Setting the Summit Table

By Evan Thomas

There is Ronald Reagan the pragmatist, the leader who despite his brutally frank rhetoric avoids dangerous confrontation, the bargainer who bids high and then, often at the last moment, splits the difference.

Then there is Ronald Reagan the ideologue, the visionary who fastens onto simple--sometimes simplistic--solutions and serenely ignores the mutterings and machinations of official Washington.

Which Reagan will go to the summit in Geneva this November? Unless he was simply trying to keep a lid on expectations for the meeting, the President last week seemed to drop a strong hint that it would be the ideologue. At his first formal press conference since undergoing surgery for cancer last July, Reagan declared that he would not abandon his cherished Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), better known as Star Wars, in exchange for cuts, however large, in the Soviet nuclear arsenal.

For weeks the Kremlin has been feeding rumors that it would be willing to make such a deal. Soviet diplomats whispered to Western journalists that when Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze arrived in Washington this week to consult with both the President and Secretary of State George Shultz, he would carry a very concrete and attractive arms-control proposal in his briefcase.

But Reagan launched what appeared to be a pre-emptive strike. Star Wars, he insisted, was not "a bargaining chip." The prospect of a space-based defense, he said, "is too important to the world to have us be willing to trade that off for a different number of nuclear missiles when there are already more than enough to blow both countries out of the world."

Arms-control proponents were deflated by Reagan's apparent hard line. "If he means what he says," said Paul Warnke, Jimmy Carter's arms-control negotiator, "it puts an end to arms-control prospects." But there was some room for maneuvering. Though Reagan "spoke from the heart," said one White House aide, "this thing is not static. It could change between now and November."

Reagan's remarks were intended by the White House to lower expectations about the forthcoming summit and the third round of nuclear-arms limitation talks, which began last week in Geneva. They were also aimed at sending a signal to the Soviets, who are waging a propaganda campaign to bring world pressure on the U.S. to abandon Star Wars.

It is, of course, impossible to know if the Soviets are sincere about arms control. They may simply be trying to posture as peacemakers. That certainly is Reagan's interpretation. "I do think that this is a continuation of a longtime campaign," he remarked at his press conference, "to build an impression that we may be the villains of the piece and that they're the good guys." State Department officials insist that Soviet rhetoric has not been backed by concrete proposals. Said one top analyst: "We haven't seen anything in their hints that is different from a pure propaganda campaign."

Perhaps, but the hints are nonetheless alluring. During the second round of the Geneva talks last summer, Soviet Negotiator Victor Karpov informally suggested that Moscow might be willing to cut its arsenal of missiles and bombers by as much as 40%, including for the first time nuclear "charges," meaning warheads. In the past, the Soviets had agreed to limit only launchers, which allowed their missiles to be loaded up with multiple warheads. The Soviets also alluded to setting a ceiling on the number of land-based missiles. The U.S. considers these big "silo busters" to be the most destabilizing element in the Kremlin's nuclear arsenal, because they give the Soviets the capacity to launch a first strike that could devastate America's land-based missiles.

Even more tantalizing, Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev told visiting U.S. Senators that Moscow was willing to make "radical proposals" for cutting back offensive weapons if the U.S. would restrict its Star Wars program to "fundamental research." For the first time, Gorbachev moved away from a demand that the U.S. drop SDI altogether. Many American experts noted with cautious interest the signs of flexibility. "The Soviets are now laying out the terms of a deal," said John Steinbruner, foreign policy director of the Brookings Institution in Washington.

Administration officials, however, remain skeptical. Their posture toward the Kremlin, said one, is "put up or shut up." Washington wants to hear concrete proposals at the negotiating table, not trial balloons floated to journalists. At various times in Geneva, Reagan noted last week, "we have offered at least six versions of a possible reduction and six different ways to enlist their interest in negotiating with us in a reduction of warheads. They have come back with nothing." Before returning to Geneva, the U.S. delegation, led by Max Kampelman, was summoned to the White House to hear Reagan deliver an impassioned defense of SDI. "Their instructions were to stand pat," said a top official. "It's time for the Soviets to play their stake."

It is possible that Reagan is simply driving a hard bargain with the Kremlin, trying to squeeze concessions before agreeing to a deal. He did leave a slight opening by indicating that he would be willing to negotiate with the Soviets before deploying a space-based defense system the hope of persuading them to deploy one too. He insisted, however, not only that research and deployment would continue but that "one day" the system would be tested as well, even if it means revising the 1972 antiballistic missile treaty in order to avoid violating it.

Judging by his own statements, it appears that the only deal Reagan would accept is one that calls for deep reductions in land-based missiles without precluding the eventual development of a space-based defense. Said a senior arms-control official: "Unless the Soviets come forward with an offer he can't refuse, anything else is fevered dreams at this point."

None of Reagan's advisers appear willing to try to persuade him to put SDI on the bargaining table. In his first term, the U.S. arms-control apparatus was nearly paralyzed by an intramural struggle between advocates of a negotiated agreement, led by former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt, and opponents of arms control, led by Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle. Burt has since departed to become Ambassador to West Germany, leaving no one to push hard for arms control. The Pentagon under Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger is unalterably opposed to abandoning SDI (see box). Publicly, Shultz always backs the President. Arms-Control Adviser Paul Nitze would seize what he considered an opening for an advantageous arms deal, but he is a veteran of the bureaucratic wars and not likely to lead any quixotic crusades. The man in the best position to soften Reagan's intransigence is National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane. Yet publicly, at least, he has kept himself carefully aligned with his White House boss. Said one Administration official: "No one is ready to break ranks on this one."

The Administration's hold-fast position may be a sound negotiating tactic, but it gives the Soviets an edge in the war of words. The rhetoric level will increase this week as both Shevardnadze and Shultz give major speeches to the U.N. General Assembly at the opening of its 40th session. The Soviets continue to build up the summit as a "window of opportunity" for a major breakthrough in arms control that may not arise again "for a very, very long time." The U.S. just as resolutely tries to play down such talk as "wishful thinking." At his press conference, Reagan said the summit should be viewed as "a beginning point for better relations, a starting point for progress."

A critical question is how public opinion will respond in Western Europe. If the U.S. is ultimately viewed as an obstacle to nuclear sanity, the result could be disarray in the alliance and strong pressure to make concessions. The Administration is trying to keep the Allies in line by dangling lucrative defense contracts for SDI research. Last week the U.S. appeared to be close to signing agreements with the British and West Germans to clear the way for such research.

Reagan and Gorbachev have a full slate of issues aside from arms control to discuss in Geneva. These include "regional problems," a euphemism for hot spots like Central America, Afghanistan and the Middle East. A number of "bilateral issues" are also on the agenda, ranging from restoring Aeroflot flights between Moscow and New York City, which were suspended after the Soviets declared martial law in Poland in 1981, to discussing the "peaceful exploration of space." The Soviets refuse, however, to talk about human rights. The American side feels the Soviets are dragging their feet on the bilateral issues, and may be holding these agreements hostage to a broader arms-control deal. The Soviets are in any case lumping all these bilateral issues together. "They want a package deal," said a U.S. official. "It's got to be all or none."

In the end, the possibility of real prog-ress may hinge on the personal chemistry between the superpower leaders. Shultz has already taken to the affable but businesslike Shevardnadze, whom he finds far pleasanter to deal with than the last Soviet Foreign Minister, the glum and wily Andrei Gromyko. The two top diplomats should have ample opportunity to get to know each other better this week, since they are expected to spend a minimum of eight to ten hours together in New York and Washington. Shevardnadze is also scheduled to sit down with the President at a private meeting and a working lunch at the White House.

It remains to be seen how Reagan will get along with Gorbachev. In contrast to some earlier summit mismatches, like the urbane but untested John Kennedy and the blustering Nikita Khrushchev in 1961, both Reagan and Gorbachev are charismatic and confident performers.

Reagan came into office skeptical of arms control, and he has presided over the most serious and protracted breakdown in the Geneva talks. Yet, whether by Irish luck or intuitive statesmanship, he is currently in a position to get a far better deal out of the Soviets than any of his predecessors did.

That is at least partly a result of his Star Wars initiative, which has caused the Soviets deep concern. But if he now totally refuses to budge on Star Wars, the President runs the risk of touching off the costliest surge yet in the arms race. Without some accord on space weapons, the superpowers could get caught in what is known as an offense-defense spiral: each side proliferates offenses to penetrate the other's new or improved defenses, and adds defenses to protect itself against the other's increasingly sophisticated offenses. That is the classic formula for strategic instability and nuclear brinkmanship. For a President hoping to go down in history as a peacemaker, it would be a bitter legacy indeed.

With reporting by Johanna McGeary and Strobe Talbott/Washington