Monday, Jun. 29, 1987
Central America Potholes on the Road to Peace
By Jill Smolowe
For months the Presidents of five Central American countries had been signaling new hopes for peace in their embattled region. The focus for that optimism was a proposal they planned to discuss at a June 25 regional summit meeting in Guatemala City. But last week, following a flutter of U.S. diplomacy in the region, the peace initiative appeared to collapse. Salvadoran President Jose Napoleon Duarte, Washington's closest ally in Central America, demanded a postponement of the meeting. Meanwhile, President Reagan held a hastily arranged, one-hour session at the White House with the author of the peace plan, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez. After the meeting, the White House noted that Reagan had "concerns" about details of the proposal, while Arias stated that there had been agreement "on the end . . . but not the means."
Even before the White House statement, charges had been flying throughout Central America that the U.S. was once again working to stymie the convoluted regional peace process. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega Saavedra, whose Sandinista government is fighting off the attacks of U.S.-supported contra rebels, accused the U.S. of a "direct attempt to kill any possibility of a negotiated settlement in the region." Ortega once again charged the U.S. with foiling peaceful negotiations in order to "isolate Nicaragua and launch a direct invasion against our country." The Nicaraguan President declared that he would not agree to a summit postponement and would boycott any future meeting.
U.S. officials, on the other hand, argued that the problem with the June 25 meeting was a lack of advance preparation that could be solved with only a few weeks' delay. But that claim rang hollow. Conceded one U.S. diplomat: "We panic at the thought of a Central American agreement with the Sandinistas."
Arias describes his ten-point proposal as a "risk for peace." As he sees it, the plan is a "balanced proposal" that, at best, could bring an end to nearly a decade of bloodshed in the region. At worst it would call the Sandinistas' bluff, perhaps exposing them as the hard-line Communists they frequently insist they are not (see box).
First aired in February, the Arias proposal echoes many of the items included in the so-called Contadora process, a four-year, Latin American effort to negotiate a Central American settlement that still sputters on without appreciable result. Both plans call for a region-wide cease-fire and an end to outside military assistance to all guerrilla groups, including the rebels in El Salvador and the contras. Both schemes propose a general amnesty for insurgents, followed by a peaceful political dialogue between opposition forces and incumbent governments. The Arias plan also follows Contadora in calling for pluralistic democracy in all Central American countries. But the Arias scheme is more specific: it would require all five nations to begin holding free elections within six months of agreeing to the accord.
A more important innovation in the Arias scheme is that it calls for a cease-fire to precede the intended reconciliation in each Central American country. As far as Nicaragua is concerned, that amounts to recognition of a long-standing Sandinista refusal to talk seriously with the contras while they continue fighting.
Washington continues to insist, on the other hand, that Nicaragua must embrace a democratic political process before any cease-fire takes place. "The Arias plan lets the Sandinistas off the hook," complains a U.S. official in the region. "It gives them a cease-fire in an increasingly debilitating war on the basis of only vague promises for the future." Washington maintains that only continued military pressure on Managua will produce any meaningful change. "The war weakens the Sandinistas' ability to govern," says a senior Washington official. "They have not been able to consolidate their hold on the country." The Administration balks at the plan's vague verification procedures and its failure to guarantee that the contras will be included in the democratic dialogue that would follow a cease- fire.
Until last week nearly all Central American leaders -- government officials and opposition politicians alike -- had voiced enthusiasm for the Arias scheme. Among other things, they noted that unlike the stalled Contadora effort, which is sponsored by Mexico, Panama, Venezuela and Colombia, Arias' plan is completely homegrown. Even the civilian leadership of the contras has offered qualified support. "The plan forces the Sandinistas to choose between continued war and returning to the ((democratic)) promises they made in 1979," says Contra Leader Alfredo Cesar. In March the U.S. Senate, by a vote of 97 to 1, also embraced the "thrust" of the plan.
The flurry of endorsements reflects a mounting feeling that, among other things, the anti-Sandinista effort of the contras is in grave danger of collapse. A chief reason, of course, is the Iran-contra hearings in Washington, which have badly tattered U.S. policy in Central America and cast doubt on the Reagan Administration's ability to sustain support for the rebels. A watershed for that support will appear in September, when the Administration approaches Congress for an additional $105 million in contra aid. In its statement following the Reagan-Arias meeting, the White House asserted the U.S. President's intention to "continue to apply pressure on the Sandinista regime to democratize," and to seek "renewed funding from the Congress." Some experts say the Administration will be lucky to get some, let alone all, of the requested funds.
A more immediate question is whether the delayed Central American summit meeting will ever take place. After hasty consultation, the Presidents of Honduras and Guatemala suggested last week that the parley be rescheduled for August 6-7. But it seems unlikely that all of the concerned parties, Ortega in particular, will agree. Even if the Latin Presidents do gather in Guatemala City at that time, however, last week's confusing diplomatic tango has seriously muddied the peacemaking waters.
With reporting by John Moody/San Jose, with other bureaus