Weapons That Refuse to Die

By Ed Magnuson

"This isn't a conference report," protested Oregon's Democratic Congressman Les AuCoin. "It's a surrender document." His House colleague, California Democrat Don Edwards, agreed. "The House was skunked," he complained. Their anger was directed at the outcome of a House-Senate conference committee to resolve differences between the two chambers on next year's defense spending. The Senate had prevailed so overwhelmingly, with the unexpected concurrence of House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin, that House leaders decided to delay until after the recess a vote on the compromise military-spending package. Most galling of all, but perhaps not surprising, the Congressmen once again displayed their chronic inability to cut major weapons systems from the budget.

On one level the issue was money. Aspin, a Wisconsin Democrat, agreed to go along with the Senate's total $302.5 billion for the Pentagon, some $10 billion more than the House had approved. This provides a 3% increase in funding, thus allowing the Pentagon to keep pace with inflation. Aspin, who headed the House conferees, traded the higher figure for language forcing the services to re-examine their purchasing procedures and the rising costs of some of their major new weapons systems.

On an equally significant level, the issue was not simply how much should be spent but how it should be spent. Some 34 weapons systems were initially killed, mainly by the House, but the conferees ended up restoring twelve of the major ones. Those that failed to regain funding were mostly "systems" that scarcely deserved the term: 250 forklift trucks (costing $26.3 million) and 1,413 motorcycles ($5.6 million), for example. Ironically, virtually the only concession granted by the Senate was to go along with the desire of the House to spend $100 million more for research on a future weapon: the mobile, single-warhead Midgetman intercontinental ballistic missile. The so-called compromise even gave the Pentagon 1,000 more missiles, mostly Sidewinders, than it had sought.

The process again illustrated how hard it is to kill hugely expensive systems once they have established a toehold. Almost every new weapons proposal gets quick Capitol Hill approval for research and development, since this seed money is fairly small. After that, it is virtually impossible to stop, no matter how high the costs soar above original estimates. "Once a system nears the production stage it's too late," says Maine's Republican Senator William Cohen. "There's such a constituency of the Pentagon, the contractors and potential job holders that no democratically elected Congress can say no."

A Congressman's desire to protect his home turf often saves weapons that ought to fade away. Neither the Air Force nor the Army asked for money for the C-12 personnel-carrying aircraft, and the Navy requested only twelve, presumably because all the services knew the politics involved would guarantee them the funds anyway. The transport plane is made by Beech Aircraft, which is owned by Raytheon Co., which happens to be in Massachusetts, the home state of House Speaker Tip O'Neill. He reportedly told Aspin "not to come back" from the conference without funds for the aircraft. In the debate Republican Barry Goldwater, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, insisted that the project be opened so that other manufacturers could bid on it. The conferees appeased both of the powerful lawmakers by approving funds for the 24 planes ($2 million each) and requiring that bids be taken on them.

Some of the attempts to kill weapons were mere political posturing. The House rejected four major weapons systems, knowing that the Senate was certain to insist on restoring them. This was done so that in the resulting "compromise" the House conferees could agree to revive the systems only after receiving assurances that a lid would be placed on their costs. This tactic resulted in continued funding, for example, for the AMRAAM, a radar-guided Air Force and Navy missile that has technical problems, is more than two years behind schedule and is costing about twice the original estimates (now about $450,000 a missile); and for the P-3C Orion, a patrol plane used in antisubmarine warfare (more than $40 million an aircraft).

Even the Senate, which has been more generous than the House to the military, had chopped three systems from its bill on the reasonable ground that they did not rate high priority at a time of limited available funds. They were the 9-mm Beretta handgun, which is a replacement for the venerable Colt .45; the Navy's SH-2F submarine-hunting helicopter; and the Army's field artillery support vehicle. All were restored in conference simply because the Pentagon would be saving $1 billion by closing some of its bases, and an additional $1.8 billion by curtailing retirement spending. That meant the military budget would fall below the Senate's $302.5 billion ceiling. Instead of moving closer to the House limit and saving the money, the conferees decided to fund the systems.

In the process, they also incurred mammoth future commitments by approving R. and D. funds for five new weapons systems: the Army's multipurpose LHX helicopter; an advanced tactical fighter for the Air Force; a similar attack plane for the Navy; the all-service JVX vertical takeoff aircraft, which has rotors that tilt; and the C-17 cargo transport plane, which could become one of the most expensive aircraft programs in history, now slated at $40 billion. To the legislators, the $1.3 billion in start-up money no doubt looked piddling. The cost of completing the five systems over the next decade: an estimated $180 billion. --By Ed Magnuson. Reported by Bruce van Voorst/Washington

With reporting by Reported by Bruce van Voorst