The Admiral Takes the Hit

By Jacob V. Lamar Jr

Throughout his career, John Poindexter had played by the rules. As a vice admiral in the U.S. Navy, he was regarded as a painstakingly efficient officer who paid scrupulous attention to the chain of command, never challenging his superiors, always following orders to the letter. Indeed, one commanding officer characterized Poindexter as "totally loyal and trustworthy, and a thorough briefer who rarely interjected his own viewpoints." But as Ronald Reagan's National Security Adviser from December 1985 to November 1986, Poindexter told his questioners last week, he broke that pattern. In February 1986, after just two months on the job, he decided to usurp the authority of his Commander in Chief.

In his testimony before the congressional committees investigating the Iran-contra affair, Poindexter insisted he and he alone gave final approval to Lieut. Colonel Oliver North's proposal to take profits from U.S. arms sales to Iran and divert them to the Nicaraguan rebel forces. He claimed to have exercised this authority without ever telling the President, so as to protect Reagan from the "politically volatile issue" that subsequently exploded on them. "I made the decision," Poindexter declared in an even, matter-of-fact tone. "I was convinced that the President would, in the end, think it was a good idea. But I did not want him to be associated with the decision."

Moreover, Poindexter said, his extraordinary exercise of authority did not end with the contra diversion. As the scandal was breaking last November, Poindexter testified, he destroyed a piece of vital evidence: a covert-action finding, drafted by the CIA and signed by the President in December 1985, that retroactively approved Israel's shipments of U.S. arms to the Iranians. The document, said the admiral, depicted the weapons transactions as a straight arms-for-hostages swap with Iran rather than a diplomatic effort to establish contacts with Iranian moderates, as the President has maintained. "I thought it was politically embarrassing," said Poindexter of the finding. "I tore it up, put it in the burn basket behind my desk."

To the President's supporters, Poindexter's confession was a turning point in the Iran-contra melodrama, resolving one of the essential issues of the scandal. There would be no evidence directly linking Reagan to the ugly and possibly unlawful use of money garnered by selling weapons to terrorists. While the White House staff breathed a sigh of relief over the admiral's disclosure, Reagan at first seemed nonchalant. "What's new about that?" he shrugged. "I've been saying that for seven months."

But Poindexter's testimony still has devastating implications. If the admiral is to be believed, his story reveals a startling lack of accountability in the White House. "If the President didn't know, in some ways it's more serious than if he did," said House Majority Leader Thomas Foley. "Presidents ought to be allowed to create their own political disasters," said Republican Senator Warren Rudman of New Hampshire. "Nobody else ought to do it for them."

Was Reagan's famous management style so lax that his newly appointed National Security Adviser could feel free to run a highly sensitive covert operation without ever informing the President or any of his other top advisers? White House aides rejected the idea. The President, they said, was angry when he learned that Poindexter had authorized the diversion. Asserted Chief of Staff Howard Baker: "The President has said, 'I did not know it, and had I known about it, I would have stopped it.' That's the totality of it." Confronted with the White House statement, Poindexter calmly stuck to his story that Reagan would have approved his decision. "People can draw their own conclusions, I guess," he said.

To some members of the Iranscam committees, Poindexter's testimony simply did not wash. "I just don't believe what he says," remarked Democratic Congressman Louis Stokes of Ohio. "It does not appear logical that a man of his intellect and management skills would arrogate unto himself the responsibility of making a monumental decision affecting the President."

In fact, the self-portrait drawn by the admiral last week did not appear logical in several respects: the naval officer known for his lack of political savvy making a crucial political judgment call; the strict by-the-book staff man reborn as a renegade who followed his own lights in deciding what Reagan should and should not know. "It doesn't make any sense," said a committee staffer. "This man wants you to believe that he risked the entire presidency on a set of decisions he thought were either too controversial or too unimportant to belabor the President with." Senate Panel Chairman Daniel Inouye called Poindexter's testimony "incredible, mind boggling, chilling."

The performance fueled rather than stilled speculation in Washington that Poindexter was the Administration's designated scapegoat for the scandal. In earlier testimony North, who was Poindexter's hyperactive aide at the NSC, claimed he and Director of Central Intelligence William Casey had often ! discussed the intricacies of the Iran-contra operation. According to North, Casey said the Marine might have to play the "fall guy," taking blame for the entire operation if it was ever exposed. On further consideration, Casey speculated that North might not be "senior enough" to make a credible scapegoat; the CIA director suggested Poindexter would have to share the role.

Poindexter testified that he had never heard of any scapegoat plan. But some thought the admiral was indeed falling on his sword for the sake of Ronald Reagan. "This man will never say anything that reflects adversely on his Commander in Chief," said Senate Counsel Arthur Liman. "How do we know he's not still protecting the President?"

Poindexter, 50, related his amazing tale in ordinary, conversational tones, then broke out his pipe and lit up, as if he had come to the end of an after- dinner story. He matter-of-factly told the panel of the day in February 1986 when North said he had found a way to fund the contras with profits from the arms sales to Iran. At the time the rebels were running out of the $27 million in humanitarian aid the U.S. had granted them in 1985. Poindexter saw the diversion scheme as a way of providing "bridge financing" for the contras while the Administration struggled to persuade Congress to approve a $100 million aid package. "I thought it was a neat idea too," Poindexter said, echoing North's description of the deal.

Poindexter recognized that the diversion would be as controversial as it was neat. Thus, he said, he approved it without informing Reagan, in order to "provide some future deniability for the President if it ever leaked out." Poindexter argued that in authorizing the deal he was not making policy; he was only carrying out Reagan's established objectives. "My role was to make sure that his policies were implemented," said Poindexter. "In this case, the policy was very clear, and that was to support the contras." After working in the White House since June 1981, he said, "I was convinced that I understood the President's thinking on this."

Poindexter contended that during daily briefings he reported to Reagan "in general terms" on the status of the contras. He said he told the President of North's "instrumental" role in helping sustain the rebels, filling Reagan in on the secret airstrip built in Costa Rica by North's contra resupply network. The admiral said that while the President knew the rebels were being supported by private donations and contributions from third countries, he never asked where precisely the money was coming from. "The President . . . is not a man for great detail," said Poindexter, inadvertently provoking chuckles from the audience.

Poindexter insisted that he never discussed the diversion with any Administration official other than North. The admiral said he refrained from talking about the scheme with Casey -- even though the CIA had been deeply involved in previous contra activities. His rationale was that Casey often had to testify before the congressional intelligence-oversight committees and Poindexter did not want him to have to lie. North, however, told the Iran- contra committees that Casey knew all about the diversion.

Though Poindexter had the gumption to authorize the diversion, he seemed not to want to know too much about the deals: he testified that he never asked North how much money was being diverted to the contras; the admiral, known for his attention to detail, said he was not concerned with such bits of "micro- management."

Poindexter said he cautioned North against putting any information about contra support on paper. Nevertheless, North testified that he sent Poindexter five memorandums, each outlining the details of a specific transfer of arms proceeds to the contras. Each paper recommended briefing the President and seeking his approval of the transaction. North said he never knew if Reagan saw the memos, but he shredded all his copies of the documents when he learned that the arms deals might come to light. One memo, however, escaped the shredder and was discovered by investigators from the Justice Department.

Poindexter not only denied showing Reagan the surviving memo but said he could not recall receiving any diversion memos from North. Under questioning by Liman, Poindexter said that even if North had sent him the memos, he would not have discussed any aspect of the diversion with the President; he had made a "deliberate decision" not to do so.

The first time the admiral could remember seeing the infamous diversion memo at all was when Meese directly confronted him with it last Nov. 24. Poindexter said he promptly offered to resign; on the following day the Attorney General instructed him to do so. Strangely, however, Meese never asked Poindexter who approved the transfer of arms profits to the contras. Nor did White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan question Poindexter about the diversion.

< An incredulous Liman asked the witness why he did not say, "I, Admiral Poindexter, made the decision and did not tell the President of the United States." Poindexter's lame reply: although he gave the notion "a lot of thought," he waited to consult his attorneys. The result, as Senator Rudman pointed out, was "the agony that we've had for the last eight months" as Reagan was battered with questions about his role in the scandal.

At the time of the Meese inquiry, Poindexter said, one of his aides turned up a finding that authorized U.S. facilitation of a November 1985 sale of 18 Hawk antiaircraft missiles from Israel to Iran. Poindexter testified that he watched Reagan sign the document on or about Dec. 5, 1985, his first day as NSC chief. The problem with this finding, said Poindexter, was that it depicted the transaction as a trade of arms for the release of Americans being held hostage in Lebanon. The paper would be superseded in January by a finding that explained the weapons sales and freedom for the hostages as part of a broad initiative to re-establish diplomatic ties between the U.S. and Iran. Poindexter said he had forgotten about the year-old document until his aide handed it to him last Nov. 21. Moments later Poindexter ripped it up and had the scraps incinerated. Explained the admiral: "I simply didn't want this document to see the light of day."

Poindexter was not alone in forgetting the 1985 finding. Last winter Reagan told the Tower commission that he had approved the initial Hawk shipment before the fact. The President later told the board members that he had had no prior awareness of the transaction. Finally, he wrote a note to the Tower board saying, "The simple truth is I don't remember -- period." After Poindexter's disclosure last week, the President still said he does not remember signing the finding.

Many sections of the admiral's testimony were marred by evasive answers, confusion over details and awkward twists of logic. Among Poindexter's other significant revelations:

-- Unlike Robert McFarlane, his predecessor as National Security Adviser, Poindexter said he did not feel that the NSC staff was covered by the Boland amendment, which prohibited assistance to the Nicaraguan rebels by U.S. military or intelligence agencies. Although the NSC directed the contra- resupply network, Poindexter told Congress that his agency was adhering to the letter and spirit of the law. How so? "By keeping the other departments that were covered by the Boland amendment out of the issue."

-- After North successfully convinced members of the House Intelligence Committee that he was not involved in covert support for the contras in 1986, Poindexter sent his aide a computer message saying, "Well done." House Counsel John Nields asked Poindexter last week if he had authorized North to lie to Congress. The admiral replied that he did not instruct North to lie, only to "withhold information."

-- North testified that Director Casey had hoped to use some of the profits from the Iran arms sales to set up a secret account to finance covert operations without congressional oversight. Poindexter said he had never heard such a plan discussed "in that depth." He added, "It's an idea that has some attractive features in my mind."

The vigorous, outspoken North had provided a stark contrast to his seemingly unflappable NSC boss during his six days of sometimes impassioned testimony. By the time North left the witness chair last Tuesday, he had been transformed into an international celebrity. But in his final hours on the stand, the Marine who had offered the committee lengthy discourses on patriotism and geopolitics got a dose of his own medicine. Most of the 26 panel members lectured North on his flawed view of democracy and the significance of the scandal. Senator William Cohen, a Maine Republican, criticized the colonel and his associates for attempting to act on a contra policy that did not have the support of most Americans. "A democracy demands not only that the rights of the minority be respected," said Cohen, "but that the rules of the majority be respected. And that's true even if you and I believe the majority is wrong."

Indiana Democrat Lee Hamilton, chairman of the House panel and a widely respected student of foreign affairs, summed up the serious implications of the scandal with special eloquence. "I am impressed that policy was driven by a series of lies," said Hamilton in a soft, steady baritone. "Lies to the Iranians, lies to the CIA, lies to the Attorney General, lies to our friends and allies, lies to the Congress and lies to the American people." Hamilton reminded North of one of Thomas Jefferson's credos: "The whole art of government consists in the art of being honest."

Poindexter's testimony revealed even more layers of deceptions obscuring what really happened in the tortuous Iran-contra affair. After the admiral's dubious story, members of the investigation may suspect that they will never hear the full truth about the scandal.

CHART: TEXT NOT AVAILABLE

CREDIT: TIME Chart by Nigel Holmes

CAPTION: POINTING THE FINGER

The chain of command in the Iran-contra affair ran from Oliver North, who served as a National Security Council aide, through the National Security Adviser (first Robert McFarlane and then John Poindexter), to the President. Here, in paraphrase, is where the four stand in taking responsibility for key actions.

DESCRIPTION: Photos of Ronald Reagan, Oliver North, John Poindexter and Robert McFarlane, with color bars showing their statements on trading arms for hostages; the diversion; arming the contras; the cover-up.

With reporting by Michael Duffy and Hays Gorey/ Washington