Blaming Men, Not Machines

By Richard M. Cohen

Navy brass had feared for weeks that the tragedy of Iran Air 655 would claim another victim: the controversial Aegis system aboard the U.S.S. Vincennes. How could that complex network of radar and computers have mistaken a civilian airliner for an attacking fighter plane? But when the fragmentary results of Rear Admiral William Fogarty's investigation leaked last week, blame fell not on the machines but on the men who were operating them. Under the pressure of combat, Pentagon sources say, the overwrought sailors on the Vincennes misread the radar data about the oncoming Airbus and passed faulty information to Captain Will Rogers III. He then ordered the launching of the two missiles that destroyed the plane, killing all 290 aboard.

Fogarty's 70-page report, which must still be reviewed by Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman William Crowe and Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, contradicts key elements of what Admiral Crowe told the public about the shootdown shortly after it occurred on July 3. Crowe announced that the Aegis system had tracked the incoming "hostile" aircraft as traveling at 520 m.p.h., flying at 7,500 ft. and descending in a threatening path toward the U.S. warship. But the Aegis data reportedly showed the Airbus flying at about 400 m.p.h. at 12,000 ft. and climbing.

The psychological stress of combat on the Vincennes' sailors led to the misreadings, Fogarty's investigation concluded. The cruiser had been on Persian Gulf duty only since late May, and its crew got its first taste of battle the morning of July 3. The ship had just skirmished with Iranian gunboats when the Airbus was spotted, and all hands were already on alert because of intelligence warnings of a possible Iranian terrorist attack over the July 4 weekend. According to the Washington Post, agitated crew members even fumbled the complex firing sequence several times before launching the missiles.

Yet more than a few Washington cynics speculated that the "human error" leak was an attempt to head off criticism of the Aegis system, the defensive backbone of the Navy's 14 carrier battle groups. Critics charge that Aegis, which can monitor hundreds of targets at a time, has never been adequately tested and is better suited to the open ocean than to the crowded gulf. "The Navy has to protect the Aegis," said a congressional staff aide. "If Aegis doesn't work, the carrier groups can't survive."

The leaks left important questions unanswered. Among the most critical is whether the Vincennes actually received a signal from the doomed aircraft identifying itself as an F-14 fighter. A series of such coded responses was allegedly a crucial factor in Rogers' decision to fire. Sources say the Fogarty report suggests the signals came from a C-130 transport at the Bandar Abbas airport some 60 miles away. But the C-130 signal differs from that of an F-14.

As the accounts of the Fogarty investigation were circulating, a congressional committee led by Wisconsin Democrat Les Aspin held hearings on the Administration's proposal to pay compensation to the relatives of the Airbus casualties. Few Congressmen seemed sympathetic to the idea. "People ask why should we pay the victims of this tragedy," noted Aspin, "when Iran still holds ((U.S.)) hostages and has never paid any of the victims of its policies." State Department Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer reminded the committee that Ronald Reagan had endorsed the decision to fire on Iran Air 655 as "justifiable defensive actions." But after the succession of mistakes reported on the Vincennes, that justification seemed considerably shakier.

With reporting by Bruce van Voorst/Washington