Central America Contra Countdown

By Jill Smolowe

Suddenly, the Sandinistas were on the offensive, lobbing peace grenades in the general direction of Washington. A Nicaraguan government delegation showed up in Costa Rica a full week ahead of schedule for face-to-face talks with the U.S.-backed contras. When the rebel leaders dismissed the offer as a publicity stunt and refused to begin talks prematurely, the Sandinistas hurled another surprise. They called for an international commission to monitor Nicaragua's compliance with a Central American peace plan. The panel would include not only representatives from the Organization of American States, Socialist International and the United Nations but also members of the U.S. Democratic and Republican parties.

But the Reagan Administration was determined not to be outflanked yet again by the Sandinistas on the battlefield of public opinion. In a White House speech to supporters last week, Ronald Reagan sounded a familiar theme, arguing that continued contra pressure is needed to ensure that the Sandinistas keep their word. "We must make sure that each time the Sandinistas walk through a new door toward democracy, we close it behind them -- and keep it closed," Reagan declared. "Only the freedom fighters can do that." Despite recent Nicaraguan concessions, including a bow to Washington's long sought demand that the Sandinistas talk directly to the contras, Reagan charged that the Sandinistas had not made "good faith efforts" to achieve peace.

The intense maneuvering in Washington and Managua could mean just one thing: another congressional vote on contra aid was at hand. But this vote, scheduled for next week, promises to be different. Seven years after first requesting money for the rebels and making the contras a cornerstone of his foreign policy, Reagan may be facing his final showdown over the fate of those he once likened to the Founding Fathers. Administration officials maintain that there are only enough military supplies in the pipeline to sustain the rebels through February. If the vote is no, Reagan will not be able to provide new funds until October, dangerously close to the end of his term, when his influence will be minimal. "If Congress votes down aid this time," Reagan warned last week, "the decision may well be irrevocable." If the vote is yes, it may kill the Central American peace plan that has won a Nobel Prize for Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez but that is quickly running out of deadlines. Says Republican Representative Henry Hyde of Illinois: "It's going to be a very emotional, very bloody debate."

At the heart of that debate is the question of whether the Sandinistas can be trusted. A skeptical White House dismisses Sandinista concessions as cosmetic and insincere. "Each step they have taken, each reluctant reform, is still easily undone," Reagan insisted. Democratic Senator Christopher Dodd of Connecticut challenged that view. "Every time the Sandinistas make a concession, the White House sees it as a major setback," he charged last week. White House Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater delivered a sharp rebuttal. "The Democrats, Chris Dodd and others, they want a surrender, and they think surrender is the best way to achieve peace. We disagree."

The outcome is too close to call, and some Washington officials point out that previous votes were also accompanied by dire predictions about the fate of peace in the region. But Republicans and Democrats agree that much will depend on Ortega's performance over the next few days. Two weeks ago, in an eleventh hour attempt to keep a five-month-old Central American peace process alive, Ortega offered several striking concessions, among them promises to lift Nicaragua's state of emergency and to hold direct talks with the guerrillas. Last week he moved to honor those pledges, restoring civil liberties, disbanding an unpopular ad hoc court system and inviting the rebels for face-to-face negotiations. But the coincidental arrest in Nicaragua of five opposition leaders and hints that tough measures might follow approval of new contra aid strengthened suspicions about Ortega's motives. "All the Sandinistas care about now is stopping that aid," says an opposition leader in Nicaragua. "They will withdraw their concessions as soon as they have achieved this."

Certainly, Ortega has used well-timed gestures in the past to sway Congress. Shortly after the Reagan Administration made known its intent last September to seek $270 million in contra funding, Ortega went on a public-relations offensive. He announced the reopening of two opposition news outlets, the newspaper La Prensa and Radio Catolica, and pardoned 16 jailed rebel sympathizers. Sensing defeat, the U.S. Administration scaled back its request to just $30 million. Still, Ortega pressed on. He agreed to indirect talks with the contras and designated Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo as the mediator. In the end, Congress granted only $14.4 million.

Ortega is not letting up as the Reagan Administration presses its current campaign. His proposal last week for an international commission that would include members of the U.S. political parties was coupled with an offer to ( permit the contras to continue receiving humanitarian aid from the U.S. and other foreign sources. By offering the U.S. a role as both guarantor and benefactor in postwar Nicaragua, Ortega seems to be playing to a pet theme of the President's that Reagan has applied to arms treaties with the Soviets: trust, but verify.

Ortega's shrewd diplomacy has already had considerable impact on the pending aid vote. Just a month ago, the Reagan Administration still planned to request $270 million in contra funds, much of it to be designated as military aid. Last week, however, Fitzwater conceded that the "$270 million figure has been overtaken by events." After several days of discussions, the White House decided to ask this week for less than $50 million, with only 10% earmarked for lethal purposes. But Capitol Hill buzzed with proposals to postpone the aid vote. Among those championing a delay was Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole. A strong supporter of Reagan's contra policy who once called Ortega a "ringmaster of repression," Dole cautioned last week that there were not enough votes to assure new aid.

The turn of events has left Reagan feeling bruised. Once again, his determined support for the contras has produced congressional charges that his real agenda is a military victory at any cost. Pointing to recent Sandinista concessions, a senior White House official said last week, "I'm afraid the Administration has not done a good job in pointing out that we've been in the vanguard of making these proposals and urging these results." As happened during the U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations that led to last December's treaty, the White House is coming out second best on the public-relations front. Like Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Ortega has learned to curry international favor by responding to U.S. demands with the answer least expected by the White House: yes.

Also like Gorbachev, Ortega has found that his triumphs abroad can be offset by pressures back home. In Managua, it did not escape notice that Ortega had forsaken once immutable Sandinista positions, most notably a pledge that they would never negotiate with the contras, whom they refer to as U.S. puppets. After Ortega announced the talks, La Prensa's headline read SANDINISTAS SURRENDER. That theme was echoed in the streets and at the markets. "We have been going backward ever since the Sandinistas came to power," said Rosario Arroliga Quintanilla as she shooed flies from the filets of pork displayed at * her small stand at Managua's Oriental market. "Now they are surrendering everything they have always said they would never surrender."

It may be that some members of the nine-member Sandinista directorate feel the same way. Since the five Central American Presidents signed Arias' peace pact last August, every conciliatory gesture made by Ortega in the international arena has been followed quickly by a harsh gesture at home that reminds the internal opposition not to push the limits of reform too fast. And each time the boot came down, rumors flew that the moderate and hard-line comandantes were in deep disagreement. Last week brought new evidence of strains. As Ortega decreed an end to the state of emergency, five more opposition members were arrested, bringing to twelve the number detained and released in the past two weeks. The arrests may have embarrassed and undercut Ortega, and were said to be the work of one of the directorate's toughest ideologues, Interior Minister Tomas Borge.

If the arrests were intended as a warning shot over Ortega's head, they apparently worked. The note of compromise that Ortega struck in San Jose two weeks ago while meeting with the peace plan signatories quickly evaporated when he returned home. During a visit last week to Ciudad Dario, a town north of Managua, he warned that if contra aid was approved, the Nicaraguan government would gain a "free hand to take necessary measures to defend the sovereignty, self-determination and independence of our country." The implication was that even a single additional cent of aid would provoke the Sandinistas to withdraw some, if not all, of their concessions. The hard truth is that Nicaragua's economy cannot withstand much more battering by the contras. Fuel shortages, coupled with contra attacks on installations, have forced the government to implement daily blackouts of up to ten hours a day.

If Ortega can sound inconsistent, so too can the contra leaders. For years the rebels and their U.S. backers have noisily demanded face-to-face negotiations with the Sandinistas. Now that the Sandinistas have agreed to such a meeting, the contras are assuming a tougher posture. "If Ortega wants to dialogue, he should come here himself," said Rebel Leader Aristides Sanchez last week before the contras rebuffed Nicaragua's invitation for early talks.

Scheduled to begin the negotiations this week, the rebels may demand that the meeting be put off until after Feb. 6, when Cardinal Obando is expected to % return from a just announced trip to Rome. The contras may also insist that Nicaragua's internal opposition participate or require that the negotiations include political matters. The guerrillas are reluctant to hammer out a cease- fire just as the aid vote is coming due. But they risk appearing uninterested in peace at a time when the Sandinistas are making a point of their eagerness to negotiate.

This week, as the showdown on Capitol Hill approaches, the Administration is expected to escalate its own public-relations offensive. Reagan plans to make a fervent appeal for contra aid during his State of the Union address, then lobby the few dozen legislators who have not yet made up their minds. Secretary of State George Shultz and Lieut. General Colin Powell, the National Security Adviser, will also be deployed to the Hill to rally forces. Marvels Democratic Congressman Lee Hamilton of Ohio, an opponent of rebel aid: "There's an intensity there that is lacking on other issues."

Senior White House aides have begun to acknowledge that the Sandinistas deserve partial credit for their proposals, but they quickly contend that more needs to be done. "I think progress is being made," said a high-ranking assistant. "Not enough progress, but there is movement." Administration officials insist that Reagan is willing to stop military assistance as soon as the Sandinistas and the contras negotiate a cease-fire, but even if that were to happen, the President is not likely ever to trust the Sandinistas. After seven years, countless speeches and millions in aid, Ronald Reagan's dedication to the contras remains undiminished. In the battle over rebel aid, Reagan is determined to fight on, even if the smell of peace is in the air.

With reporting by John Moody/San Jose and Barrett Seaman/Washington