The Whole World Will Be Watching

By GEORGE J. CHURCH

"A lot is at stake. The whole direction of U.S.-Soviet relations is going to be significantly marked by the outcome of the first summit meeting in six years." --A White House aide, paraphrasing the speech Ronald Reagan will deliver Thursday before departing for Geneva

"There is a strong possibility of a boiler-plate summit reaching one or two milestones but never getting down to basics." --A senior adviser to Reagan

The odd thing is that the final rounds of presummit briefings, speeches, meetings and (as always) propaganda in Washington and Moscow lend support to both these forecasts. Admittedly, the long-awaited talks next week between the leaders of the world's two nuclear superpowers may never get beyond the boiler plate of Soviet-American relations. If any concrete agreements emerge (cultural exchanges? new consulates?), it might be stretching a point to call them milestones. Indeed, it seems increasingly obvious that the 74-year-old President of the U.S. and the 54-year-old General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party are going to Geneva not just to haggle over missiles but to articulate strongly opposed views of the world and of each other's behavior. Yet that exchange, paradoxically, might indeed mark a new direction for superpower relations. Even though the opportunity of a bold stroke for peace may be squandered, the summit is likely to start a continuing dialogue that, no matter how spirited, would be better than the frozen silence in which the White House and Kremlin have eyed each other since Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev met in Vienna in 1979.

Discussions preceding the summit have often seemed to highlight rather than narrow differences. On arms control, inevitably the main issue in a world living under a perpetual threat of nuclear extinction, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have exchanged proposals that call for cutting to 6,000 the number of "nuclear charges" in their arsenals, but they differ deeply on what warheads and bombs to put in that category. Progress, if any is possible, awaits a decision by Reagan to agree to some limits on his Star Wars defensive shield, or by Gorbachev to shoot for a deal without any such limits. On regional issues (such as Afghanistan and Central America) and human rights, the discussions amount largely to mutual accusations of meddling, subversion, repression.

It would be naive to expect the leaders of two nations with sharply contrasting political and social systems and deeply differing values even to begin to solve these impacted problems in eight hours of talks on Tuesday and Wednesday. But their meeting could at least set the tone for whatever combination of shouting and serious negotiation (it is unlikely to be either/or) will succeed the silence. A whole world will be anxiously watching every eyelid they lift or lower.

As Reagan pored over briefing books and prepared for his first eyeball-to-eyeball summit with a leader of a nation he has made a career of denouncing, Secretary of State George Shultz flew to Moscow with National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane and a dozen-odd other U.S. officials last week to lay the final groundwork for the meeting. The American team was whisked to Osobnyak, the czarist-era mansion where Soviet diplomats often conduct business. "We always expect good results from meetings," said Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze before escorting his visitors into the white marble meeting room. It was a friendly opening to two days of inconclusive argument about fundamental differences.

For eight hours, broken only by a brief working lunch, Shevardnadze and Shultz, along with their advisers, reviewed thick documents that laid out the rival positions of each country. No new common ground emerged. "The positions are like black and white," said one American present, "and it is hard to see a shade of gray." It was a disconcerting prelude to Shultz's meeting the next day with Gorbachev.

The spirit looming over the first business session the Soviet leader has ever held with top American officials was that of Lenin, whose brooding fervor seemed to pervade the exchange. Huge portraits of him decorated Red Square in anticipation of last week's anniversary parade of the Bolshevik Revolution; a portrait of Lenin even peered over Shultz's shoulder in the austere Kremlin conference room where the talks were held. Gorbachev opened with a comment that "most often misunderstandings come from a lack of knowledge." Shultz replied: "That's right, although sometimes I know cases where I wish I didn't know as much as I do."

In the four hours of private talks that followed, neither side budged an inch. On the American side were Shultz, McFarlane and U.S. Ambassador Arthur Hartman. Sitting with Gorbachev were Shevardnadze and Soviet Ambassador to Washington Anatoli Dobrynin. The meeting got straight to business, but it quickly became apparent that no one was ready to modify set positions. Shultz had come to Moscow largely to probe for possible Soviet concessions, but found Gorbachev unyielding on almost every point. Human rights? That subject was "discussed rather fully," Shultz told reporters later, "but I have nothing to report as to what possible constructive outcome there may be." Regional problems? Replying to Reagan's accusations that Moscow and its allies are imposing Marxist regimes by force on such Third World countries as Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia and Nicaragua, Gorbachev reaffirmed "an enduring Soviet policy to support wars of liberation as a national responsibility."

Not only did Gorbachev repeat Moscow's line that there could be no agreement on reducing offensive nuclear weapons without an accompanying ban on Star Wars development, but he appeared to retreat from what leniency he had previously displayed. In an August interview with TIME, Gorbachev had hinted that he might accept some SDI research, since laboratory activities cannot be verified anyway. But last week, said one American, Gorbachev seemed to be insisting on a "complete ban on every activity in any way related to strategic defense."

More disconcerting even than Gorbachev's substantive positions was his tone. The Soviet leader who met Shultz last week was not at all the affable crowd pleaser who toured London, Paris and Soviet farms and factories; he was a tough executive used to dominating a discussion. One American described the Soviet chief's demeanor as "intellectually curious, vigorous, active, articulate, argumentative, self-assured, occasionally impulsive." Suspicious too. According to Shultz, Gorbachev "suggested all that happens results from a conspiracy of the [U.S.] military and Big Business." Another American official reported Gorbachev seemed convinced that U.S. policy "was heavily influenced by a small circle of extremist people who are ideologically anti-Soviet" and who have "an ulterior motive, a hidden agenda," presumably a desire to destroy Communism, in their policy recommendations. At another point Gorbachev accused Washington of thinking it could "break us" by forcing a costly missile-defense race.

Gorbachev did not always even hear out the Americans. More than once he listened to just enough of the Russian translation to get the gist, then cut off the translator and launched into a rebuttal. Commented Shultz: "He is accustomed to interrupting and expressing a view. So, when in Moscow, do as those in Moscow do. We interrupted too." It seemed to be "a shouting match," suggested one reporter. Not quite, said Shultz, just a "frank argument." But he left Moscow with no agreement even over whether the President and Gorbachev should issue a joint communique at the end of the summit meeting. The Soviets have proposed one, but Shultz's team answered in effect: Let's wait and see how the talks go.

On that subject, Shultz ventured a prediction of sorts: If Gorbachev takes the same combative line in Geneva that he did in Moscow, the summit could become "something of a spectator sport. The President is an old hand at this." Said the Secretary, with a weary grin: "I'm looking forward to it."

A part from his meeting with the Shultz team, Gorbachev has been keeping a low presummit profile. He made only obligatory public appearances at last week's celebrations of the 68th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, reviewing the traditional parade of Soviet military might from atop the Lenin Mausoleum in Red Square on Thursday and delivering a brief address at a Kremlin reception expressing hope for a "fruitful" summit. But the Revolution Day symbolism was every bit as unyielding as any of Gorbachev's remarks to his American visitors. NO TO STAR WARS proclaimed many of the posters tacked up around Moscow.

Reagan's presummit activity has been far more public. All last week the President stepped up a publicity campaign, capped on Saturday by a speech billed by the White House as a "message to the Soviet people." The President expanded his regular weekly radio speech from five minutes to ten and had it beamed worldwide over the Voice of America network. It was a highly personal talk stressing Americans' political and moral values and yearning for peace, and it alluded only briefly to the summit. Said the President: "I hope my discussions with Mr. Gorbachev in Geneva will be fruitful and will lead to future meetings. We seek peace not only for ourselves but for all those who inhabit this small planet." Translators rendered the speech into 42 languages, including Russian, Ukrainian and other tongues spoken in the U.S.S.R., where Washington estimated the potential shortwave-radio audience at 23.6 million.

Reagan, like Gorbachev, had little new to say on substantive issues--with one misleading and embarrassing exception. In a long interview with five Soviet reporters that was published at the start of last week, Reagan astonishingly declared that the U.S. would not only negotiate with the Soviets before deploying a Star Wars system and offer to share the technology but that it would not deploy an SDI system "until we [the U.S. and U.S.S.R.] do away with our nuclear missiles, our offensive missiles." In fact, he repeated the thought in only slightly different language three times, which raised an obvious question: Why bother with an extremely costly defensive system if there were no longer any nuclear missiles to intercept? His answer: "In case someplace in the world a madman someday tries to create these weapons again." White House aides hastened to correct the President, who later backtracked to say that if the Soviets would not do away with offensive systems, the U.S. would deploy SDI anyway. All the same, the original gaffe was an unnerving example of the tendency toward impulsive misstatement that Reagan will have to guard against when talking to Gorbachev at the summit.

Otherwise, Reagan has been sketching a cool and consistent line toward the summit. While Gorbachev wants to focus on arms control, the President will insist on reviewing the full spectrum of U.S.-Soviet differences. What he plans to tell Gorbachev, advisers say, is roughly this: The U.S. does not and will not threaten the Soviet Union militarily or politically. It is the U.S.S.R. that killed detente by its military buildup and its aggressive efforts to spread Communism through the Third World. The U.S. is eager for a fresh start, but that will require modification of the behavior that causes Americans to view the Soviet Union as an expansionist totalitarianism.

The White House is well aware that Gorbachev is likely to respond, as he did to Shultz in Moscow, by reciting a catalog of American sins and Soviet suspicions. But Reagan feels under no pressure, or so his aides insist to journalists, to show any concrete results from the summit. "No deal is better than a bad deal," they quote him as telling them. Indeed, one adviser insists that Reagan is in the strongest pre-summit position of any President since Dwight Eisenhower in 1955.[*] The rationale: the U.S. has rebuilt its military strength, and its economy is prosperous; it has blunted what once looked like a Gorbachev propaganda advantage by making a new arms-reduction counterproposal two weeks ago, and enjoys solid support even from those allies most anxious for an arms-control deal; at home, Reagan's popularity is high.

Thus in the White House view, Reagan can claim some success from a summit that results in no more than a vigorous argument ending in an agreement to continue negotiations on a variety of subjects at various levels. That would satisfy U.S. public opinion, says one adviser: "People think we ought to talk to the Soviets, ought to talk to them more than we do, but they do not trust the Soviets much."

Some of Reagan's lieutenants venture that a ho-hum outcome might be acceptable to Gorbachev too. In the U.S. reading, the Soviet leader wants an easing of tensions with the U.S. in order to concentrate on pepping up the Soviet economy, but he has not made clear and perhaps not decided himself how far he is willing to modify Soviet policy to do so. At the moment he needs not only to prove to his colleagues in Moscow's collective leadership that he is not caving in to the U.S., but to keep foreign affairs relatively quiet. Consequently, says one Administration official, "Gorbachev does not lose by having a fairly flat outcome to the summit."

Even the physical arrangements for the meeting took protracted negotiation. Reagan will arrive Saturday night and proceed to Maison de Saussure, an 18th century estate on Lake Geneva, which will be his residence during the summit. Gorbachev is expected to arrive on Monday and take up residence on the grounds of the Soviet mission to the United Nations European headquarters in Geneva.

Reagan is host for the first day's talks on Tuesday at Fleur d'Eau, an unoccupied chateau made available by the Swiss government. Advancemen have arranged for Gorbachev to be driven to the back of the house just before 10 a.m. Reagan will be waiting on a flight of gray stone steps leading to the rear portico, hand outstretched for a historic shake. After a brief get-acquainted session, the President and General Secretary, each accompanied by seven aides and a translator, will confer until noon, return to their residences for lunch, and meet again from 2:30 to 4:30 p.m. To accommodate the parties, the U.S. has shipped to Geneva a 16-ft.-long stretch oval table from the New York City building housing the American mission to the U.N. Should the leaders decide to take a walk while talking, Fleur d'Eau was chosen in part to make a stroll pleasant; its huge garden stretches to the lake.

Gorbachev turns host Tuesday night for a dinner at the Soviet mission, and for Wednesday's working sessions at another building on the grounds. When U.S. advancemen first saw that building, it was so dilapidated they irreverently christened it "the urinal." But the Soviets have completely renovated it, painted it bright yellow and furnished it in 19th century French decor. Wednesday night Reagan will give a dinner. At present no parting ceremonies are scheduled, but American advancemen have staked out a theater the leaders can use Thursday morning if they reach any understanding they want to formalize with a flourish.

Subject to change, the talks are supposed to begin with arms control Tuesday morning, proceed to bilateral issues that afternoon, turn to regional relations Wednesday morning and conclude with human rights. Working parties are painstakingly reviewing 26 topics grouped under the four main headings.

Nuclear arms reductions and space-based defenses are, of course, the biggest issues, but there are many other important ones that are hardly less contentious. For example: chemical weapons, which the U.S. has proposed banning, while the Soviets want to retain existing stockpiles; and nuclear testing, which the Soviets have offered to suspend totally, while the U.S. insists that such a moratorium would be unverifiable. However, should the two sides wish to demonstrate that they can agree on something, there are a few possibilities. They could, for example, issue a strong statement on nuclear nonproliferation, a topic on which they are in rare complete accord. Neither Washington nor Moscow wants to see nuclear weapons developed by any additional nations.

On regional issues, the White House will attack Soviet activities in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and a now familiar list of other countries; the Kremlin will raise American backing of the embattled governments of El Salvador and, allegedly, South Africa, among others. The two might agree, however, to set up regular meetings between their regional experts.

The easiest area may be what is called bilateral relations, which could include a new consular agreement and one to increase what Shultz calls "people-to-people" exchanges. Nonetheless, these have been literally up in the air because the Soviets have linked both to resumption of U.S.-U.S.S.R. airline service. That presents difficulties involving landing fees and ticketing arrangements, which cause the American carrier involved, Pan Am, to fear that flights to the Soviet Union would be unprofitable.

Human rights have always been a touchy topic for Soviet leaders, and for Gorbachev more than most. Reagan plans an appeal to Soviet self-interest, arguing that it is abuses of human rights that make the U.S. public most suspicious of Moscow, and most unwilling to conclude agreements. Gorbachev has developed a counterargument that the U.S.S.R. values such "human rights" as full employment and free medical care, which the U.S. ignores. In addition, the Soviet press has lately been playing up such alleged U.S. violations of human rights as the Move bombing in Philadelphia. Sample fulmination: according to Pravda, "the United States is going through a 'prison boom.' Camps for dissidents are hastily being built there." The Soviets may even try to counter American allegations of human rights abuse with propagandistic bombast about the purported torture of fickle Soviet Defector Vitaly Yurchenko.

In sum, the most cursory review of the Soviet-American agenda is sobering: with few exceptions, the more important and potentially dangerous the issue, the deeper are the divergences. The spirit in which they are discussed, however, can make a lasting difference in the long run, and only the heads of government can set the tone for their subordinates. Barring some spectacular blowup or equally improbable major agreement, the success or failure of the summit will eventually be judged less by what Reagan and Gorbachev do in Geneva than by what happens in what is likely to be a long and difficult series of follow-up negotiations. Says one senior American official: "Both sides have moved to the recognition that the real importance of the summit will rest on what comes after it." Or, as Shultz put the point, "Life doesn't end in November." --By George J. Church. Reported by Laurence I. Barrett and Johanna McGeary/Washington and James O. Jackson/Moscow ON THE TABLE

There will be 26 issues on the agenda in Geneva next week, ranging from maritime boundaries to nuclear weapons. A guide to the most important:

[This article contains a table. Please see hardcopy of magazine or PDF.]

SECURITY ISSUES

AMERICAN POSITION

SOVIET POSITION

Strategic Weapons

The U.S. wants a limit of 6,000 nuclear charges (i.e., warheads) atop submarine-and land-based ballistic missiles and air-launched cruise missiles. It wants to ban mobile missiles and new heavy land-based missiles.

The U.S.S.R. originally proposed the 6,000 cap but wants to include weapons in which the U.S. has an edge: gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles launched from planes. It wants to ban air-launched cruise missiles.

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces

A freeze on weapons in Europe at the end of this year, limiting each side to about 140 launchers. British and French forces are not to be counted

A ban on U.S. ballistic missiles. The U.S. could keep about 120 cruise missiles. Soviets would cut their forces to equal U.S. deployments plus those of Britain and France.

Space Weapons

Reagan is determined not to yield on his Strategic Defense Initiative, insisting that research and testing would be within the bounds of the ABM Treaty and that any SDI developments could be shared with the Soviets.

Gorbachev is equally adamant in his desire to ban any research, testing or development of Star Wars technology. Arms-control negotiations at the summit could thrive or die on the SDI issue.

Nuclear Nonproliferation

The U.S. wants an agreement to do more to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

This is the one area of arms control on which the summiteers are expected to reach an agreement.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

The U.S. wants to prevent local clashes from turning into superpower confrontations. Reagan will say the U.S.S.R. should stop supporting Communist insurgency in El Salvador and break its military ties with Nicaragua. The U.S. will also criticize Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Africa and Kampuchea and will suggest the signing of a mutual statement condemning terrorism.

While the U.S.S.R. also wants to keep regional disputes from boiling into East-West incidents, the Soviets will insist on their right to support what they consider "wars of liberation." Gorbachev will criticize U.S. backing of the contras and intervention such as the 1983 invasion of Grenada. He will probably agree to sign an antiterrorism statement.

BILATERAL ISSUES

The U.S. would like to open new consulates in both countries, restore landing rights for U.S. and Soviet airlines, which were eliminated after the KAL 007 tragedy, and establish a system of regular superpower summits.

The U.S.S.R. is in favor of more consular exchanges and open to the idea of periodic summits, but civil aviation talks may flounder owing to a disagreement over ticket prices and the landing fees the Soviets are requesting.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Reagan will criticize Gorbachev for his government's treatment of Jews. Andrei Sakharov and other dissidents; its oppression in Eastern Europe; and its failure to comply with the Helsinki accords.

In what will amount to a propaganda skirmish, Gorbachev will charge the U.S. with abusing American Indians, blacks and other minorities and attack America for not providing full employment and national health programs.

With reporting by Reported by Laurence I. Barrett, Johanna McGeary/Washington, James O. Jackson/Moscow