A Promising Soviet Ploy

By BRUCE VAN VOORST

For weeks the Reagan Administration has been complaining that Soviet foot dragging at the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) talks in Geneva reduced the odds for an agreement and for a U.S.-Soviet summit before the end of the year. But last week, in the latest in a series of unpredictable diplomatic maneuvers that began at the Reykjavik summit, Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev made another surprise shift on arms control that could get the stagnant talks moving -- and reap new propaganda victories for the Kremlin.

Gorbachev's ploy: agreeing to accept a long-standing American preference for the elimination by both sides of all intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in Asia as well as Europe. Ironically, that arrangement -- known in the arcane lingo of arms control as "global double zero" -- was first put forward by U.S. negotiators six years ago.

Gorbachev used what seemed to be an unlikely medium to unveil his ploy: an Indonesian newspaper, to which he granted an interview. Gorbachev's offer effectively removed one of the last major U.S. conditions for an INF agreement covering not only intermediate-range missiles (with a range of 600 to 3,500 miles) but shorter-range missiles (300 to 600 miles) as well. Until last week Moscow had been willing to agree only to eliminate intermediate- and shorter- range missiles from Europe while insisting on retaining 100 intermediate- range SS-20 missiles in Asia. In return the U.S. would have been allowed to deploy 100 intermediate-range Pershing IIs in Alaska.

At first blush Gorbachev's latest offer seemed to be a major concession to the U.S. But the fine print contained some troubling details. The Soviets still insist that any INF elimination of shorter-range ballistic missiles must apply to 72 aging German-owned Pershing IAs now deployed in West Germany. Because West Germany is barred from having nuclear weapons, these missiles are tipped with U.S.-controlled nuclear warheads. To go along with Gorbachev's proposal, the U.S. would have to scuttle plans to replace the obsolescent Pershing IAs with more capable, shorter-range versions of the Pershing II. The conversion plan is extremely controversial in West Germany, however, and Chancellor Helmut Kohl may yet find it easier simply to retain the Pershing IAs, a solution that might be acceptable to the Soviets.

Despite their misgivings about the proposal, U.S. officials believe Gorbachev's offer could prove the basis for an eventual compromise if tricky disputes over on-site inspection of nuclear facilities, including virtually ) unannounced visits to operational centers, can be resolved. As National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci put it, "If they mean what they say, it has removed something of a major obstacle." One thing the U.S. will insist upon is "conversion" rights, allowing the redeployment of cruise missiles from bases in Europe to warships in the Atlantic.

Gorbachev's proposal, which could clear the way for a much delayed meeting between Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze that would serve as a walk-up to a summit in the U.S. later this year, showed an exquisite sense of timing and an appreciation for U.S. politics. The Soviets were evidently waiting to judge the impact of the Iran- contra hearings on the stature of both Reagan and Shultz. Apparently the Soviets are now eager to reach agreement with a President who, though wounded, can command enough support from Senate conservatives to ratify an INF accord. Once again Mikhail Gorbachev has demonstrated that in the world of geopolitical public relations, he is a master at making the most of other people's ideas.

With reporting by James O. Jackson/Moscow and Christopher Redman/Paris