Back to Basics

By Strobe Talbott

Washington and Moscow last week moved another step closer to the arms-control bargaining table. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko had agreed in Geneva three weeks ago that after more than a year of diplomatic deadlock, their governments would begin talking again about measures to regulate the arms race on earth and, if possible, avoid one in space. On Saturday, the White House and the Kremlin jointly announced a date and venue for the new talks: March 12 in Geneva.

At the same time, the Soviets unveiled their negotiating team. It will be led by Victor Karpov, a veteran diplomat who was his country's chief negotiator in both the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) at the end of the Carter Administration and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) during the first Reagan term. His American counterpart in the upcoming discussions will be Washington Attorney Max Kampelman.

But even as the superpowers were agreeing on procedure, there was a new glimpse into how far apart they are on substance. It was contained in a document made public by Paul Nitze, 78, special arms-control adviser to Shultz and President Reagan, outlining the "strategic concept" behind proposals that Kampelman will present in Geneva. The U.S., the statement said, "should seek a radical reduction in the number and power of existing and planned offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether land-based, space-based or otherwise."

In practice, that probably means that the U.S. will urge the Soviets to give up large numbers of their currently deployed land-based ballistic missiles in exchange for cutbacks in American offensive and defensive programs that are still in the testing stage, such as the MX missile, antisatellite weapons and perhaps eventually some of the more exotic components of the Star Wars antimissile program. As Nitze confirmed to TIME last week, the Administration's approach to the new negotiations "is consistent with the position we took in START and INF (the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces talks on Euromissiles)."

The Soviets have complained repeatedly that it is inherently unfair for the U.S. to seek trade-offs between existing Soviet arms and future American ones. They have warned that if new talks are to go anywhere, they must be based on the concept of "equal reductions." Translation: trade-offs between existing weapons on both sides.

The strategic concept that Nitze publicized last week also put the Soviets on notice that whatever the outcome of the new talks, the Administration is committed to protecting its offensive forces with some kind of antiballistic missile (ABM) defenses. That is a reversal of American policy since 1972, when the superpowers agreed to severe limitations on ABMs in the course of SALT.

The Administration envisions deployment of strategic defenses during a "period of transition, beginning possibly ten years from now," to be followed by the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons, both offensive and defensive, and the attainment of "a nuclear-free world." The Soviets are extremely skeptical about that utopian vision, believing that the so- called period of transition will turn out to be a permanent and very dangerous arms race. Shultz laid out the Administration's strategic concept for Gromyko during their encounter in Geneva, and as Nitze acknowledged last week, "Gromyko took a very dim view of it."

On Saturday, Reagan pronounced himself "a little more optimistic" than Nitze, though "not euphoric," about the chances of progress in Geneva. Said the President: "I too know how tough this is going to be."