Middle East Goodbye to All That

By Jill Smolowe

For weeks, King Hussein agonized over his decision. He ordered up secret studies to assess the consequences, but still he hesitated. Finally, in mid- July, he made up his mind. Even the few remaining skeptics in his Cabinet had become convinced that action must be taken. As a courtesy, Hussein advised Washington several days in advance that an announcement would be forthcoming.

Then at 8 p.m. on a Sunday evening, Hussein, sitting beneath a portrait of Sharif Hussein, his great-grandfather, went on Jordanian television. Calmly he informed his 3.6 million countrymen that in response to the wishes of both the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Arab states, he was "dismantling the legal and administrative links" between Jordan and the Israeli-occupied West Bank.

The announcement struck like an earth tremor, disrupting the status quo in the West Bank and scrambling the assumptions that have underlain talk of an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. In Baghdad P.L.O. Chairman Yasser Arafat met late into the night with his advisers; he then imposed a blackout on all official comment and called a meeting of the 451-member Palestine National Council, the P.L.O.'s top decision-making body, later this month to take measure of the King's maneuver. In Jerusalem officials at first brushed off Hussein's announcement, but the Knesset scheduled a special session to discuss the matter. In Washington some officials expressed the belief that Hussein's move killed the already faint hopes for a regional peace plan outlined by Secretary of State George Shultz earlier this year. Others suggested that the King's action might ultimately achieve quite the opposite, namely, produce momentum for a settlement. State Department Spokeswoman Phyllis Oakley captured the confusion by saying, "No jumping to conclusions -- not even inching to conclusions."

In the days after his speech, Hussein maintained a calculated silence, never explaining precisely how far he plans to go toward severing ties with the 800,000 Palestinians who live in the West Bank. Initial speculation centered on the possibility that the King intended to relinquish Jordan's historical / connection to the West Bank, an area that Amman formally ruled from 1950 until 1967, when Israel seized the territory during the Six-Day War. But Hussein insisted in his speech that he was not abandoning the Palestinian cause. His more likely aim: to lay down a challenge to the P.L.O., which has long demanded total control of the West Bank. Should the P.L.O. fail to administrate effectively or to progress toward peace, Hussein in no way foreclosed a future role for Jordan. "It's the put-up-or-shut-up approach," said a Western diplomat in Amman.

Whether the King dealt from strength or frustration, his move was the logical culmination of a series of disappointments. Through the eight months of the Palestinian intifadeh, or uprising, Hussein has found Jordan's role and influence steadily diminished in the West Bank. While the King has a keen interest in easing the living conditions for West Bank Palestinians, fellow leaders in the Arab world have persistently refused to recognize his efforts. Jordan's financial and political efforts on behalf of the West Bank have provoked Arab criticism that the King is trying to usurp the P.L.O.'s role. Hussein's attempts to promote the U.S.-sponsored peace plan have met with angry charges that he intends to speak for the Palestinians. "Our efforts are misconstrued as competition," he said plaintively at the Arab summit in Algiers last June.

If Hussein's patience was already strained, the summit in Algiers pushed it to the snapping point. During the three-day meeting, Hussein, whose government spends up to $70 million annually on administration in the West Bank, appealed to Arab leaders to honor past financial commitments, as well as new ones, to both the P.L.O. and Jordan. He was turned down on both counts. Instead, the summiteers voted to pay the P.L.O. $128 million directly to defray the costs of the intifadeh so far, plus $43 million a month to keep the uprising alive. (Not a dinar of that pledge has so far reached the P.L.O.) At the same time, the Arab leaders reiterated their 1974 position that the P.L.O. was the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people.

Hussein's frustration also extends to the U.S. and Israel. When Washington renewed its attempts last March to broker a settlement in the Middle East, Hussein, unlike some of his Arab brethren, attempted to promote the initiative. At the Reagan Administration's bidding, he approached the P.L.O. with the notion of forming a joint delegation for future negotiations. But . Hussein received little support from Washington, which declined to press Israel to accept a land-for-peace exchange. Says Robert Neumann, a former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia: "Hussein finally got disgusted with the American efforts to use him."

Israel, meanwhile, refused to make the slightest concession to help smooth the way toward an international peace conference sought by Hussein and other Arab leaders. At least one comment in Hussein's speech last week was aimed directly at Israeli hawks. "Jordan is not Palestine," the King noted. Many Israeli rightists, hardened by the turmoil of the intifadeh, have come to support the view promoted by former Defense Minister Ariel Sharon that Jordan should be the Palestinian homeland and that the West Bank should be annexed by Israel. If large numbers of Palestinians from the West Bank were forced into Jordan, where the population is already almost two-thirds Palestinian, Sharon's vision might become Hussein's reality.

Hussein's bitter gambit may be an attempt to force a recognition of his central role in the peace process. It would be a vindication for the King if Arafat fails to live up to the responsibilities thrust upon him and is compelled by his constituency to return -- kaffiyeh in hand -- to plead for help from the King. "Behind Hussein's action is his conviction that Arafat won't be able to pull it off," says Joseph Sisco, former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Near East Affairs.

It is difficult to assess how heavy the P.L.O.'s new burden will be. While agreeing to sever Jordan's links with the West Bank, Hussein remained studiously vague in his speech about the concrete steps he intends to take. Just before his speech, the King terminated a five-year $1.3 billion development program for the West Bank and dissolved Jordan's 60-member lower house of parliament, half of whose members represent West Bankers. Both steps were more symbolic than significant.

Four days later, however, Jordan announced that it was laying off or retiring 21,000 West Bank civil employees, including teachers, health, and utilities workers. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir responded that Israel would block the P.L.O. from assuming those responsibilities. Jordanian officials said there were no plans to revoke the Jordanian passports held by 750,000 West Bank Palestinians or to close the two bridges that link Jordan and the West Bank.

In the West Bank, some Palestinians regard Hussein's withdrawal as a positive step toward some form of Palestinian statehood, and believe the moment is right for the P.L.O. to create a government-in-exile in the occupied territories. Others are less sanguine. On Saturday, Israeli television reported that authorities had seized an embryonic "declaration of independence" drawn up by Palestinian leaders. Many Palestinians fear that Hussein has opened the door to annexation by Israel.

At an Israeli Cabinet meeting last week, two conservative ministers, including Sharon, spoke in favor of annexation, while Labor ministers warned that an expanded Israel would dangerously tilt the balance of the population in favor of the Arabs. No action is expected before the November election of a Prime Minister, which pits hard-liner Shamir against the more moderate Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. Peres, who accepts the concept of a Jordanian- Palestinian delegation at an international peace conference, insisted last week that Hussein's move was "more of a warning than a practical step." One practical consequence, however, may be that Peres could suffer at the polls.

Shultz, for his part, is loath to pronounce his peace initiative dead. "He ((Hussein)) has to be a partner because Jordan has the longest border with Israel of any state," the Secretary of State said last week. "If there's going to be peace between Israel and its neighbors, then Jordan is involved." Hussein would not disagree; as he said in his speech last week, "Jordan will not give up its commitment to take part in the peace process." By abdicating responsibility for the West Bank, however, Hussein is challenging the U.S., Israel and the P.L.O. to work together toward a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict -- without relying so heavily on him. The question is what it will take to persuade the King to step back into the process, if that is what he has in mind.

With reporting by David S. Jackson/Amman, with other bureaus