Search for a Middle Ground

Even through the past two years of turmoil in South Africa, the Reagan Administration has firmly stuck to its policy of "constructive engagement," under which it hopes to nudge Pretoria toward a peaceful end to apartheid by means of "persuasion and pressure." The policy was fashioned by Chester Crocker, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, who continues to be the Administration's troubleshooter for the region.

Recently, however, that hands-off position has seemed more and more insufficient. On the one hand, South Africa's imposition last month of a state of emergency reasserted its absolute indifference to gentle prodding from abroad. On the other hand, support for sweeping economic sanctions has been steadily mounting in Congress. The Administration is now trying to map out some middle ground between doing nothing and imposing tough sanctions. As Secretary of State George Shultz explained last week, Washington must act "in a manner that lends strength to our statements but leaves us in a position to exercise what persuasion we can."

In the hope of resolving that problem, the State Department and the National Security Council have initiated a full-scale review of the Administration's South African policy. For the moment, however, their options seem as confused as the situation they are trying to address. Two weeks ago, National Security Adviser John Poindexter said that the Administration might pursue closer contacts with the black militant African National Congress. But then he downplayed the possibility, pointing out that the A.N.C. did not represent all blacks and that Washington still had problems with the A.N.C.'s "commitment to violence and ties to the Soviet Union." Poindexter also mentioned that a high-level U.S. envoy might be sent to Pretoria, but then admitted that an envoy could achieve little. Last week White House Spokesman Larry Speakes reiterated that the Government was considering only a "shift in emphasis" in the constructive-engagement policy.

Both Shultz and President Reagan remain opposed to sanctions, arguing that they would not only remove U.S. leverage in South Africa but devastate much of southern Africa. In June, however, the House overwhelmingly voted to clamp a comprehensive trade embargo on South African products and force all U.S. companies to withdraw from the embattled country within six months. Last week the Senate delivered its strongest gesture of impatience yet. Only hours before the body recessed for the holiday weekend, Republican Senator Nancy Kassebaum introduced a bill that would ban all new U.S. loans and investments in South Africa. Said she: "The government of South Africa has become so intransigent that our policies appear to be entirely irrelevant."

Such pressure has increased the urgency for the Administration, as Shultz puts it, to "turn up the rheostat." The Secretary of State is expected to reveal a few adjustments in constructive engagement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 22. The changes, however, will probably be mild and largely cosmetic. Shultz has admitted that Washington's "ability to pressure South Africa is limited." But if the U.S. does nothing, it may forfeit even that limited role, not only in South Africa's current affairs but also in the future of that tormented country.