Negotiation By the Numbers

By Ed Magnuson

If George Shultz and Andrei Gromyko can get past the initial hurdle in Geneva --agreeing about what their long-term talks should cover--one thing is certain: they will find themselves enmeshed in a nuclear numbers game of mind- numbing complexity.

The questions involved make college calculus look simple. If the U.S. has 550 of one type of missile that carries three warheads of 335 kilotons each, and the Soviet Union has 308 of another type that carries ten warheads of two megatons each, which side is better off? It all depends on what you count: warheads, missiles and bombers, explosive power, accuracy or other variables. To the layman's inevitable question "Who is ahead?" the experts have no answer.

Further complicating the equation are domestic political perceptions. Seeking the White House in 1980, Ronald Reagan warned of a "widening gap" being opened by the Soviets in the nuclear competition and vowed that he would help the U.S. regain a "superior defensive capability." After taking office, he declared flatly that "on balance the Soviet Union does have a definite margin of superiority." Nearing the end of his first four years, Reagan told the United Nations, "America has repaired its strength."

But a look at the numbers suggests that Reagan could be argued with on both counts. The Soviets held no clear overall superiority in 1980, and the U.S. has made no decisive gains in the Reagan years (see chart). When Reagan took office, the Soviet Union could deliver 7,925 nuclear warheads against the U.S., according to calculations made by Rand Corp. Analyst Edward Warner. Nearly four years later, that total had grown to 8,700. During the same period, the number of strategic U.S. warheads has gone from 10,034 to 11,140. (Because of different methods of determining how many warheads are deployed at any time, the counts vary; for example, the Pentagon estimates that the Soviets now have 9,240 strategic warheads, which still leaves the U.S. with a substantial lead.)

Using launchers as a comparison rather than warheads, the U.S.S.R. has fared better: from 1980 to 1984, the number of Soviet strategic missiles and bombers has remained at about 2,500, while the American total has decreased from about 2,100 to 1,950. The Soviets retained their lead in explosive power, roughly 5,800 megatons to 3,800 megatons.

During Reagan's first term, the U.S. retired 21 Titan II missiles, which are considered obsolete; the remaining 33 are being phased out at the rate of one a month. Eight Polaris submarines with 64 long-range missiles were also retired, but three new Trident subs, carrying 576 missiles, more than made up for the loss. The U.S. also took 79 of its oldest B-52 bombers out of service, but it equipped 90 others with formidable cruise missiles.

The Soviets' most significant gain in this period came in submarine-launched missiles. While concerned about the Soviet submarine buildup, Pentagon analysts remain confident that the U.S. retains a solid superiority in the highly elusive submarine deterrent and see no imminent breakthrough in submarine detection that would jeopardize this advantage.

But if the overall numbers show no clear U.S. gain, why has the perception of new U.S. strength become so prevalent? Part of the reason is that the nuclear debate has focused so heavily on missiles in Europe. This is the area in which there was an undisputed "missile gap." In 1981 the Soviets had deployed 920 warheads on intermediate-range missiles, with about three- fourths of them aimed at European targets. The U.S. had absolutely none, although Soviet officials have long insisted on counting the French and British nuclear arsenals as a threat to Soviet targets. Reagan prevailed against a strong Soviet propaganda drive and much uneasiness in Europe when he got NATO to carry out its 1979 decision to deploy U.S. Pershing II and ground- launched cruise missiles on the Continent. Approximately 100 of these single- warhead weapons are now in Britain, West Germany and Italy. But in the same four years, the Soviets added more than 400 warheads to their intermediate-range forces.

U.S. officials contend that the initial deployments in Europe significantly improve the Western position despite the Soviet response. There is no need, they say, to match the Soviets "missile for missile, warhead for warhead" in Europe. "What we need is only enough to put them at sufficient risk to deter aggression," says Lieut. General John Chain, director of the State Department's bureau of politico-military affairs.

Amore important basis for the perception of new U.S. strength lies in Washington's plans for future development of nuclear weapons systems. These include the much debated and still uncertain deployment beginning in 1986 of the ten-warhead MX missile, development of a small mobile Midgetman ICBM, deployment beginnning next year of the B-1B bomber, deployment in the late 1990s of the radar-evading "Stealth" bomber, acceleration of the Trident submarine schedule to a total of perhaps 20 by the 1990s and placement of more sophisticated Trident II D5 missiles on the new subs.

The disputes about the meaning of all the weapons totals are unending. Says Raymond Garthoff, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution: "In its most basic sense, strategic parity between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. has existed, and will continue to exist, as long as each has the recognized capability to deal the other a devastating retaliatory strike." Contends the Committee on the Present Danger, one of whose former members is Ronald Reagan: "The U.S. strategic posture visa-vis the Soviet Union has deteriorated sharply and is considerably worse than official estimates." Perhaps Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt puts the argument in its most sophisticated perspective. "The strategic nuclear balance," he says, "is what the world understands as to who is ahead. It is a psychological as much as a hardware dimension. And in terms of deterrence, it does not matter if the difference is psychological or real."

With reporting by Johanna McGeary/Washington