Force and Personality

By GEORGE J. CHURCH

Shultz and Weinberger present different views of military power

Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger have been working together for most of the past 15 years: as high economic officials of the Nixon Administration; then as top executives of Bechtel, the worldwide construction firm; and currently as the most powerful members of Ronald Reagan's Cabinet. They breakfast together once a week, alternating as hosts, and confer frequently by telephone. When Shultz was asked last week about their reported disputes, he replied, "That's nonsense."

That is for the record. Privately, U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick has told friends worriedly that the tension between Shultz, her nominal superior, and Weinberger has become "palpable." A Pentagon insider is blunter. Their dislike, says he, "is only thinly disguised when they meet publicly."

What is more, the feud is not simply a personal one. For months, Shultz and Weinberger have been giving Reagan conflicting advice on some of the gravest issues of U.S. policy. Lately they have been carrying on what amounts to a public debate.

Weinberger opened a new round with a speech three weeks ago, taking issue with earlier statements by Shultz. The Secretary of Defense laid down six conditions for the use of U.S. combat troops abroad. Some were unexceptionable: "We should have clearly defined political and military objectives." But others were more controversial. Military power, said Weinberger, should be used only "as a last resort" to protect "vital interests" of the U.S. or its allies, only "with the clear intention of winning" and only if there is "some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress."

On a broad range of issues--arms control, trade with the Communist world, dealings with NATO allies, to name a few--Weinberger is far more hawkish than Shultz. But on the use of U.S. armed forces, the Pentagon boss reflects the views of military commanders who still shudder at the memory of Viet Nam. While the Pentagon clearly would like to see the Sandinista regime topple in Nicaragua, Weinberger has ruled out direct U.S. military involvement. Said he: "The President will not allow our military forces to creep--or be drawn gradually--into a combat role in Central America." Shultz, while no less opposed to military entanglements in that region, has long insisted that his diplomats must be backed up by a credible willingness to use force. He replied to Weinberger in a speech of his own last week, arguing that "there is no such thing as guaranteed public support in advance." If force is used effectively, as in Grenada, he said, public support will follow; if not, as in Viet Nam, it will be "frittered away." He added, "A great power cannot free it self so easily from the burden of choice."

The White House, which cleared both speeches through National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, insisted they were not necessarily contradictory; Shultz too said force should be "a last resort." But a practical test of the two Secretaries' perspectives last winter opened a split that has never healed. Weinberger successfully insisted on taking U.S. Marines out of Lebanon after their ranks had been decimated by terrorist attack. Shultz has grumbled publicly that the pullout "undercut prospects for successful negotiation."

The Secretaries have also been at odds on other, related issues. Among them:

Terrorism. Shultz advocates "active defense against terrorism," perhaps including "pre-emptive action against known terrorist groups"--even at the risk that some innocent civilians might be killed. "One way or another," Shultz commented last week on the airline hijacking in Tehran, "the law-abiding nations of the world will put an end to this barbarism." Weinberger, says an aide, "feels that discussion of counterterrorism should be limited" and any counterattacks decided "on a case-by-case basis," presumably only if the group responsible for a specific terrorist attack could be precisely identified.

Arms Control. Highly placed sources say that Weinberger told aides that Shultz was showing "undue haste" in scheduling a meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in January. "Absolutely untrue," says the Pentagon. Shultz's aides are drawing up a list of possible bargaining chips; the Pentagon is adamantly opposed to almost any concession.

NATO. At ministerial meetings last week, Shultz pressed Belgium and The Netherlands to go ahead with the deployment of American medium-range missiles, a stand Weinberger fully backs. In general, though, Weinberger wants to push the NATO allies harder than Shultz would to build up their defense forces.

In part, the dispute is institutional: the State Department's diplomats and the Pentagon's brass often view the world from different vantage points. The Pentagon's insistence on a voice in foreign affairs also is a perennial sore point, especially now that Shultz is campaigning to reassert State's traditional primacy in setting foreign policy. But Weinberger and Shultz also have deeply felt policy beliefs that put them in sharper than normal opposition.

There is little doubt that their differences have been aggravated by personal factors. Weinberger, who was outranked by Shultz both in the Nixon Administration and at Bechtel, is said to resent what he regards as Shultz's air of superiority. Weinberger has the advantage of an easy intimacy with Reagan, which began in California in the 1960s. He discussed with the President his speech about the conditions for the extensive use of military power. Shultz was not asked to comment and did not see the speech until Weinberger handed it to him at one of their breakfasts only hours before it was delivered.

In a perverse way, the dispute may be helping to keep Shultz in office. He was widely expected to return to private life at the end of Reagan's first term. But if he had resigned, his successor might have been none other than Weinberger. Shultz, says one Administration official, will "stay on that job till hell freezes over" rather than let that happen. --By George J. Church.

Reported by Johanna McGeary and Bruce van Voorst/Washington

With reporting by Johanna McGeary, BRUCE VAN VOORST