An Interview with Yitzhak Rabin

Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin was in Washington last week to discuss his country's military and economic needs with President Reagan and top Administration officials. During the visit, Rabin won promises of $1.8 billion in U.S. military assistance but failed to change the Administration's stance that Jerusalem must first implement domestic austerity programs before increased economic aid can be considered. Later in New York he met with a group of editors and journalists, and next day talked with Time Inc. Editor in Chief Henry Grunwald, Chief of Correspondents Richard L. Duncan and Senior Writer William E. Smith. Excerpts from the two interviews:

On Israel's decision to withdraw unilaterally from southern Lebanon: Our new government decided to focus on one issue: reasonable security for our (northern) settlement population, and to (achieve this) without remaining in Lebanon. I believe that among the many surprises, and most of them not for the good, that came out of the war in Lebanon, the most dangerous is that the war let the Shi'ites out of the bottle. No one predicted that; I couldn't find it in any Israeli intelligence report. The Shi'ites, the largest community in Lebanon, were oppressed by the P.L.O. (Palestine Liberation Organization). They didn't like the struggle against the P.L.O., and they received us in the beginning as liberators. But in the last year and a half, they looked at us the way they looked at the P.L.O., as a foreign occupation force. It's more than that. In trying to forge an identity, they had to have somebody to fight, and so they started a struggle against Israel. If as a result of the war in Lebanon, we replace P.L.O. terrorism in southern Lebanon with Shi'ite terrorism, we have done the worst (thing) in our struggle against terrorism.

In 20 years of P.L.O. terrorism, no one P.L.O. terrorist (ever) made himself a live bomb--took a car or pickup, put half a ton of high explosives in it and drove it with the intention of blowing himself up with the target. The Shi'ites did it to the (U.S.) Marines in Beirut, to the French paratroopers and to us in Tyre. In my opinion, the Shi'ites have the potential for a kind of terrorism that we have not yet experienced.

On how the withdrawal will be carried out: We decided to redeploy unilaterally in three phases to the international boundary, and maintain a security zone that will be manned by local Lebanese forces friendly to us, rather than be a daily target for every Shi'ite group, as we are now. I prefer offensive methods. We'll see what the Shi'ites do. If there is a problem, we'll bomb them, we'll shell them. If there is a need, we'll send an armored column in to cope with the area from which they have come. In any event, Lebanon will remain a center of terror. Terror cannot be finished by one war. It's total nonsense; it was illusion. I told the people (of northern Israel) I am not going to promise you that no (rockets) will fall on you, any more than I can promise anyone in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem that no plastic bomb will be blown up in a bus or a supermarket. In fighting terror, you cannot let it interfere with the normal life of civilians in Israel.

We are not going to stay on in Lebanon because our presence might prevent clashes between the various factions. I don't want to be the policeman of Lebanon. It's not the business of Israel. Israel was not created to serve as a policeman of the region. We made it clear we don't link our unilateral decision to anything the Syrians do. They want to stay in Lebanon, let them stay. Militarily, for Israel, I would prefer to see two divisions in Lebanon than the whole Syrian army on the Golan Heights. I know that whoever sets his foot in Lebanon has sunk into the Lebanese (swamp). They want it, let them enjoy it. We want one thing: that they do not move closer to our borders. That's all.

On Israel's economic crisis: It is our most serious problem, the one on which the fate of the national unity government will be tested and judged. We decided to mobilize a national consensus, and this means government, labor and business. First we put through a freeze on salaries and prices, a holding operation that cost Israel a considerable amount of foreign currency. Within three months, we brought the inflation down from 23% a month to 3.7%. We gained time, relaxed the atmosphere, created confidence. We cut $1.1 billion from government operations, and we now have the lowest defense budget in eleven years.

On the military situation in the region today: Israel is in relatively good shape. Egypt, in my opinion, is out of the cycle of war. Iraq is pinned down (in the gulf war), and so there is a relaxation on our eastern front. But in Syria the Soviets have greatly increased the supply of arms, both qualitatively and quantitatively, as a result of the June 1982 encounter (between Syria and Israel). I'm not saying the Soviets would not have given the Syrians these weapons anyway, but I believe it would have taken them an additional five or ten years.

On Israel's priorities: We're tackling our economic problems and making a good beginning. We're solving the problem in Lebanon. We're warming up our relations with Egypt. (Until those goals are achieved) it will be almost impossible for anyone to bring about a new peace initiative. The problem for Jordan in deciding whether to join the peace process is the Arab world. The Reagan initiative (of September 1982) failed because it did not lead King Hussein to join the process. Jordan will not do what (Egyptian President Anwar) Sadat did--face total isolation, boycott, banning and a loss of Arab financial aid. Without a real realignment within the Arab world, and especially until the Saudis stop being afraid of their own shadows, I can't see a situation in which Jordan will risk joining the peace process. Peace cannot be imposed. We cannot impose it on the Arabs. The Arabs cannot impose it on us. And, with all due respect, even the superpowers cannot impose peace. Peace is something that must derive from the will of those who are today fighting each other.

On the premature release of news about the airlift of Ethiopian Jews to Israel: I feel very bad about it. I believe the efforts Israel makes, with the support of others, to bring over 10,000 Ethiopian Jews to Israel brought Israel (to a realization) of the reason for its existence more than anything else. There are a quarter of a million Ethiopian refugees in Sudan. Who gives a damn about them except Israel?

On whether the 1982 war in Lebanon was a mistake: After I assumed the responsibilities of Minister of Defense, I decided to focus on what has to be done now, to look to the future rather than raise differences, and there were differences. I'm trying to learn the lessons of the past, but not to make speeches about the past.