Nicaragua Oh, Brother -- Not Again!

By Jill Smolowe

Some things never change. Every year Ronald Reagan petitions a resistant Congress for renewed aid to the contra rebels. And every year, as the vote nears, Nicaragua's Sandinista leaders make a blunder that puts Reagan's request over the top. In 1985 Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega Saavedra jetted off to Moscow four days after a $14 million contra-aid measure had been rejected; chastened by what looked like a deliberate slap in the face, Congress reversed itself and okayed a $27 million package. The next year a Sandinista attack on contra bases inside Honduras persuaded Congress to approve $100 million. This year may be no different. A Central American peace pact should have ensured congressional rejection of new contra funds. But last week both Ortega and his younger brother, Defense Minister Humberto Ortega, delivered speeches that defied the spirit of the peace plan. Now renewed contra aid seems far more likely to be approved.

The latest Sandinista stumble began last weekend, after Managua learned that the U.S. press would carry the damning charges of a recent Nicaraguan defector, Major Roger Miranda Bengoechea, who had occupied a top post in the Defense Ministry. Hoping to pre-empt Miranda's charges of a planned military buildup, Humberto Ortega delivered a powerful speech reaffirming Sandinista plans to arm up to 600,000 Nicaraguans and obtain Soviet MiG-21 jet fighters by 1995. Unflinchingly defiant toward the U.S., Humberto thundered, "We do not need to hide our relations with the socialist camp in defense matters!"

Daniel apparently had second thoughts. The next day he told U.S. reporters that the military plans were only a "proposal" and painted instead a picture of a Swiss-style large reserve army. But Ortega was trying to have it both ways. While aiming to soothe Washington, he was playing to audiences at home, where both Miranda's charges and peace talks with the contras threaten to weaken Sandinista support. In a speech the same day, Ortega warned that if the Sandinistas lost an election they would step down but would lead an insurrection if they disagreed with the new government's policies. Ortega warned the opposition parties to watch their step. If the opposition gets too cozy with the contras, he threatened, "the people can lose their patience very quickly."

Other undemocratic soundings emanated from Managua. After learning that Ortega planned to ask the Supreme Court to step down, three of the seven members resigned last week, citing the government's failure to abide by the tribunal's rulings. They found particularly galling a case in which Agrarian Reform Minister Jaime Wheelock was ordered to return a large farm to its former owner; he has not yet complied. After asking the rest of the members to resign, Ortega packed the court with his supporters. A national dialogue also collapsed last week after 14 opposition parties walked out, charging that the government had not responded to their proposals for constitutional reform. The events dulled the impact of Ortega's promise to observe a two-day Christmas truce and to send "technical advisers" to participate this week in direct talks with the contras.

In Washington the House of Representatives seemed inclined to provide some contra funding, following the Senate's approval two weeks ago of $16 million in nonmilitary aid. Even House Speaker Jim Wright, a promoter of the regional peace plan, found Humberto Ortega's speech "outrageous and counter- productive." Meanwhile, Miranda's Administration handlers took him to Capitol Hill to meet with congressional opponents of contra aid; most came away reasonably convinced of the major's credibility. Earlier, questions had arisen about Miranda's veracity. During his interrogation by U.S. intelligence agencies, he reportedly had problems passing a lie-detector test. Moreover, a senior Pentagon official admitted that aspects of Miranda's testimony were "speculative." But Humberto Ortega's speech confirming Nicaraguan plans for a military buildup convinced most officials that Miranda's testimony was largely on track.

Reagan's propaganda victory was tarnished by other awkward questions. Why were Miranda's charges not made public before the Reagan-Gorbachev summit? Was it mere coincidence that his first meeting with journalists got under way only as the summit was drawing to an end? Various theories circulated: the Administration was afraid that Miranda's accusations might upset the goodwill summit; Gorbachev would undermine the impact of the charges by denying them; the Miranda weapon was intended solely for contra-aid purposes. There was also the possibility that Reagan had not yet been briefed about what Miranda would be saying.

That still left unexplained why Reagan had not pursued a vague offer from Gorbachev to stop arming the Sandinistas. The proposal came during a private & eleven-minute walk around the grounds of the White House. As recounted last week by Reagan, Gorbachev expressed a willingness to withhold all military aid from the Sandinistas except for "some small arms, police-type weapons." Asked by reporters why he hadn't seized upon the offer, Reagan replied, "This is a subject we are going to be discussing for some time."

In Moscow Soviet officials called Reagan's account "at odds with reality." Foreign Ministry Spokesman Boris Pyadyshev said Gorbachev's offer had referred to all of Central America and that it provided for "reciprocal Soviet and American pledges to refrain from deliveries of weapons." That account closely matched a version given earlier in the week by Reagan's chief of staff, Howard Baker. U.S. officials made it clear that they found Gorbachev's offer unattractive and would not abandon their friends in the region. Translation: superpower involvement in Central America is not going to end anytime soon.

With reporting by Ricardo Chavira/Washington and John Moody/Mexico City