the same time (the mark of a first-rate intelligence, according to F. Scott Fitzgerald). This runs against the American tendency to believe in solutions; the formula implies that U.S.-Soviet strains are not a problem to which there is a solution, but a more or less permanent condition that can only be alleviated, not cured.

The fact is that the Reagan Administration is being pushed toward something that, by any other name, is still detente.

As long as it can be protected from the Utopian left, which sees it as institutionalized brotherhood, and from the triumphalist right, which sees it as institutionalized surrender, and defined as no more or less than controlled conflict, detente remains the inescapable intellectual framework for American policy. And within that framework arms control is crucial.

True, its achievements in the past have been modest at best, progress has been glacial and the process at first aroused exaggerated expectations.

Technology keeps threatening to outpace possible negotiations.

But there is simply no convincing alternative.

The Reagan Administration has often acted as if any arms-control proposal acceptable to the Soviets must be automatically flawed. In fact the Soviet Union, like the U.S., will naturally accept only proposals it considers to be in its own self-interest. The open contempt for arms control expressed by some members of the Reagan circle and the unrealistic proposals for cuts offered at the outset of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) have obscured a central fact: the major source of the problem lies in the Soviets' own aggressive nuclear buildup and their excessive view of what they require for their own security. Thus even a "reformed" Reagan Administration with a more tolerant approach to arms control may not get anywhere with the Soviets.

There are certain concessions beyond which no Administration can or should go to win an agreement. At the same time, President Reagan seems to have disavowed the possibility that America can permanently restore any significant nuclear superiority over the Russians. What is at issue is an acceptable but more realistic definition of parity.

Unfortunately, much of the arms-control debate seems like a scholastic exercise about how many warheads can dance on the head of a missile. This frightful air of unreality has much to do with the desire both on the left and on the right, in a curious mirror image, to escape these dilemmas and to find simple and understandable solutions. On the left, the desire to escape takes the form of a naive belief in good will or in unilateral actions. On the right, it takes the form of a search for "superiority," in the belief that we can outspend the Soviets and outdo them more or less indefinitely in technology. The Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") is an elaboration of this view.

The Star Wars program has a certain appealing plausibility: defense is better than offense, safety behind a shield in the sky is better than the "balance of terror." Technological feasibility aside, however, the opponents of Star Wars seem to have the better case. The prospect of one side more or less safe while the other side is open to attack is untenable in the nuclear age. Moreover, in the absence of a new bargain with the Soviets, such a situation is bound to be relatively short-lived. Sooner or later the Soviets can catch up with American technology, the most notable example being multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVS). But this does not mean that development of a defensive system should be banned independently of what is done about nuclear weapons in general. The Soviets seem genuinely afraid of a technological race with the U.S. in space defense. This fear should be used as a major bargaining chip.

The elements of an agreement for offensive weapons exist.

They are summed up in the phrase "offsetting asymmetries" the recognition that the Soviets will not significantly cut their principal arsenal of ground-based missiles unless the U.S. makes certain concessions in an area where it is particularly strong, namely bombers, cruise missiles and, increasingly, submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

This principle is recognized in various schemes, including the so-called framework approach advanced by the State Department in August 1983 but never adopted by the Administration and in the so-called double build-down scheme, under which both sides would discard old weapons as new ones were produced. These schemes should become the basis for the Administration's negotiating position.

Despite the Soviets' stated willingness to return to the negotiating table, movement toward an agreement, if any, is likely to be excruciatingly slow. At any rate, what is needed is a merger or at least a link of INF (for Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) and START negotiations plus space-defense negotiations. There is simply not enough room for bargaining and trade-offs if things are to be fought out separately in different arenas.

Apparently the President genuinely hopes to make progress in the area. The issue is not sincerity but intellectual capacity and will. He will have to become personally involved in the process, understanding it far better than he has so far, or else appoint a really trusted, high-level associate with the power to enforce his views. He will have to crack down hard on the guerrilla war between parts of the Administration. Throughout the first Reagan term, "negotiability" with the Russians was not the issue, but rather negotiability within the Administration. This situation can be ended only by a decisive President and very likely a change in some of the principal characters.

In dealing with the larger world of politics and psychology surrounding the enclaves of missiles and warheads, Reagan II would do well to take certain precepts to heart. One is that we have only very limited means of influencing events inside the Soviet Union. Fierce rhetoric certainly will not do it. Criticism, of course, must not cease, but the U.S. must also be very cautious in linking condemnation to practical policy, or in suggesting that peace requires drastic changes in the Soviet regime. A lesson from pre-Reagan days, but still applicable, involves one of the most destructive actions of U.S. foreign policy, which was championed by the usually very wise Henry M. Jackson: the late Senator's attempt to force liberalization of Jewish emigration from the U.S.S.R. by denying Russia most-favored-nation treatment. Focusing on Jewish emigration as distinct from any other, possibly worse, abuses in the Soviet system was not only arbitrary, it was clearly counterproductive.

The Reagan Administration also needs to get better at matching means and ends, although this does not imply ceding anything to the Soviets that need not be ceded--and certainly not without exacting a price. Those who urge a last-ditch stand against Soviet influence everywhere, a sort of Churchillian resistance sometimes suggested by apocalyptic right-wingers, overestimate both our will and our resources. America must differentiate, without of course publicly drawing a map, between areas and situations of the first or second or fifth importance.

Certain basics are beyond compromise. But many policies can and should be stopped or moderated in exchange for something else. American aid to resistance fighters in Afghanistan, for example, should continue. But eventually the Soviets might be willing to curb certain actions elsewhere in the world in exchange for Western accommodation over Afghanistan. The willingness to deal at the right moment is essential.

Whether such a moment will present itself in Central America is not certain. Where Central America is concerned, a debate rages between those who argue that the chief cause of Third World insurgencies is economic and social injustice, and those who argue that it is interference by the Soviets or their surrogates. Nothing is more futile or arid than this argument. Obviously both forces are at work, and both must be coped with. The Reagan Administration has balanced the two approaches--the stress on force and the stress on development--more successfully than it is generally given credit for.

The Reagan team undoubtedly started with an excessively apocalyptic view of the situation. But it was essentially right in believing that a successful Communist revolution in El Salvador, or neighboring countries, no matter how seriously driven by the thirst for social justice, would be an American defeat.

In El Salvador, the election of President Jose Napoleon Duarte was something of a turning point--and incidentally, would not have occurred had the Administration followed the counsel of those Congressmen who, since 1981, have sought to condition continued military aid to the Salvadoran government on the commencement of indiscriminate negotiations with the guerrillas, which would have led to "power sharing."

The Duarte regime remains fragile. The dialogue he initiated with the guerrilla leaders could prompt the far right to sabotage his government. Moreover, it is far from clear what can come of this dialogue. It is premature to hope that the guerrillas will put down their arms, trusting in the government's security guarantees, and take part in elections. But the prospect of such an outcome is at least somewhat more plausible than it seemed a year ago.

The situation in Nicaragua is less hopeful, and the choice for Washington painfully limited. There is no serious prospect that, by themselves, the counterrevolutionaries, or contras, could overthrow the Sandinista regime, much as that would be in the American national interest. But they have proved important as an instrument to make the regime more malleable; there is little evidence to support the opposite view, that they solidified the regime. By cutting off aid to the contras, Congress irresponsibly deprived the U.S. of an important bargaining counter.

The Contadora process, involving efforts by the governments of Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Panama to achieve peace in the region by negotiation, can be useful, depending on how it is handled. The original proposals could, if pushed to their maximum, provide for the removal of Cuban and other foreign forces, prevent foreign bases and eliminate arms assistance to other revolutionary forces elsewhere in the area. In general, the U.S. should continue working with Contadora, but it must insist on effective enforcement and should not let itself be pressured into accepting a premature and incomplete agreement. Standing on principle and playing for time may not be the worst policy here. Obviously, the appearance in Nicaragua of sophisticated offensive weaponry could change the equation.

Ultimately, the most important foreign policy goal for Reagan II lies in domestic politics: to achieve at least some measure of consensus on foreign and defense issues, especially regarding the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the more or less bipartisan approach to foreign policy that prevailed from World War II till Korea--some would say till Viet Nam--was neither typical nor natural. Yet there are special moments--this may be one--when the normal partisan quarrel over foreign affairs can be muted if not suspended.

It will be very difficult, putting it mildly, to persuade the fervent ideologues in the Republican Party of this. They see the election as a clear mandate for the hard-line Reagan and for their more extreme goals. Nor will the right wing necessarily hesitate to attack the President if it considers him too weak, especially because he will be increasingly a lame duck. Nevertheless, he remains a hero to a majority of Americans, and his anti-Communist credentials are so strong that the country at large would have a hard time accepting the notion that he had gone soft.

The first term has shown that extreme hard-line positions not only fail to work with the Russians but in domestic politics as well. An analysis of the election returns makes clear that voters liked Reagan's patriotism, his emphasis on American strength and even rearmament, but also wanted far more serious effort in arms control and peaceful diplomacy.

If the President wants to leave a legacy of better relations with the Soviets, as well as gain a serious chance of another Republican victory in 1988, everything indicates that he must follow more or less centrist policies. The best hope for the Democrats would be a Republican candidate and a set of policies to revive the "warmonger" fear of the earlier Reagan days. Thus, for political reasons as well as for idealistic ones, Reagan has every incentive to reach out to the Democrats in search of consensus.

Do the Democrats have any incentive to meet him even halfway? Just as Reagan had to move to the center, they did too. Despite emotional support for a nuclear freeze and for the notion of banning nuclear weapons from outer space, voters did not favor positions they suspected might mean unilateral U.S. concessions. And if Reagan II is at all successful in improving U.S.-Soviet relations, the Democrats will have very little to gain from the issue. They would do better to ease the issue out of politics and earn at least some of the credit for embracing bipartisanship.

The Democrats would have to disown the quasi-isolationist and quasi-pacifist positions of many liberals (which Walter Mondale did only partly toward the end of the campaign). Similarly, Reagan would have to continue distancing himself from the far right. There is a lot of room for him to do that without in any real sense "going soft." He can argue with reason that he is now able to negotiate from strength. A tough but realistic position on arms control may well win bipartisan approval.

Agreement might be harder on issues like Central America and the military budget. But among the things Reagan could safely concede would be some further reductions in the defense budget combined with overall reform of the armed forces. Defense expenditures growing at a somewhat slower but sustainable rate backed by bipartisan consensus would be far more impressive to the Soviets than higher defense expenditures, which are probably not sustainable and at the mercy of congressional or partisan politics. One of the greatest boons to the Soviets over the years has been American inconsistency and the chance of playing Democrats off against Republicans. To avoid this and to achieve at least partial consensus would be worth a great deal.

--By Henry Gnmwald The foregoing, written by the editor in chief of Time Inc., is adapted from an article in the winter issue of Foreign Affairs.