Greece the Gadfly Stays in Office

By George Russell

It was billed as one of Greece's most important elections since World War II. At stake: the future direction of a volatile democracy still haunted by the memory of a right-wing dictatorship, perhaps even the stability of NATO's southern flank. The campaign had been spectacular and occasionally ugly, a succession of mammoth rallies, fiery oratory and occasional mudslinging. When the political chorus finally fell silent last week, there was a faint sense of relief in Western capitals. The paradoxical reason: Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, 66, the charismatic Socialist whose belligerent rhetoric and obstructionist ways have tested alliance patience since 1981, was still securely in power.

With the ballots counted, Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) had taken 45.8% of the 6.4 million votes cast and gained a clear majority of 161 seats in the 300-member Parliament. The Socialists finished well ahead of the center-right New Democracy party, led by Constantine Mitsotakis, which won 40.8% and 126 seats. The other loser was the Moscow-lining Communist Party (known by its Greek initials K.K.E.), which emerged with 9.9% of the vote and twelve seats. Exultant, Papandreou termed the result of the balloting "a victory for the people and a defeat for reaction."

Among those who saluted the Prime Minister's triumph was Ronald Reagan. The West's foremost conservative expressed cautious hope that "our two governments can work effectively together to improve our relations, both bilaterally and within the alliance that assures our liberty and security." Papandreou told a postelection press conference in Athens that he had responded "warmly" to Reagan's words and that "it is not our intention to create unnecessary problems nor to worsen relations." But he also warned of problems that "cannot be wished away."

If the U.S. and its allies felt somewhat heartened by Papandreou's clear-cut success, it was because they had feared something worse, the emergence of a minority PASOK government, with the Communists holding the balance of parliamentary power. The Communists have frequently attacked Papandreou for failing to remove four U.S. military bases from Greece (the leases for the facilities, which are important for NATO's Mediterranean defense, come up for renewal in December 1988). Papandreou's triumph guaranteed that, as a French analyst put it, "there can be no Communist blackmail."

For Papandreou, the victory was perhaps the sweetest in his 22-year political career and a vindication of sorts for his populist brand of socialism. In the final stages of the campaign, the Prime Minister pragmatically stressed his party's social welfare achievements. He rarely fell back on the bluff and bluster that after his first election four years ago he frequently employed against the U.S., NATO and the ten-nation European Community, which Greece joined in 1981.

In the end, with New Democracy in disarray and the Communists chastened, Papandreou emerged as a more powerful leader than before. Said a longtime Greek ambassador: "Now he can do whatever he likes with Greece. He may wake up some morning with a headache and decide to take us out of NATO."

Hardly anyone expects Papandreou to do that. But if the Harvard-educated economist and former Berkeley professor has a proven track record for anything in politics, it is for mercurial gestures. A onetime U.S. citizen who reverted to Greek citizenship in 1964, he seems to have thrived during his first term on ruffling feathers among the Western allies. The exponent of a nebulous "Third Road to Socialism," Papandreou irked the Reagan Administration by dubbing the U.S. the "metropolis of imperialism." Even though Greece has been a NATO member since 1952, he opposed the alliance's decision to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe, while barely mentioning a deeply threatening Soviet buildup of SS-20 missiles on the Continent. At times, Papandreou's anti-Western posturing reached surprising extremes. In 1983, for example, his government refused to condemn the shooting down of a Korean airliner by Soviet jet fighters, and Papandreou briefly championed the Soviet claim that the aircraft was a U.S. spy plane. Last March he irritated his European Community partners by threatening to veto the entry into the group of Spain and Portugal, an event scheduled to take place next January. He backed down only after winning $1.5 billion in development aid.

For all his outbursts against the West, Papandreou's sallies have largely proved to be grandstanding. In the main, they have been the product of the historic enmity between Greece and Turkey, a fellow NATO member. That confrontation intensified after the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, in which Greeks are the ethnic majority. During Papandreou's tenure, the two countries have failed to resolve long-standing disputes over air and sea jurisdiction around Greek islands off Turkey's Aegean coast, as well as over the 1983 declaration of independence by Turkish Cypriots in the zone under their control.

Most Greeks join Papandreou in decrying what they consider a U.S. tilt toward Turkey as a strategically more important NATO partner. Nonetheless, following his 1981 election, the Prime Minister failed to follow through on earlier threats to pull Greece out of NATO and the European Community. Moreover, despite his continued opposition to the presence of U.S. bases, Papandreou negotiated a five-year renewal of the leases in 1983. Says an adviser at NATO headquarters in Brussels: "By his standards, at least, he has been less extreme. We're hoping everyone will give him the benefit of the doubt."

A less charitable calculation is that Papandreou will now be too preoccupied with domestic problems to needle Greece's allies. During the campaign, he promised to "guarantee the expansion of the welfare state," mainly in the areas of pensions and health care, rather than institute prudent austerity measures. If he pursues that promise, Greece's economic woes might worsen. Inflation now stands at 18.5%, the highest in Western Europe. Unemployment has more than doubled, to 8%; among Greek youth it is estimated to be around 28%. Foreign investment has dried up, local capital has fled the country, and despite European Community subsidies, Greece's foreign debt has risen to $12.5 billion, from $7.9 billion when Papandreou came to office. Says a Western diplomat: "Greece will have to cope with so many economic problems in the next few years that there will be no room for fantasy in diplomacy."

By that logic, Papandreou should make no potentially disruptive external moves. The U.S.-base leases, for example, help to bring Greece $500 million a year in U.S. military aid. The facilities also provide work for about 1,650 Greeks. To be on the safe side, however, the U.S. Defense Department has made contingency plans to relocate the bases if necessary.

Domestically, Papandreou has made clear that he is intent on increasing his ; personal power. Last March he shocked many of his countrymen when he abruptly withdrew his backing for a second term for Constantine Caramanlis, then the country's President. A conservative, pro-Western politician revered by most Greeks, Caramanlis had been a moderating influence on Papandreou. The Prime Minister replaced him with his own candidate, Leftist Christos Sartzetakis, and in coming weeks Parliament is expected to pass a constitutional amendment severely restricting the powers of the presidency. The presidential office's loss of power will be Papandreou's gain.

Whatever Papandreou's other objectives may be for his second term, they are unlikely to lead him back toward the political center. Says a Greek politician: "After this election, his base is more of a leftist constituency than ever before." As long as Papandreou is in office, in other words, the Western alliance will have to keep a close eye on the gadfly in Athens.

With reporting by Mirka Gondicas and Wilton Wynn/Athens