Ignoring Both Carrot and Stick

By William R. Doerner

When the U.S. Congress voted to impose economic sanctions on South Africa last October, overriding President Reagan's veto in the process, legislators in effect wrote two lists. One enumerated U.S. policy goals for South Africa, including the freeing of political prisoners, repeal of key laws enforcing racial apartheid, and entering into negotiation with legitimate representatives of the country's black majority. The other spelled out areas of trade and finance that would no longer be permitted until those goals were attained, including new U.S. investments in South Africa and the importation of that country's agricultural products, coal, iron, uranium, textiles and military equipment. The clear intent was to give Pretoria a choice: either make major changes in a repugnant social policy or suffer painful economic consequences for not doing so.

As the first anniversary of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 approaches, South Africa's white minority has neither chosen the carrot nor suffered the stick. The government of State President P.W. Botha has undertaken none of the political changes specified in the act, sticking instead to its own long-scheduled list of minor reforms. South Africa's economy, meanwhile, though limping in spots, has not endured any major setbacks as the result of either U.S. sanctions or similar punitive measures that have been imposed by 27 other countries. Says Helen Suzman, a staunchly antiapartheid member of South Africa's Parliament, of the overall results of sanctions: "I don't see any positive effects on the pace of change."

Sanctions have not, however, been wholly toothless. South Africa's economy, which has been in recession for the past five years, is expected to grow this year by 2% to 3%, a rate that one State Department analyst estimates to be perhaps one percentage point lower than if sanctions had not been imposed. South African exports to the European Community in the first quarter of 1987 plunged 33% below those of the same period last year, and the first half's decline in shipments to the U.S. came to a hefty 45%.

But large chunks of South Africa's vital export economy have proved to be relatively invulnerable to punitive measures. That has much to do with the glitter of gold, which accounts for more than half of the country's $22 billion in foreign earnings expected this year, up 3% from 1986. Paradoxically, even though gold shipments are not banned by most sanction imposers, including the U.S., world jitters about South African political turmoil have helped boost the price of gold over the past two years, from $280 per oz. to a current level of $463. Even producers of some banned commodities have found ways to beat the rules. Many South African fishermen, for example, have reregistered their ships in the Cayman Islands, enabling them legally to ship South African lobster tails to the U.S. as Cayman produce.

Politically, South African leaders maintain that sanctions have, if anything, proved counterproductive to the aspirations of apartheid's foes. Says David Steward, head of the government's Bureau for Information: "If it is truly the U.S. aim to bring about change in South Africa -- supposing for one moment that the U.S. has any right to interfere in our affairs -- sanctions are the worst possible way of trying to achieve this end." That argument is, of course, self-serving. But the government strummed loudly on the sanctions issue during South Africa's parliamentary election campaign earlier this year. Voter resentment over the measures not only helped keep Botha's National Party in power but also propelled the even more reactionary Conservative Party into second place -- and status as the official opposition -- sending Suzman's liberal Progressive Federal Party into the wilderness.

As a result, Botha has come under little pressure to broaden the modest reforms that he began in 1985. Within the past three weeks, Botha has unveiled the last two such measures on his list: an amendment that would give the country's strictly segregated communities the local option of admitting residents of more than one race, and a plan to form a multiracial National Council to consult on the outline of a new constitution. Both proposals have been rejected as tokenism by black antiapartheid groups.

One of the most telling signs that sanctions against South Africa have not even begun to prove effective is that many black organizations that originally supported them have begun to change their position. To be sure, most such groups would firmly deny that they are retreating from the goal of punishing South Africa economically for its support of apartheid. For example, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the country's largest labor federation, has called for even stronger "comprehensive" sanctions that would include a total embargo on trade, investment and travel involving South Africa. COSATU's rethinking on sanctions, however, is less remarkable for that unrealistic idea than for its frank conclusion that the current "selective sanctions" can have "serious negative consequences" for workers. That, after all, is an argument long employed by opponents of such measures.

The U.S. debate on sanctions is likely to be rekindled this week, when the State Department is scheduled to release its first annual review assessing the measures' effectiveness. In view of the Administration's past record, few expect the report to call for making current U.S. punitive actions any tougher, even if it deems the current sanctions completely unsuccessful. But there is little sentiment in Congress to abandon after only one year a program that passed amid bitter debate and provided at least the appearance that the U.S. was doing something about apartheid.

With reporting by Bruce W. Nelan/Johannesburg