Full-Court Press

By Jacob V. Lamar Jr

Though he has generally been circumspect about saying it outright, Ronald Reagan for his entire presidency has considered the dismantling of Nicaragua's pro-Soviet Sandinista regime both a geopolitical objective and a moral crusade. Last week the President all but abandoned circumspection.

In his fight for more military aid to the contras, Nicaragua's rebel forces, he took off his gloves and came out swinging, warning of "strategic disaster" if Congress thwarted him. Emboldened by the U.S. role in helping to achieve a peaceful transition in Manila, he made a rather forced comparison: "We stood for democracy in the Philippines," he said. "We have to stand for democracy in Nicaragua." He conjured up visions of an inexorable Communist advance: "If we don't want to see the map of Central America covered in a sea of red eventually lapping at our own borders, we must act now." Then he invoked the greatest threat of all in the post-Viet Nam era: "We send money and material now," he warned, "so we'll never have to send our own American boys."

Reagan's apocalyptic talk was part of the Administration's all-out campaign to win congressional approval of a $100 million aid package to the contras over the next year and a half--$70 million in military assistance and $30 million in humanitarian aid, such as food, clothing and medical supplies. (The $27 million in humanitarian aid that lawmakers agreed to last year as part of a reluctant compromise expires at the end of the month.) To kick off the effort, Reagan met with three leaders of the Unified Nicaraguan Opposition, Arturo Cruz, Alfonso Robelo and Adolfo Calero. He made a tough speech to Jewish leaders gathered at the White House, and scheduled a television address for this coming Sunday. The issue was publicly cast by the President, and more strongly by his top advisers, in us-or-them terms, with a blunt accusation that those who oppose aiding the contras are lining up, inadvertently or otherwise, on the side of Communism.

The Administration has offered a simple rationale for its aid request: only through the "two-track approach," a combination of military as well as diplomatic pressure, can the Sandinistas be forced to permit the democratic pluralism that was promised by their 1979 revolution and end their support for Communist revolutions elsewhere in Central America. To persuade Congress that he was in fact pursuing both tracks, and to underscore the connection he sees between the Philippines and Nicaragua, the President last Friday appointed as special envoy to the region Diplomat Philip Habib, who had hours earlier returned from his troubleshooter mission in Manila.

Although the House is not expected to decide on the aid package until next week, votes in several committees provided a preview of the sentiment. The House Armed Services Committee approved the $100 million by voice vote. But the package was rejected by four other important House panels, including the full Foreign Affairs Committee. Much of the voting followed party lines; to win the support he needs among House Democrats--and among some skittish Senate Republicans--Reagan may have to make significant concessions on the size and nature of the package.

The President's point men, Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, gave stark warnings last week about the Communist threat in Central America. But both also took pains not to demand the complete overthrow of a regime with which the U.S. still maintains diplomatic ties. In a speech last week, Shultz declared that Nicaragua could become "a Soviet and Cuban base on the mainland of Latin America, a regime whose consolidated power will allow it to spread subversion and terrorism throughout the hemisphere." Nevertheless, he offered a rational, carefully worded definition of the Administration's goals: "We want the Nicaraguan regime to reverse its military buildup, to send its foreign advisers home, and to stop oppressing its citizens and subverting its neighbors."

It was Weinberger who most explicitly raised the specter of eventually having to send in U.S. troops if the contras are allowed to wither away. "It will be a very expensive task," he told the House Armed Services Committee, "and will cost a great many lives." Although Reagan and Weinberger both emphasize that there currently are no plans to involve American forces, the Pentagon has already established a foothold in Nicaragua's neighbor Honduras, where U.S. troops have been conducting maneuvers since 1983. A $30 million network of air bases, intelligence posts, radar stations and other installations has been built, and last week 96 engineers from the Fort Bragg, N.C.-based 82nd Airborne Division parachuted into Honduras to begin work on a 4,700-ft. runway within 25 miles of the Nicaraguan border.

The Administration's opponents argue that aiding the contras would make it more rather than less likely that the U.S. might become further involved militarily. Even with increased aid, the hard-pressed contras cannot possibly force the Sandinistas to relinquish their tight hold on the country (see box). The more the U.S. becomes committed to the goal of changing the fundamental nature of the Sandinista regime, the more likely it is that American forces will seem necessary.

"In Central America, there is a mismatch between the Administration's objective and the instruments available, reminiscent of our ill-fated adventure in Lebanon," James Schlesinger, Defense Secretary under Gerald Ford, told TIME last week. "Mere dislike of the Sandinistas is not an - adequate basis for policy." Schlesinger contends that the rebels are no equal for the Nicaraguan army. "To define the American interest as that of the contras is to identify with a losing cause," says he. "To suggest that money for--and victory of--the contras is the only way to avoid introducing American troops is to come close to committing us to the introduction of our forces."

The tough rhetoric coming from the Administration, and, in particular, the implication that opponents are dupes of Moscow, left many lawmakers steaming. "They are trying to make this the ultimate test of conservative patriotism," said Kansas Congressman Jim Slattery, a centrist Democrat. "The tactics have backfired," said another moderate Democrat, Dave McCurdy of Oklahoma. "The rhetoric, the harshness, are working against them." In a meeting with Shultz last week, these Congressmen strongly objected to what they called "red baiting." The Secretary insisted that the Administration was not questioning their patriotism.

Even in the Republican-controlled Senate, the Administration's tone antagonized legislators. Deploring the White House's depiction of the contra aid debate as a "disagreement between Republicans in white hats and Democrats wrapped in red banners," Republican Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum of Kansas declared, "I find this simplistic reasoning to be highly offensive." When it seemed on the verge of sabotaging its own crusade, the Administration shifted tactics slightly late in the week. Said one U.S. official: "Congressmen don't like to be threatened; they like to be cajoled."

Cajoling, as most lawmakers know, is something Reagan does expertly. But so far the Administration has insisted on taking a stubborn stance and forcing a showdown. Republican Senator Richard Lugar, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, last week quietly proposed to the White House that some compromise plan on contra aid be sought before any floor vote. He was turned down. Nevertheless, there was some feeling on the Hill that a number of centrist House Democrats could still be swayed. "Today, we'd win," said one Democrat. "In two weeks, Reagan may pick off just enough votes to do it."

Democratic leaders tried to counter what the Administration called Reagan's full-court press by emphasizing the need for stronger diplomatic efforts. "Instead of escalating the fighting in Central America," said House Speaker Tip O'Neill, "the President should ally with the democratic nations in the region who are committed to a peaceful resolution of the region's conflicts. They want America's diplomatic strength, not its military firepower." Indeed, both Costa Rica and Honduras have publicly expressed their misgivings about the contra program.

A group of House Democrats, led by Californian Mel Levine, has proposed a plan under which Reagan would impose a six-month moratorium on military maneuvers in Central America, resume bilateral talks with Managua and meet personally with the Contadora group to discuss a peace plan. When asked if he would go along with the proposal, Reagan said, "No, I think six months is too long a time with what we're facing down there."

The most prominent of the diplomatic initiatives has been that of the Contadora group, composed of Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Panama, and named for the Panamanian island where its representatives first met in 1983. But the Contadora process up to now has proved no more successful than has throwing money at the contras. The Reagan Administration rejected a proposed treaty drafted by the group in 1984 that would have required the U.S. to break off its support of the rebels as well as its military assistance to El Salvador and Honduras without demanding any democratic reforms in Nicaragua.

In late January the Contadora four revived their effort during a conference at the Venezuelan resort of Caraballeda. The "Declaration of Caraballeda" calls for direct negotiations between the U.S. and Nicaragua and the creation of a Central American parliament. The declaration has been endorsed by all five Central American countries involved: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica and Guatemala. Even some contra leaders are hopeful about this initiative. "At Caraballeda, they are for the first time talking about internal reconciliation, which is the root of the problem," says contra Leader Cruz, referring to the rebels' demands for direct negotiations with the Sandinistas.

In appointing Habib as a special envoy, Reagan sought to deflect the criticism that he had forsaken diplomatic alternatives. Habib said the first channel the U.S. would pursue was an offer made last week by El Salvador's President Jose Napoleon Duarte to meet with his country's leftist guerrillas if Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega simultaneously opened talks with the contras. The Sandinistas have already rejected proposals for any type of talks with the contras.

Given the tenor of the current debate, the U.S. dilemma can seem rather hopeless: Washington is becoming more and more polarized between those who have faith in the contra cause and those who have faith in diplomacy, although neither path alone offers any real hope of changing the fundamental nature of the Sandinista regime.

A more limited (and somewhat less satisfying) goal, however, might be plausible: attempting to contain the spread of Sandinista influence. If regional treaties seem impotent in ensuring this aim, the Administration might argue that steady support must be given to the contras--even with little expectation that they could ever win--as a way to tie the Sandinistas down, prevent them from fomenting revolution elsewhere, and make Soviet support for its client state more costly.

With reporting by Johanna McGeary and Barrett Seaman/Washington