Why It Is Time to Talk to the P.L.O.

By WALTER ISAACSON

In the late summer of 1975, after an all-day negotiating session in Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's Jerusalem office, Henry Kissinger approved a midnight addition to an agreement with Israel. The U.S., he pledged, would not "recognize or negotiate with" the Palestine Liberation Organization until the P.L.O. accepted Israel's right to exist. Washington later added another condition, that the P.L.O. renounce terrorism. With the exception of occasional clandestine contacts and the publicized breach that cost Andrew Young his U.N. ambassadorship, the stricture has been U.S. policy ever since.

Rightfully so: there was nothing to gain from dealing with murderous thugs implacably dedicated to Israel's destruction. But now, though the P.L.O. has yet to meet all the conditions that would make it a fit participant in formal peace negotiations, a new approach seems to be warranted. A series of events during the year of the intifadeh makes it in America's interest to engage in talks with the P.L.O., even if they are only exploratory and informal.

-- By producing a highly qualified reference to U.N. Resolution 242 as a basis for negotiations, the Palestine National Council in Algiers last month did little more than obfuscate its position on Israel's right to exist. But ambiguity represents a step in the right direction from the dagger-sharp stance of the past, progress that ought to be encouraged and clarified through diplomatic channels.

-- The intifadeh has served to moderate P.L.O. goals, because the residents of the occupied territories who are involved in the uprising are more willing than exiled Palestinians to accept coexistence with Israel. In addition, the longevity of the intifadeh has underscored the difficulty of continuing to defer the Palestinian question.

-- In the past year, Yasser Arafat has been able to solidify his leadership among those involved in the intifadeh as well as among Palestinians in exile. As a result, the P.L.O. is established more firmly than ever as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Israel can no longer reasonably hope that a group of West Bank or Gaza leaders unaffiliated with the P.L.O. will emerge.

-- Similarly, King Hussein's decision last July to curtail Jordan's role in the West Bank removes for the near future the option of letting Amman act as a reluctant surrogate for the Palestinians.

-- The tacit acceptance of Israel's existence by most of the Arab countries has made a diplomatic settlement more conceivable.

As the Algiers meeting reminded the world, the P.L.O. and its legislative branch, the P.N.C., still contain some ruthless men. A resolution that renounced terrorism in general terms still sanctioned attacks in Israel and the occupied territories; even as it was being adopted, Palestinian commandos with plans to hold a small village hostage were caught infiltrating Israel from Lebanon. The Algiers resolutions were read in front of a map that showed Palestine before Israel was created. And Abul Abbas, the demon of the Achille Lauro, was embraced by Arafat and seated as a member of the P.L.O.'s executive committee; Abul Abbas smirked that Leon Klinghoffer, the 69-year-old American shot in his wheelchair and dumped overboard, "maybe was trying to swim for it."

But those who fought what they considered to be implicit recognition of Israel in the final resolutions were voted down. In an analysis published last week, Bassam Abu Sharif, Arafat's chief spokesman, proclaimed that the result was a declaration that met the conditions set by the U.S. for recognition. "The P.L.O. has officially changed its position from one of total rejection of Israel's right to exist as an exclusively Zionist state to one of full acceptance of Israel," he said.

In fact, that is far from clear. But that is why diplomats were invented: to probe ambiguities, clarify positions, encourage progress. When John Kennedy was confronted with contradictory messages from Nikita Khrushchev during the Cuban missile crisis, he decided to cable his acceptance of the more conciliatory of the two and ignore the other. Faced with differing interpretations and translations of what was decided in Algiers, the U.S. could seize upon the more positive interpretations as the basis for preliminary talks with the P.L.O. The U.S. goal in those discussions: to nudge the P.L.O. into agreeing that it has indeed adopted a "full acceptance of Israel."

A decision to talk directly with the P.L.O. would have to be part of a broader reassessment of the U.S.'s Middle East policy. Certain principles should not change, most notably Washington's basic commitment to the security of Israel. But a crucial part of any sensible policy would be accepting the fact that, like it or not, the P.L.O. is the representative of the Palestinian people. If there is to be a peaceful resolution to the conflict, P.L.O. involvement is required.

By establishing direct contact with Arafat, Washington could help break the logjam blocking mutual recognition between the P.L.O. and Israel. Like most of its Western allies, the U.S. could have dealings with the organization without extending formal recognition. The prerequisites for such recognition, as well as for participation in full-fledged Middle East peace negotiations, should remain the same as they have been since 1975: no matter how painful it may be for Arafat to offer an unqualified acceptance of Israel's right to exist and to renounce all forms of terrorism, these are not unreasonable demands. If he proves unwilling to accept them, the U.S. can always break off contact and, with no apologies, ostracize the P.L.O. once again.

With reporting by Dean Fischer/Cairo and Bruce van Voorst/Washington