Why Not Accept a Ban?

Ronald Reagan is the only President since the U.S. first developed the Bomb to oppose a comprehensive ban on the testing of atomic weapons. In 1963, two years after the Soviets broke an unofficial 34-month moratorium, John Kennedy sent Diplomat Averell Harriman to Moscow in hopes of securing such a sweeping ban; he returned after twelve days with only the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which forbade explosions in the atmosphere and oceans but not underground. The Nixon Administration in 1974 negotiated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, limiting underground blasts to no more than 150 kilotons; like SALT II, it was never ratified by the Senate, but is generally accepted by both sides. This week's planned detonation, the 758th at the Nevada Test Site, would be under the threshold, but it clearly reasserts Reagan's resistance to Soviet proposals for a complete test ban.

The President contends that as long as nuclear weapons are needed for deterrence, the U.S. must test them. Because they are highly complicated devices with electrical, mechanical and chemical components that can develop glitches, Reagan argues, that "a limited level of testing assures that our weapons are safe, effective, reliable and survivable."

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger has stressed the country's need to develop increasingly effective warheads and "modernize our tactical nuclear weapons." Testing is also necessary to develop systems like the nuclear- generated X-ray laser, which may prove critical to the President's Strategic Defense Initiative, or Star Wars. In addition, Weinberger's deputy Richard Perle points out that testing more precise warheads has allowed the U.S. to reduce its overall megatonnage by 75% in the past two decades. "That," says Perle, "makes for a far safer and more stable world." Supporters of a ban counter that it would decrease the chances of a pre- emptive nuclear attack by making both arsenals less dependable. "If there are doubts about reliability," explains former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Paul Warnke, "then any tendency toward first strike on either side is diminished." In a Council on Foreign Relations study released last week, a group of authors, including President Ford's National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and his Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, state that a ban could make "a significant contribution to slowing nuclear proliferation." Proponents also argue that it would be to America's strategic advantage, since the Soviets are behind the U.S. in warhead sophistication. Says Richard Garwin, a nuclear expert with IBM: "Resuming testing will enable the Soviets to further miniaturize their warheads and put even more on their large MIRVed missiles."

While rejecting a total ban, the President has proposed to the Soviets new methods of verifying tests to ensure that both sides are within the limits of current treaties. Last week the CIA announced that it has changed its methods of measuring Soviet tests and conceded that its previous calculations of Soviet violations may have been overstated by as much as 50%.

Agreeing that verification is crucial, proponents of a complete test ban argue that it would be easier to verify than the current threshold ban, because the Soviets have offered on-site inspection for the total test ban. But many in the Administration, led by Perle, maintain that even on-site monitoring offers little promise. "There's no way a few inspectors can police the whole Soviet Union," Perle says. For these hard-liners, the need to stay ahead of Moscow's modernization program is paramount. Concedes Perle: "I'm opposed to a comprehensive test ban even if it were verifiable."