The Pentagon's "Flying Edsel"

By BRUCE VAN VOORST

From its conception in the late 1960s, the B-1B bomber has been a child of controversy. A breathtakingly beautiful airplane with slim-silhouette wings that meld into a fuselage that breathes speed, the swanlike aircraft is designed to penetrate Soviet air defenses, unleashing nuclear-tipped missiles at targets deep inside the country. But skeptics lampooned the B-1B -- at $283 million a copy the most expensive plane in aviation history -- as an unnecessary and probably unworkable interim successor to the aging B-52s, and in 1977 President Jimmy Carter scuttled the project. Newly elected Ronald Reagan revived the B-1B in 1981, ordering 100 of the bombers, but as production approaches the halfway point, critics in the Pentagon and elsewhere are decrying the plane as something of a turkey, a "flying Edsel."

Pentagon officials insist that is not the case. Says Air Force General Lawrence Skantze: "The B-1B is the best, most capable bomber in the world today." Claims Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger: "The plane will do what it's supposed to do." Nevertheless, Assistant Air Force Secretary Thomas Cooper told Congress, "We have to be aware of the limitations in the B-1B right now and plan accordingly." The Air Force is also withholding almost $300 million from contractors for poor performance. Last week, tucked away in the Defense Department's 1988 budget proposal was the Air Force's most public admission yet of troubles: a request for $600 million to repair problems with the aircraft.

In its rush to deploy the B-1B, the Air Force went into production while the aircraft was still undergoing major design modifications. Even before the first bombers became operational last fall at Dyess Air Force Base in Texas, there were portents of trouble. The plane's fuel tanks, built directly into the wings without rubber bladders, leak jet fuel. Early flight tests revealed problems caused by loading cruise missile launchers and antiradiation pods onto the original airframe design. In gaining an extra 41 tons -- nearly a 25% increase -- without additional wing surface, the B-1B had acquired an extraordinary "wing loading" of 245 lbs. per sq. ft., twice the weight carried by the commercial Boeing 747. The added weight means the plane is prone to stall when the pilot attempts complex escape maneuvers. New stall- inhibitor and stabilization mechanisms will ease the problem but will make it more difficult for the B-1B to execute maneuvers vital to survival. Pilots complain that the heavy load makes the aircraft "fly like an elephant."

There are other problems. Pilots bringing the B-1B to treetop level found that the ground-tracking radar, designed to keep the plane from slamming into hills, was inadequate. The system jerked the B-1B up and down, causing considerable internal stress. Fuel consumption turned out to be enormous, particularly when the pilot kicked in the afterburner to accelerate through enemy defenses, raising doubts whether the plane can even reach its targets. So many difficulties emerged in flying the aircraft that some 40% of the training missions have had to be scrubbed.

By far the most critical deficiency is the failure of the sophisticated electronic countermeasure devices -- the "black boxes" designed to jam antiaircraft radar and missiles. So dissatisfied is the Pentagon with the equipment that it is withholding payments to the manufacturer, Eaton Corp. Shortcomings in the jamming hardware, for example, have triggered difficulties with other elements of the aircraft's computer "brain," with unforeseeable consequences. Some $104 million of the money requested for repairing the B-1B is earmarked for this software system. Last week Eaton tacitly confirmed its problems with the black box by ousting the manager of the B-1B electronics project.

The Pentagon argues that the structural problems can be overcome and the bugs worked out of the electronic warfare system. "There are always problems with new aircraft," explains Lieut. General William Thurman, commander of the aeronautical systems division responsible for the B-1B. "There's nothing wrong we won't be able to fix." But many observers contend that the fundamental shortcomings of weight and fuel consumption will permanently limit the utility of the airplane. Even Air Force insiders doubt the ability of the troubled electronic jamming system to assure the B-1B's mission to penetrate Soviet airspace. In particular, the black boxes are designed to protect the plane from attack from below, yet the new Soviet MiG-31 and other planes have a "look-down, shoot-down" capability that severely threatens the B-1B from above.

To many observers who have battled the B-1B for over a decade, current problems merely confirm long-held doubts. Says Georgia Democrat Sam Nunn, the incoming chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee: "For most of the aircraft's useful life, it will not be able to penetrate (Soviet airspace) and will be a standoff carrier of cruise missiles and conventional bombs." The U.S., concludes Nunn, "could have built that kind of system much cheaper than we have built the B-1B."

But the issue is broader than just the fate of the B-1B program, which will have cost nearly $30 billion by the time the last plane is delivered in 1988. Close on its heels is the successor aircraft, Northrop Corp.'s so-called Stealth bomber, supposedly even less visible to enemy defenses and better able to penetrate to targets. Plans call for producing 132 Stealth planes, with a projected price tag said to top $40 billion.

Unlike Rockwell International Corp.'s B-1B, which at least was constructed in public view, the Stealth is a "black" Pentagon program, with neither the aircraft's general performance nor its cost open to outside inspection. Industry rumors, however, claim the plane is already $2 billion over budget. "After seven years of testing, the Air Force still couldn't deliver a serviceable B-1B," said one critic. "Who knows what mistakes are being made behind the black wall of secrecy surrounding the Stealth bomber?"