Of Arms and Reforms
By Andrei Sakharov Copyright (c) 1987 by Andrei Sakharov
In February, barely two months after Soviet authorities unexpectedly released him from internal exile, Andrei Sakharov created a worldwide sensation by turning up at an international forum in Moscow. Sakharov, 65, a nuclear physicist often described as the "father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb" and a courageous defender of human rights in his homeland, spent nearly seven years under virtual house arrest with his wife Elena Bonner in the closed city of Gorky. During the February forum, Sakharov delivered three speeches eloquently expressing his concerns about human rights, U.S.-Soviet relations and the nuclear arms race. He made a slightly edited version of those speeches, along with a preface explaining his reason for giving them, exclusively available to TIME.
In the speeches, Sakharov takes up the broad themes that repeatedly have brought him into conflict with the Kremlin since the early 1960s: the connection between preserving peace and protecting human rights, the need for greater openness in the Soviet Union, and the possibility of an eventual convergence of capitalist and socialist societies.
Sakharov voices deep skepticism about Ronald Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative. Yet he does not favor the Soviet negotiating position that makes an arms-agreement "package" dependent on what amounts to U.S. abandonment of sdi. Mikhail Gorbachev's latest proposal of a separate agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces appears to approach this position.
The conclusion of Sakharov's statement may surprise those who saw Chernobyl as a crippling if not fatal blow to the future of nuclear power. He argues strongly for the further peaceful development of nuclear energy, but suggests that reactors be buried underground to prevent any repetition of last year's Soviet nuclear disaster.
I agreed to participate in the "Forum for a Nuclear-Free World and the Survival of Mankind" on Feb. 14-16 in Moscow, and I spoke at three sessions. My decision attracted great attention. Some approved of it, some condemned it, many characterized it as sensational. But for me the choice was clear.
My views were formed during the years I spent on nuclear weapons; in my struggle against testing of these weapons in the atmosphere, underwater or in space; in my public activities and writing; in the human-rights movement; and in Gorky isolation. My fundamental ideas were reflected in a 1968 essay, "Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom," but since then life has brought many changes that have forced me to modify my position and make it applicable to specific circumstances. I am referring in particular to recent changes in the domestic life and foreign policy of the U.S.S.R.
The main and constant ingredients of my position are the idea that the preservation of peace is indissolubly linked to the openness of society and the observance of human rights, as formulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the conviction that only the convergence of the socialist and capitalist systems can assure a fundamental and lasting solution to the problem of peace and the survival of mankind.
I realized that my participation in the forum would be used to some extent for propaganda purposes. But I believed that the positive significance of a public speech, after I had been gagged for so many years, would outweigh any negative effects.
The ideas I expressed differ in many respects from the official Soviet position, but in many other respects they coincide with it. In any event these are my thoughts, my convictions. At the forum, two Soviet participants, Academician Yevgeni Velikhov, vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and Andrei Kokoshin, the deputy director of the Institute of U.S.A. and Canada Studies, argued at length against some of my ideas. I take that as an indication of the importance and relevance of my words.
My first speech was delivered at a session on strategic arms reductions, the second at a session on antiballistic-missile (ABM) defense and the Strategic Defense Initiative, the third at a session on the problem of banning underground tests ((a so-called comprehensive test ban, or CTB)). I attach special significance to the second of the talks, in which I came out against the "package" approach, whereby the U.S.S.R. is strictly linking agreements on nuclear weapons reductions to conclusion of an SDI agreement. Another important statement was on the safety of nuclear power, in my third speech. I would like there to be a broad public discussion of these issues.
My participation in the forum was reported in the Soviet press but not the main points of my remarks. This is what Pravda wrote: "Academician A.D. Sakharov noted the unsoundness of the position of SDI proponents. He also termed as incorrect the idea that the existence of the SDI program would spur the U.S.S.R. to disarmament talks. The SDI program impedes negotiations. The scientist also proposed his own version of how to achieve a 50% cut in nuclear weapons." Western radio stations have also reported my views imprecisely and incompletely. This reinforced my decision to publish the complete text of my speeches at the forum.
ON GORBACHEV. I have thoughts of a technical nature regarding strategic arms reduction. But first I would like to examine certain general issues. As a citizen of the U.S.S.R., I direct my appeals to the leadership of our country in particular, along with the other great powers with their special responsibility for the world situation.
International security and real disarmament are impossible without greater trust between the nations of the West and the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries. There must be a settlement of regional conflicts on the basis of compromise and restoration of stability wherever it has been disrupted. Support for destabilizing and extremist forces and all terrorist groups should be ended, along with attempts to expand the sphere of influence of one side at the expense of the other. All countries should work together on economic, social and ecological problems. Greater openness and democracy in our country are necessary. We need the free flow of information; the unconditional and complete release of prisoners of conscience; the freedom to travel, to choose one's country and place of residence; effective control by the people over the formulation of domestic and foreign policy.
Despite the continuing process of democratization and the increasing openness in the country, the situation remains contradictory and unsettled, and in some areas instances of backward movement can be observed (for example, the new decree on emigration). Without a resolution of political and humanitarian problems, progress in disarmament and international security will be extremely difficult, if not impossible.
Conversely, democratization and liberalization in the U.S.S.R. -- and the economic and social progress closely associated with them -- will be impeded unless the arms race slows down. Gorbachev and his supporters, who are waging a difficult struggle against ossified, dogmatic and self-seeking forces, have an interest in disarmament, in making sure that huge material and intellectual resources are not diverted to producing new and more sophisticated weapons.
But the West and the entire world also have an interest in the success of reforms in the U.S.S.R. An economically strong, democratic and open Soviet Union will be a very important guarantor of international stability, a good and reliable partner in the common resolution of global problems. On the other hand, if the West tries to use the arms race to exhaust the U.S.S.R., the course of world events will be extremely gloomy. A cornered opponent is always dangerous. There is no chance that the arms race can exhaust Soviet material and intellectual resources, or that the U.S.S.R. will collapse politically and economically; all historical experience indicates the opposite. But the process of democratization and liberalization will stop. The scientific and technical revolution will assume a pronounced military-industrial character, and as one might fear, expansionist tendencies and alliance with destructive forces will prevail in foreign policy.
STRATEGIC ARMS. Now a word regarding the special problems of strategic arms limitation. At their meeting in Reykjavik last October, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev discussed a simultaneous 50% cut in all types of strategic weapons of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. This plan would maintain the existing proportions of various types of arms for each side. I am relying on publications available to me; it is possible that certain details are unknown to me. The "proportional" scheme is the simplest, and it is quite natural that progress should begin with that. But it is not the optimal outcome, since it does not solve the problem of strategic stability.
A large part of the U.S.S.R.'s thermonuclear capability is in powerful, silo-based missiles with multiple warheads ((SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs armed with MIRVs and launched from underground silos)). Such missiles are vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike by the modern, highly accurate missiles of the potential enemy. It is of decisive importance here that a single enemy missile with multiple warheads can destroy several silo-based missiles. Given the rough equality of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the enemy could use only a portion of his own missiles to destroy all of one side's silo-based missiles. In that situation, the strategic importance of being the first to strike grows enormously. A country relying mainly on silo-based weapons may be forced in a critical situation to launch a first strike. This is an objective strategic reality that cannot be ignored by the opposing side.
I want to stress that no one planned this situation when silo-based missiles were deployed in the 1960s and '70s. It arose as a result of the development and deployment of multiple warheads and the increase in missile accuracy. But today silo-based missiles -- and, more generally, any missiles with vulnerable launch sites -- constitute the principal source of military strategic instability.
For this reason I believe it is extremely important to give priority to cutting back missiles with vulnerable launch sites, i.e., missiles that are mainly first-strike weapons. That means first and foremost reducing the number of Soviet silo-based missiles, which are the backbone of Soviet thermonuclear forces, as well as U.S. MX missiles ((the new, ten-warhead ICBM that became operational at the end of 1986)). Perhaps simultaneous with an overall reduction in numbers, some of the remaining Soviet silo-based missiles should be replaced, at the same time as the general cut, by less vulnerable missiles with equivalent striking power (missiles using mobile or camouflaged launchers, cruise missiles with various basing modes, submarine-based missiles, and so on). I believe there is no need to replace the U.S. MX missiles, since they play a smaller role in the overall balance and can simply be eliminated in the process of bilateral cuts.
Admittedly, negotiating a nonproportional reduction ((one that would require heavier cuts for silo-based ICBMs)) is more difficult for experts and diplomats than agreeing to a proportional reduction. But I am convinced that this is extremely desirable. The additional expenditures required for restructuring Soviet strategic forces seem to me fully justified, and the deeper the cuts in the ((Soviet and U.S.)) strategic forces, the smaller those expenditures will need to be.
That brings me to the question of how to determine the maximum cuts in the strategic forces that will still permit strategic stability to be maintained. That is a very difficult task, involving numerous unknown and not properly defined factors.
I shall cite two considerations illustrating these difficulties. An assessment of the damage that would result from a nuclear exchange depends on what scenario one uses, on whether the enemy has launched a first strike or a retaliatory strike. As I see it, a country undertaking a dangerous confrontation may decide to launch a first strike, since the level of damage it will sustain from the enemy's retaliatory blow will be lower. That raises the considerably more complex question of maximum acceptable damage that a country contemplating a nuclear war can sustain. How much harm to the populace and the nation's economic and military potential can a government undertaking nuclear confrontation permit as the price for victory? For that question to arise, it is assumed that there would not be mutual assured destruction.
This question cannot be resolved on the basis of a peacetime psychology. I recall decisions made under critical circumstances by leaders of the recent past, but in fact the situation of which we are speaking here ((a superpower's willingness to "go nuclear" in a crisis)) is without precedent. For this reason, I would be hard put today to name a specific level ((of strategic nuclear weapons at which war would be "thinkable")). It may even approach the level of what we think of now as mutual assured destruction! In any event, this question can be postponed until after a 50% reduction has been implemented ((with a "priority" on reductions in first-strike weapons, such as fixed-site ICBMs)).
A nuclear-free world is a desirable goal, but it will be possible only in the future as the result of many radical changes in the world. The - conditions for peaceful development now and in the future are settlement of regional conflicts; parity in conventional arms; liberalization, democratization and greater openness of Soviet society; observance of civil and political rights; a compromise solution on the issue of antimissile defenses without combining it in a package with other questions of strategic weapons. Convergence -- a rapprochement of the socialist and capitalist systems -- offers a real and lasting solution to the problem of international security.
UNTYING THE PACKAGE. The possibility of an agreement on several critical disarmament problems emerged in Reykjavik. But the negotiations were frustrated by the SDI problem, more precisely by Reagan's reluctance or inability to conclude a compromise SDI agreement providing for both a moratorium on deployment in space of ABM components (which is a necessary condition) and specific limitations on the testing of SDI, which involves launches of components into space or underground nuclear explosions. In the version most acceptable to the U.S.S.R., the agreement would provide that SDI work be limited solely to laboratory research. Apparently the compromise agreement proposed by the Soviet side was unacceptable to the U.S. side, since it deprived America of a free hand to proceed with SDI.
Given the predictable position that Reagan took ((he rejected the Soviet attempt to limit SDI to the laboratory)), the package principle adopted by the Soviet side assumed decisive importance. It makes an agreement on SDI a necessary condition for other disarmament agreements, especially any agreement to cut the number of ICBMs. A deadlock developed.
I believe that the package approach can and should be revised. A significant cut in ICBMs and medium-range and battlefield missiles, and other agreements on disarmament, should be negotiated as soon as possible, independently of SDI, in accordance with the lines of the understanding laid out in Reykjavik ((presumably with the additional feature of priority cuts in silo-based MIRVed ICBMs)). I believe that a compromise on SDI can be reached later. In this way the dangerous deadlock in the negotiations could be overcome. I shall try to analyze the ideas that led to the package approach and demonstrate their unsoundness. I shall also attempt to demonstrate the unsoundness of the arguments in favor of SDI itself. I'll begin with the latter.
I'm convinced that the SDI system is not effective for the purpose for which its proponents claim it was intended. ABM components deployed in space can be put out of action even in the non-nuclear stage of a war, and especially at the moment of transition to the nuclear stage, through the use of antisatellite weapons, space mines or other means. Many key land-based ABM installations will also be destroyed. The use of ballistic missiles with lighter warheads and solid-fuel missiles with decreased boost-phase time will require an excessive increase in the number of SDI space stations.
ABM systems are of little use against cruise missiles and missiles launched from close range ((with "depressed," sub-ballistic trajectories)). Any ABM system, including SDI, can be effectively overcome by simply increasing the number of decoys and operational warheads, by jamming and by various methods of deception. All this as well as other considerations makes SDI a kind of "Maginot line in space" -- expensive and ineffective. Opponents of SDI maintain that even though it would be ineffective as a defensive weapon, it could create a shield behind which a first strike would be launched, since it might be effective in repelling a weakened retaliatory strike.
I think they are wrong. First, a retaliatory strike would not necessarily be greatly weakened. Second, almost all the arguments cited above regarding SDI's flaws in defending against a first strike would apply to a retaliatory strike as well.
Nevertheless, neither side can be expected to abandon SDI research at this time, since the possibility of unexpected successes cannot be ruled out. What may be even more important and realistic is that the concentration of resources on the cutting edge of technology may result in important spinoffs in peaceful and military fields, such as in computer science. I still believe all these considerations and possibilities to be secondary in comparison with the enormous cost of SDI and the negative influence of SDI on strategic stability and disarmament negotiations.
Possibly SDI proponents in the U.S. are counting on an accelerated arms race, associated with SDI, to exhaust and ruin the economy of the U.S.S.R. This policy will not work and is extremely dangerous to international stability. In the case of SDI, an "asymmetric" response (i.e., a push to develop offensive forces and weapons to knock out an SDI system) would most efficiently frustrate such hopes. The claim that the existence of the SDI program has spurred the U.S.S.R. to disarmament negotiations is also wrong. On the contrary, the SDI program is impeding those negotiations.
I shall now proceed to the central question of the package approach. A seemingly serious argument is cited in defense of the package principle: imagine that the U.S.S.R. abandons the package and agrees to a substantial cut in strategic missiles, while the U.S. maintains its freedom to deploy SDI and at a certain point begins launching SDI components into space -- in the version proposed by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, for example ((Weinberger eight weeks ago called for early deployment of a preliminary SDI, including some space-based components)). Weinberger's project envisions the development of a network of space stations over several years, each armed with several dozen antimissile missiles to destroy Soviet ICBMs in the boost phase of their trajectory. In addition, a network of sensors, reconnaissance and battle-management stations would be created. The purported danger of this system is that it would not be effective against the currently existing number of Soviet missiles, but would be sufficient, after that number is cut, to render the U.S.S.R. unarmed for all practical purposes. It is also possible that offensive nuclear space-to-ground missiles and offensive space-to-ground laser weapons could be hidden on the hundreds of space stations contemplated.
I shall begin with the last worry. Space-to-ground weapons do not appear very promising to me. Missiles deployed on space stations would have much lighter warheads than ground-based ballistic missiles of comparable cost. Moreover, the space stations and any devices launched from them would be very vulnerable to pre-emptive attack, and lasers capable of igniting fires at a distance of 100 kilometers (some 62 miles) or more must be extremely powerful and are not very reliable. But the main argument advanced in favor of the package approach is the potential of SDI against reduced Soviet ICBM forces.
I believe it is extremely unlikely that the U.S. would deploy SDI under conditions of an arms reduction, considering the extremely negative political, economic and strategic consequences of deployment and the harm SDI would do to the stability of the world situation. (Prominent U.S. political figures are convinced that Congress would not permit it.) If disarmament begins, the SDI program in the U.S. will lose its popularity.
^ But even if the forces insisting on SDI deployment nevertheless were to prevail, the U.S.S.R. would not be left in a hopeless position. It could bring to a halt any reduction of its strategic forces and begin accelerated construction of mobile strategic missiles and cruise missiles, which would thus replace vulnerable silo-based missiles. As I have noted, such substitution is desirable for other reasons.
Simultaneously, the U.S.S.R. could begin accelerated development of antisatellite weapons and space mines, which would enable it to destroy or paralyze the U.S. SDI system. It would be especially easy to destroy the comparatively few reconnaissance stations. The cost to the Soviet Union would increase, but it would not exceed acceptable levels. It would be comparable to the expense of sticking to the package approach and the existing level of the arms race.
Of course the second scenario is less favorable than the first for the U.S.S.R. But it is also less favorable for the U.S. and for the entire world. This provides reason to hope that the U.S. will not deploy SDI and will limit itself to research, which may even bear fruit in peaceful areas.
This then is the choice, either insistence on the package approach and a continuation of the arms race at existing and growing levels, combined with inevitable deployment of SDI, or abandonment of the package approach, which would permit an escape from the Reykjavik deadlock. Of course, in the worst case ((SDI deployment)), which I do not believe likely, a new round of the arms race would begin with the U.S.S.R. replacing silo-based missiles with mobile ones. Even in that event, I do not believe that the strategic position of the U.S.S.R. and the stability of the international situation would be different from the situation that would be the case if the package approach were maintained (and the Soviet Union's political stand would be enhanced ((by its show of flexibility))). Therefore I wholeheartedly favor renunciation of the package approach.
TESTING. Regarding the problem of nuclear testing, I maintain that the combat capability of many new versions of nuclear weapons (of both the fission and fusion kind) can be reliably determined without conducting nuclear tests. A possible exception may be weapons based on new physical and design principles. But existing physical and design principles already are quite sufficient to manufacture nuclear weapons satisfying all military requirements. Testing is not required to develop new versions of weapons differing only in terms of dimensions, weight or other such parameters from those previously tested. Testing is currently not necessary to verify the reliability of older, stockpiled weapons or to verify their ability to withstand the mechanical, thermal and radiation effects they may have been subjected to in combat.
One can in principle divide every nuclear charge into four relatively independent systems: electronic, ballistic, atomic and (for a hydrogen device) thermonuclear. The reliability of the first three systems can be confirmed by laboratory tests supplemented by experiments in which a low-yield fission or fusion reaction releases a small quantity of neutrons, which can be measured by a counter close to the charge to be tested. The fourth system -- thermonuclear -- does not require testing in the majority of cases, since its reliability may be established by analogy to previously tested charges based on the same physical and design principles. At the same time computer simulations of thermonuclear explosions are also quite helpful (calculations of explosive processes exhibiting spherical symmetry or symmetry of the axis of rotation are completely reliable; the reliability and accuracy of these calculations can be verified by comparing the computer simulation of actual test results obtained for analogous charges exploded in the past).
Thus the question of nuclear testing is not critical for restraint of the nuclear arms race. The issue of nuclear testing, in my opinion, is of minor, secondary importance in comparison with the other military, technical, political and diplomatic problems involved in preventing thermonuclear calamity. Underground tests are conducted in sufficiently deep chambers with adequate safety measures to prevent ecological damage both in the country performing the tests or beyond its borders. As long as nuclear weapons exist and are not banned, the decision regarding underground testing is the internal, sovereign affair of each nuclear power.
I believe that eliminating the issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban will facilitate negotiations on more urgent problems of disarmament. I have deliberately omitted any discussion of the propaganda and psychological aspects of the test-ban issue.
Nuclear weapons divide and threaten mankind. But there are peaceful uses of nuclear energy that should promote the unity of mankind. Permit me to say a few words on this subject. Participants in the forum have mentioned in their speeches the disaster at Chernobyl, an example of the tragic interaction of equipment failure and human error. Nevertheless, the aversion people rightly feel for military applications must not spill over to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Mankind cannot do without nuclear power. We must find a solution to the safety problem that will rule out the possibility of another Chernobyl resulting from human error, failure to follow instructions, design defects or technical malfunctions.
One effective solution is the underground siting of nuclear reactors at a depth that precludes the escape of radioactive substances into the atmosphere in the event of an accident. This would also assure nuclear safety in the event of ((damage to the reactor as a result of)) a conventional war. It is particularly important to assure the safety of nuclear plants used for generating heat and electricity in the vicinity of large cities.
The idea of underground siting of nuclear reactors is not new. The principal argument against it is the cost factor. But I'm convinced that the cost will be acceptable if modern excavating equipment is used. And, really, no expense should be spared to prevent accidents involving radiation. I believe that people concerned about the potential harmful consequences of the peaceful use of nuclear energy should concentrate their efforts not on attempts to ban nuclear power, but instead on demands to assure its complete safety.