Disarmament Let's Make a Deal

By Jill Smolowe

Mikhail Gorbachev's message was stunningly simple. If Washington would remove all of its medium-range missiles from Europe, Moscow would do the same. Ronald Reagan's response was no less bald: he promised to "seize this new opportunity" by presenting his Administration's own plan for a missile-free Europe. With those two moves, arms-control negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which have been stalled since last October's superpower summit in Reykjavik, suddenly took off like a racing car at Le Mans. For the first time since the grimaces and recriminations of that meeting, the two leaders seemed prepared, indeed determined, to make a historic deal.

In Geneva, American and Soviet arms negotiators brought forth draft proposals for eliminating the medium-range missiles and agreed to continue talks on those weapons, which were due to adjourn last week. Then Soviet negotiators returned to Moscow for consultations, and Max Kampelman, the chief American negotiator, flew off to Brussels to brief NATO allies before continuing on to Washington to confer with President Reagan. At week's end Reagan announced that "to maintain the momentum" generated in Geneva, Secretary of State George Shultz would fly to Moscow in mid-April to confer with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

The initial reaction to Gorbachev's proposal was highly favorable. "This is a real breakthrough," said a spokesman for Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the West German Foreign Minister. The Kohl government, once opposed to the total removal of missiles, was now solidly behind a deal. NATO Secretary-General Lord Carrington called the offer a "substantial step forward." Secretary Shultz felt there was "some prospect, perhaps pretty good, we can get something worked out."

Both Gorbachev and Reagan, of course, have their own personal reasons for wanting a deal. For Reagan, an arms-control accord could prove to be the ticket out of his Iran-contra doldrums, restoring a golden hue to his tarnished presidency. For Gorbachev, stable relations with the U.S. are essential if he is to have the time, energy and authority to concentrate on the internal reforms he is attempting. Masterly communicators, the two leaders have created a public perception that an agreement may be within reach. "The most important thing," says a senior U.S. official, "is that arms control is on the move again."

Gorbachev's proposal calls for removal of medium-range missiles from Europe over a five-year period. Washington would withdraw 108 Pershing IIs and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles, while Moscow would dismantle 270 SS-20 missiles. The Soviets have 112 SS-4 missiles in Europe, but these are being replaced by more advanced SS-20s. Both sides would then be limited to 100 medium-range warheads, the Soviets on their Asian territory, the Americans on U.S. soil.

At last fall's summit Gorbachev insisted that cutbacks on medium-range missiles be linked to concessions on Reagan's treasured Strategic Defense Initiative. Now the Soviets are willing to discuss the missiles separately. In addition, they have signaled a greater spirit of cooperation on the two stickiest outstanding issues: verification procedures and shorter-range missiles.

Diplomats in Moscow last week were suggesting that Gorbachev's proposal should be called the Sakharov Plan because it contained ideas the dissident physicist put forth in a speech in mid-February (see following story). But arms-control hands with longer memories recognize the initiative by another name: the zero option. In 1981 the Reagan Administration presented just such a proposal for the elimination of all medium-range missiles from Europe. The move was an attempt to soothe peace activists nervous about the pending deployment of Pershing IIs and cruise missiles, which were intended to match the Soviet SS-20s. Given the proposal's nonnegotiable demands, it was assumed the Soviets would never consider it seriously.

While the medium-range missiles are of political significance, they have limited military importance. If dismantled, only some 1,500 of the estimated 50,000 warheads would be removed from superpower arsenals. Moreover, existing strategic forces can easily cover the targets now handled by them. Still, West European leaders have long clamored for removal of the Soviet SS-20s. They now have to face the very real possibility of such an event and its complicated consequences. Diplomats may be recalling an aphorism of Oscar Wilde: "When the gods wish to punish us, they answer our prayers."

. Many critics feel that the removal could be a serious strategic error. To begin with, the Soviets have a considerable advantage in conventional forces in Europe. NATO relies heavily on nuclear deterrence, while the Soviets have built up more nonnuclear strength. Said a British minister last week: "We're not comfortable with zero option. It would leave us at a terrible disadvantage given the Soviet Union's overwhelming superiority in tanks, planes and of course numbers."

In addition, the medium-range missiles are visible evidence of the U.S. nuclear guarantee, and some experts fear that their withdrawal could leave Europe less well protected. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warns that if the missiles are taken out, "the American capacity to retaliate from Europe will be removed." Others argue that withdrawal of the weapons would be militarily destabilizing because it could encourage a non-nuclear conflict in Europe. NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Bernard Rogers, has warned, "The last thing we want to do is make Europe safe for a conventional war."

Many Europeans remain concerned about Soviet shorter-range nuclear arms. These can be fired up to 560 miles, compared with the 3,000-mile range of the SS-20s, and could still hit West European targets. The Soviet arsenal includes some 500 such missiles in Europe, while NATO has none. The U.S. draft treaty tabled in Geneva includes provisions for NATO to match the Soviets' shorter- range systems. But even if Moscow is cooperative, efforts to equal Soviet strength would require new NATO deployments. That could provoke a painful repeat of the parliamentary debates and ugly street protests that attended the decision on the Pershing II and cruise missiles.

Verification procedures to ensure that the missiles are removed will prove sticky. While the Soviets have indicated their willingness to accept some kind of checks, the U.S. is pushing for very specific measures, and one NATO official admits "the Soviets could find these too tough for comfort." While the details were not divulged last week, the Pentagon is known to favor ten "surprise" visits a year, as well as monitoring of Soviet production, storage and training sites. Such arrangements would of course be reciprocal, giving the Soviets access to high-security areas in the West. Says Shultz: "Everyone is edgy about intrusive verification. But it's something we've all got to face up to, and that's all there is to it."

On the American side, initial optimism is mixed with some wariness. The Soviets have dangled the prospect before of a separate medium-range reduction pact, only to then demand that the agreement be linked to SDI concessions. Cautions former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger: "The Soviets are serious, but whether they're serious about negotiation or propaganda remains to be seen."

Certainly the exquisite timing of Gorbachev's proposal is suspect. Coming just two days after the release of the Tower commission's scathing review of the Reagan Administration's bungled arms-for-hostages policy, the offer was sure to appear attractive to an embattled President. Moreover, the announcement seemed timed to exploit disagreements within the NATO alliance over Washington's broad interpretation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

A less cynical reading of Soviet motives suggests Gorbachev moved as soon as he received a go-ahead from the Politburo. There had been hints that the Soviet leader would produce an arms-control initiative at a peace forum in Moscow last month. Gorbachev's colleagues may have insisted the announcement be timed instead to coincide with the resumption of Soviet nuclear testing, which started two weeks ago after an 18-month moratorium, thus giving an appearance of dealing from nuclear strength. The Soviets may also have been concerned that they must reach agreement with the Reagan Administration or wait several years for new disarmament talks. No matter who wins the 1988 presidential election, it will take the new Administration time to come up with its own strategic policy.

When it comes to disarmament negotiations, the devil is truly in the details. While the arms talks showed such progress last week that Yuli Vorontsov, the chief Soviet negotiator, predicted that an agreement could be reached by summer, it is still to be seen whether the momentum can be sustained. Both Gorbachev and Reagan would certainly like to hold a successful summit later this year -- maybe even one at which they exchange pens after initialing an arms-control agreement. But a lot of tough bargaining will have to take place before anyone can pull out a pen.

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Credit: TIME Map by Paul J. Pugliese

Description: Warheads installed: U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Europe. NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Europe. Missiles installed/to be deployed by country.

With reporting by Christopher Redman/Paris and Bruce van Voorst/Washington