Beyond the Debate, South African Realities

By Bruce W. Nelan/Johannesburg

While Western governments grapple with the conundrum of sanctions, white South Africans are grimly pursuing their own debate about the future, fully confident that their decisions will be the determining ones. As they see it, the West has become irrational about sanctions and there is little point any longer in trying to bring reason to bear. The issue, says Tertius Myburgh, editor of the Johannesburg Sunday Times, has become "cost-free election politics" in the U.S. and "Margaret Thatcher's problem, not ours" in Britain. Although it generates political heat in Washington and London, the argument is, for white South Africans, no more than the sound of distant shouting.

The two Presidents, Ronald Reagan and P.W. Botha, agree on at least one thing: South Africa's problems will be resolved by its own people, in the main without reference to the world at large. Indeed, the reform program that Pretoria has carried out over the past two years, including an end to the color bar in sex and marriage and legalization of black residence in urban areas, was announced in Botha's speech opening Parliament in January 1985, months before South Africa became front-page news in the U.S. and Western Europe.

In a monumental change of mind that was inconceivable as recently as five years ago, most white South Africans today agree that apartheid should be "dismantled" and that blacks must be allowed to share power up to the highest level. Many go further, as Foreign Minister Roelof ("Pik") Botha did in February, when he said that a black President is probably inevitable. Some senior officials confide privately that they expect to see a black government in South Africa in their lifetime. The unresolved question is how to get from the present to the inevitable.

The most desirable but least likely outcome is black-white negotiations and a peaceful compromise. The government has already tried twice to bring black leaders to the bargaining table -- efforts that have failed because blacks demanded that first apartheid had to be abolished and political prisoners released. A third attempt will be launched later this month when Parliament takes up a bill to create a National Statutory Council, a multiracial group that is to advise State President Botha on social reform and the drafting of a new constitution that would for the first time explicitly allow blacks to participate in the political process.

It is improbable that a credible black leader will agree to join the council. Some from the so-called self-governing homelands, for whom seats will be reserved, might do so, but their participation would keep out antiapartheid activists who consider them collaborators. The most important homeland leader, KwaZulu Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi, says he will take part only if he receives a "massive mandate" from his political organization, Inkatha, and if imprisoned Black Nationalist Nelson Mandela is freed and offered a chance to join.

In the eyes of most blacks, the statutory council is flawed because it is purely advisory and blacks played no role in its formulation. "The government's basic mistake," says a Western diplomat, "is that it thinks it can, and must, remain in control of the process of change. It is trying to reform by directive, and blacks will not accept that." Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, former leader of the white opposition Progressive Federal Party, says that the government is inviting blacks to negotiate about apartheid, while the blacks are saying that if apartheid is abolished first, then they will negotiate about power.

This clash over what must come first may harden. The United Democratic Front, the largest apartheid coalition, which claims more than 600 organizations with 2 million members, now calls for nothing less than the surrender of the South African government. In a memorandum to European Community governments on the eve of British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe's visit last week, the U.D.F. declared that "there is no possibility of peace and the construction of a democratic government while the Nationalist Government remains in power."

It is possible, of course, to dismiss such demands as no more than an opening bargaining position, designed to seize the high ground at negotiations. But there are no negotiations under way now, and scant prospect of them in the short term. The memorandum is, it seems, a revolutionary document. "The people," it pledges, "are determined to continue the process of building people's power in our communities, factories and schools regardless of the cost. The possibilities of freedom and democracy are no longer dim and distant. Our victory is certain."

Exactly how victory is to be achieved is not spelled out, but a successful revolution in South Africa is an unlikely eventuality for many years -- if ever. Revolutions now require a secure source of military equipment from a friendly foreign country and, in the end, the distintegration or defection to the rebels of the army and the police. The main external threat so far has been the African National Congress, which since 1962 has been waging a low- level guerrilla war from bases in neighboring states. South Africa has effectively neutralized the A.N.C. through agreements, economic pressure and occasional cross-border military strikes. While terror bombings take place and mines, hand grenades and AK-47 assault rifles still kill and wound South Africans, mostly in township violence, the flow of weapons into the country is not enough for an armed insurrection.

The military forces and police, including reserves, total almost 500,000 very well-equipped men and women. "There is no sign of demoralization on the part of the security forces," says Michael Hough, the director of Pretoria University's Institute for Strategic Studies. "Only massive outside intervention on behalf of the A.N.C. could conceivably tilt the balance."

There seems little chance that police officers in any numbers would defect to the antigovernment side. Although nearly half the South African police are nonwhite, black activists consider them sell-outs to the apartheid system. They have been the primary target of Molotov cocktails and flaming tire "necklaces" in the townships. The army of 76,000 on active duty and 140,000 ready reservists is almost entirely white.

To imagine the success of a revolution, it is necessary to conceive of an uprising so vast and so bloody that it neutralizes or even overpowers the security forces. There is no question that the so-called comrades, the militants who attack police armored cars with rocks and firebombs, are willing to die. But given the firepower of the soldiers and police, it is highly unlikely that the comrades could overwhelm them.

Nor is it likely that sanctions could force the South African government to make political changes it otherwise would not make. According to calculations by South African economists, a trade ban would cut export earnings by only about 15% since sales of such crucial products as gold and diamonds would undoubtedly continue despite sanctions. In any case, there is no evidence that pain in the pocketbook will demolish Pretoria's political will.

It is always possible, of course, that unforeseen events could end white domination of the political system sooner than any of these analyses permit. If so, South Africa would almost certainly be ruled by people who describe themselves as socialists. The A.N.C., which views itself as the government- in-exile, officially stands for a mixed economy, but most of the U.D.F. and trade-union leaders in South Africa have proclaimed themselves champions of socialism and foes of capitalism, which they label the "other side of apartheid."

The A.N.C. makes no secret of the fact that many of its members also belong to the South African Communist Party, which maintains close connections with Moscow. A.N.C. President Oliver Tambo and Imprisoned Leader Mandela, however, are probably not Communists. In the near term, such a hypothetical black takeover would probably bring Mandela, the most admired black by far, to power. His biggest challenge would be to deal with other potential leaders like Zulu Chief Minister Buthelezi and the comrades who have been organizing in the townships. Buthelezi is an avowed capitalist and heads a union of 60,000 members formed to oppose the socialist orientation of the country's largest labor federation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions. The comrades might not be completely compliant. They could disapprove of Mandela's moderation and reject his opposition to "necklaces."

When the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group visited Mandela in prison earlier this year, he told them that if he was released from prison, the "unity of all black leaders, including Chief Buthelezi, could be achieved." Mandela emphasized his "desire for reconciliation across the divide of color" and "pledged himself anew to work for a multiracial society in which all would have a secure place."

Whether such moderation could long survive the takeover of power is uncertain. Political differences between Buthelezi and the A.N.C. and antagonism between the Zulus and the Xhosas, the ethnic group to which Mandela belongs, are so intense that the country's new leaders could split the black population into armed factions.

Lack of unity is, in fact, the greatest problem facing black South Africa. The most impressive economic sanction possible would be a general strike by all of the country's black workers, but they have so far been incapable of organizing anything more than one-day stay-aways and isolated consumer boycotts. For decades, black activists have also debated and feuded over the issue of whether whites should have a role in either the liberation struggle or the political structure that would follow it.

Because of the divisions among blacks and the strength of the Botha government, the most likely outlook for South Africa is what Frederik van Zyl Slabbert calls "violent evolution." The time for a peaceful negotiation has already passed, and a true revolution is probably impossible. The result is a future much like the present: violence in the townships, slowly increasing terrorism in urban areas and a police grip on activists of all colors.

Neither side has given up, though. The U.D.F. continues to clamor for | power. The government is pressing on with its reform program -- at its own pace. In the near future, some alteration can be expected in the Group Areas Act, which establishes residential areas by race. At a National Party Congress next month, President Botha is expected to announce additional reforms, probably including joint sessions of the tricameral Parliament, which includes Indian and mixed-race representatives.

The nature of change in South Africa has been one of belated but official recognition of facts of life. Blacks came to the cities by the millions, so the government had to drop the law that made that illegal. Blacks began forming unofficial trade unions, so the government had to accept them. Blacks opened businesses in downtown districts, so the government had to authorize that. Blacks are now demanding the right to participate in South Africa's political life, and the government will have to let this happen too.

The inherent tragedy is that the anguish and bloodshed are unnecessary. South Africa has so much natural wealth, such hardworking and skillful people and, surprisingly, so much personal goodwill between blacks and whites that a mutually agreeable solution should be possible without such suffering. But by the time violent evolution has come to the end of its cycle, all of those resources could be depleted.