East-West Questions About Doctrine

By William R. Doerner

Raising his glass to propose a toast, U.S. Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci observed that the Swiss city of Bern was an appropriate setting for the round of talks about to get under way because it was the "capital of the capital of peace." The observation was tinged with some irony, since Carlucci and his partner in discussion, General Dmitri Yazov, the Soviet Defense Minister, are responsible for the world's two most powerful military machines. Yet at the end of their three-day meeting last week, the first full working meeting ever between U.S. and Soviet defense chiefs, both men agreed that the experiment had proved worthwhile. It was never intended to be a negotiation session for achieving breakthroughs. Said Carlucci: "The purpose is to start a military- to-military dialogue."

One reason for Carlucci's participation in this dialogue was his interest in forming a judgment on a matter of fundamental concern to U.S. defense planners: whether the Soviet Union's basic military doctrine is evolving from an offensive to a defensive orientation. The possibility of such a change was first noted by some U.S. military scholars about two years ago.

Since at least World War II, Soviet doctrine has placed extraordinary emphasis on offense, specifically on the use of massive tank and artillery formations as well as swift-moving mechanized infantry units. The theory was born partly out of the determination never again to have to fight a war on home soil. While a switch to a defensive strategy could simply signify a shift of resources, with more being devoted to protection against attack, it might also mean that Moscow is determined to reduce overall military expenditures, perhaps as part of Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev's drive to speed up development of the civilian economy.

U.S. experts who believe that a doctrinal change is in the works contend that since 1986, Soviet analysts have largely ceased calling for military "superiority" and instead use such terms as "parity" and "reasonable sufficiency." Other American experts deny that change is in the air. ) Summarizing that view, Harriet Fast Scott, an author and Government consultant on Soviet military affairs, says, "Reasonable sufficiency means whatever you want it to mean."

During the Bern meetings, Yazov noted repeatedly that Soviet military doctrine was undergoing revisions but that it would take some time before the changes were reflected in defense exercises. Yet he signaled that the evolution was incomplete and would depend not on unilateral Soviet initiatives but on mutually negotiated reductions of forces by both superpowers. While not prepared to dismiss Moscow's claims of a doctrinal shift, Carlucci concluded that the practical challenges facing the West from the Soviets remain undiminished. "There has been no change in their force structure or their strategic modernization program," he said. "We need to keep our eyes open and look for those indicators, but in the meantime it behooves us to continue with our current NATO policies."

In small steps toward better relations, the two sides announced they would upgrade contacts at the level of embassy military attaches and war-college instructors. Such contacts have been restricted by the U.S. since the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Yazov agreed to study U.S. proposals aimed at preventing incidents like the fatal shooting in 1985 of Major Arthur Nicholson, a member of the U.S. military liaison mission observer team in East Germany, by a Soviet soldier. The U.S. promised to study experimental Soviet sensing technology for verifying the presence of nuclear missiles aboard warships. Another sign that "the dialogue is improving," as a Carlucci aide put it, was the agreement to hold further high-level defense meetings later this year. Soviet military Chief of Staff Sergei Akhromeyev will visit Washington, and Carlucci may go to Moscow.

With reporting by Jay Peterzell/Bern