Syria

By Howard G. Chua-Eoan

For centuries the route to Damascus has posed a challenge to travelers. The Syrian capital is walled away from the West and from the Mediterranean by the double massif of the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon ranges, rising to 10,000 ft. In other directions, the city is surrounded by the Badiya as-Sham, the great Syrian Desert, where, for seven months of the year, the relentless sun becomes a blinding enemy. But while the physical obstacles to Damascus remain, other barriers appear to be falling. Its economy in tatters, its army mired in Lebanon and its alignment with Iran a growing burden, Syria appears increasingly receptive to overtures from the West, especially from the U.S.

Flying into Damascus last week without fanfare or press conference, Vernon Walters, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, held what he called "very useful, very fruitful, very cordial" meetings with Syrian President Hafez Assad. It was a remarkable if discreet achievement after years of deep enmity between the two countries, which culminated in last year's recall of U.S. Ambassador William Eagleton after an attempt by Syrian-backed terrorists to blow up an El Al flight in Britain. Though U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon John Kelly says it is "premature to talk about rapprochement between the U.S. and Syria," Washington officials are encouraged by the tone that marked Walters' sessions with Assad.

The most encouraging sign of Syrian moderation came in early June, when Assad closed down the Damascus offices of Abu Nidal, the notorious Palestinian terrorist-for-hire. Abu Nidal, who received attention in last week's Iran- contra hearings for his threats against Lieut. Colonel Oliver North, is suspected of masterminding the Rome and Vienna airport massacres that killed 19 in December 1985. Moreover, while still railing against Israel, Syrian radio now broadcasts stinging criticisms of terrorist acts. One statement specifically condemned taking "innocents and journalists" hostage, an obvious reference to last month's kidnaping of former ABC Correspondent Charles Glass in Lebanon. Glass's abductors last week released a video recording in which the journalist confessed to being a spy for the CIA. The State Department vehemently denied that Glass had ever worked for the U.S. Government.

+ With 7,500 Syrian troops in West Beirut and an additional 25,000 in north and east Lebanon, Assad has been embarrassed by Glass's kidnaping. Assad's dilemma: fighting the Beirut terrorists would, in effect, mean confronting their chief patron, Iran, which Damascus supports in its protracted war with Iraq. According to Israeli sources, when Syrian Army General Ghazi Kenaan led his troops into Beirut in February, he wanted to curb the power of Hizballah, the pro-Iranian Shi'ite group based in the Lebanese capital that is believed to hold most of the 24 foreign hostages, including nine Americans. But Tehran and Hizballah's spiritual leader, Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, intervened, and the group agreed not to take any more captives.

After Glass was seized, an enraged Kenaan confronted Fadlallah. Though the sheik denied any role in the abduction, Kenaan nonetheless threatened to invade the city's Shi'ite suburbs, where many of the hostages reportedly are kept. Assad, says one Western diplomat, "would like nothing better than to release an American hostage. He would like to create the impression that he is doing the things that would allow pressure on Syria to be lifted a bit by the U.S. and Britain."

If Assad is to head farther down the road of moderation, he will have to loosen his country's ties to Iran. Petroleum-poor in an oil-rich region, Syria is dependent upon Iran for much of its fuel. Indeed, Damascus owes Tehran more than $1 billion -- nearly a third of its outstanding nonmilitary debt -- for discounted petroleum. Tehran has also supplied Damascus with more than 26 million barrels of crude free since 1982.

Assad must balance his allegiance to Tehran with pressures from the Soviet Union, his chief financier and arms supplier. Between 1981 and 1985, Moscow provided Damascus with more than $8 billion in weapons. Eager to play a larger role in the region, Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev reminded Assad during a Moscow visit in April that billions have been wasted on war in the region "without achieving anything." Though the Soviets have written off some $4 billion in economic loans to Damascus and rescheduled its military debt at generous terms, they have also criticized Assad for his inept handling of the economy.

Syria has cash reserves of between $100 million and $150 million, enough for only one week's worth of essential imports. In the capital, Syrians must regularly line up to buy gas, oil, sugar and rice. To preserve gasoline, the army is not using one-third of its tanks in training sessions. Assad has reportedly fired two ministers responsible for the economy, and is rumored to be about to remove the Minister of Agriculture, but more drastic measures will be needed to salvage the economy. "They've just plain run out of money," says a Western diplomat. "If Syria were a Western country, we'd consider it bankrupt."

A wily leader who has ruled his country with steely calculation for almost 18 years, Assad is above all a survivor; despite chronic heart disease and severe diabetes, he shows no signs of relinquishing his post. Assad may hope to keep Tehran and Moscow off balance by warming up to the West, but any alliance he forms with Washington would be entirely in his -- and Syria's -- self-interest. As one American diplomat put it, the relationship between Assad's Syria and the U.S. has always consisted of "peaks and valleys." Both countries apparently want to climb out of the present valley, but Assad will try to control how high the peak will be.

With reporting by David S. Jackson/Cairo and Johanna McGeary/Jerusalem