Soviet Union Shifts in the Kremlin

By George Russell

The Tuesday-evening rush hour in central Moscow dragged on interminably, a sure sign that something important was happening. As usual, the streets around the Krem- lin were blocked off, allowing black limousines to emerge from the Borovitsky Gate and speed away unhindered. Normally, that ritual ties up lesser motorists for only a few extra minutes; on this occasion, the tangle lasted much longer. The reason: the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee, more than 300 members strong, had just concluded its first plenary session under the leadership of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, 54. The outcome of the meeting, held behind closed doors last week, would provide some evidence of Gorbachev's grasp on the authority he inherited from the late Konstantin Chernenko on March 11.

The results were soon evident. Within three hours the official news agency TASS announced that Gorbachev had increased the membership of the Central Committee's policymaking organ, the Politburo, from ten to 13. In the process, he diluted the influence of the Kremlin's Old Guard, which now constitutes less than half of the Politburo membership. He also mildly flouted Kremlin protocol by leapfrogging two of his nominees to full Politburo status without benefit of an interval of nonvoting candidate membership. Finally, in his plenum speech, Gorbachev reaffirmed that the infusion of new blood at the top was part and parcel of his highest priority, the revamping of the Soviet Union's chronically ailing economy. Said he: "Revolutionary changes are needed. What is at issue is the retooling of all sectors of the national economy on the basis of the latest scientific and technological advances."

These words and deeds signaled a definite switch in the Kremlin's mood after the painfully indecisive 13-month reign of Chernenko. They also seemed to confirm that, as some Western analysts had suspected, the new General Secretary is a disciple of policies conceived by Chernenko's predecessor, Yuri Andropov. Explained Jeremy Azrael, senior analyst of Soviet affairs at the Rand Corp.: "To say that there have been new ideas on the domestic front would be a gross overstatement." Gorbachev, said Azrael, "is the heir of Andropov."

The influence of Andropov, a former KGB chief who was Gorbachev's mentor, was particularly evident in the new leader's Politburo choices. First among them, in terms of seniority, was Viktor Chebrikov, 62, Andropov's handpicked successor as head of the KGB. Chebrikov was trained as a metallurgical engineer, then labored as a Communist Party functionary in Dnepropetrovsk before Andropov made him a KGB deputy chairman in 1968. Chebrikov is well chosen as a guardian of Communist conformity: in 1981 he railed against the "contamination of Soviet youth by Western ideas" and has since waged campaigns against "reactionary theological concepts," meaning religion, and against "Zionism." He was elevated to lead the KGB in December 1982, and became a Politburo candidate member in 1983.

Andropov also played an important role in the careers of Gorbachev's two upstart choices, Yegor Ligachev, 64, and Nikolai Ryzhkov, 55, who vaulted over five candidate Politburo members.* Ligachev studied aircraft engineering and rose through party ranks in Siberia, eventually becoming party chief in Tomsk, a military-industrial center. Andropov brought him to Moscow in 1983, where he has served under Gorbachev in the Central Committee Secretariat, supervising the selection of high-level party personnel throughout the Soviet Union.

, Gorbachev's other choice, Ryzhkov, is even more of a political dark horse. A former miner, he earned an engineering degree and eventually managed heavy- industry plants in the Urals. Transferred to Moscow in 1975 and named First Deputy Minister of Heavy and Transport Engineering, Ryzhkov served as a deputy director of Gosplan, the state planning agency, from 1979 to 1982. Then he, like Ligachev, was transferred to the Central Committee Secretariat, the powerful body that administers the Soviet Union's day-to-day affairs. Ryzhkov has since headed the Secretariat's economic department and has been involved in drafting the upcoming 1986-1990 Five-Year Plan.

Gorbachev made two other significant personnel moves. In a gesture toward the armed forces, he named Marshal Sergei Sokolov, 73, the Defense Minister, to Politburo candidate status. Sokolov could attain full membership by the time of the next Central Committee plenum at the end of the year. Some Western analysts believe that the armed forces may feel shortchanged by Sokolov's promotion compared with that of Security Chief Chebrikov. What occurred may be yet another repercussion of the still mysterious demotion in September 1984 of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the ambitious former Chief of Staff, to command of the Soviet western front.

The final appointment was that of Viktor Nikonov, 56, who is expected to take over Gorbachev's former job as Central Committee Secretary in charge of agriculture. Nikonov was a party official in various Soviet republics before moving to Moscow in 1979 as Deputy Agriculture Minister. In 1983 he became agriculture

minister of the Russian republic, the most important of the Soviet states.

Gorbachev's top-level changes were surprising only in comparison with the stasis of Chernenko's tenure, a period in which no new Politburo members were appointed. That hiatus received subtle emphasis the day before the Central Committee meeting from another Young Guard member of the Politburo, Geidar Aliyev, 61. Speaking on the 115th anniversary of Lenin's birth, Aliyev asserted that finding talent in the Soviet Communist Party was no problem. Said he: "It is only a matter . . . of not being afraid to trust them and of promoting young party members more boldly." Gorbachev made much the same point during his Central Committee address. Said he: "Certain leaders who have occupied the same post for many years sometimes have ceased to see the new and have become accustomed to shortcomings. There is something to think about here."

Gorbachev gave the Central Committee several other things to think about. He criticized some of the country's 64 centralized ministries for "leniency," presumably for tolerating poor-quality goods and low productivity. He declared that economic growth rates in the current Five-Year Plan were too low. Said Gorbachev: "We have to speed them up substantially. This should be done without delay."

In fact, the Soviet economy is in worse shape than the plan indicates. In the first three months of 1985, it grew at an annual rate of less than 2%; the plan now calls for 3.9%. Gorbachev demanded improvements in technology, management and product quality. Said he: "It is important that the Soviet people feel immediately that things are changing for the better."

None of Gorbachev's exhortations were new. During his 15-month tenure, Andropov addressed many of the same issues and proposed the same solutions that his protege is now advocating. There were warnings in Moscow that Gorbachev would soon reintroduce another Andropov tactic, a crackdown on the endemic problem of alcoholism. Rumors have swept the capital that vodka will be rationed in the future.

What was most evident in Gorbachev's Central Committee performance, noted a Western diplomat in Moscow, was his "degree of impatience. He is warning people to get in line with the program by the time the new Five-Year Plan goes into effect," an event scheduled for January. Gorbachev's preoccupation with economics took priority over foreign policy in his Central Committee address. Nonetheless, he took some hard swipes at the U.S., saying, "It constantly creates seats of conflict and war danger." But Gorbachev also prescribed a return to the vision of detente as "an example of how international relations can be built," a view that he might elaborate on during his planned visit to the United Nations in September. He sent another clear message of the Soviet Union's intention to improve relations with China, which has once again become a "socialist country" in Moscow's parlance.

Two days after the Central Committee meeting, Gorbachev flew to Warsaw, where he was greeted by Poland's General Wojciech Jaruzelski before joining in ceremonies to renew the Warsaw Pact alliance among East bloc countries. At the formal signing ceremonies, where the 30-year-old alliance was extended for 20 years, plus the option of an additional decade, Gorbachev spoke forcefully but broke no new ground. Said he: "More than once we have expressed readiness to dissolve the Warsaw Treaty if NATO should agree to respond in kind. This principled stand continues to be fully valid." What undoubtedly impressed all of Gorbachev's listeners was the vigor of his public performance compared with that of the frail Chernenko.

Gorbachev has now made plain his wishes for change, but achieving it is another question. Says Gregory Grossman, a specialist in Soviet economics at the University of California, Berkeley: "A new wind tends to blow most strongly in the Kremlin. It loses two-thirds of its force for every kilometer it moves outside." Yet Gorbachev is already demonstrating his intention to move rapidly, speak out and do whatever else may be necessary to give Soviet citizens a more positive feeling about their leadership.

FOOTNOTE: *That move, while unusual, is not unprecedented. In 1973, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and the late Defense Minister Andrei Grechko joined the Politburo in the same way.

With reporting by Erik Amfitheatrof/Moscow and David Aikman/Washington